

M. Cüneyt Kaya (ed.), *Continuity and Change in Islamic Thought: The Case of Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī [İslam Düşüncesinde Süreklilik ve Değişim: Seyyid Şerif Curcâni Örneği]*, (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2015. 238 pages. ISBN: 078-605-5245-60-3.

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One of the outstanding figures of the second classical age of Islamic thought and the most influential intellectual of the fifteenth century, Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), remained on the periphery of contemporary research in Islamic philosophy and theology. While at first glance the decline thesis dominating the historiography of the post-Gazālian period might seem to be the reason for this phenomenon, another equally influential factor was the negative attitude towards Islamic philosophical theology in the contemporary Muslim world. The new scientific form of theological reasoning whose evolution started with al-Juwaynī's critical method and reached its peak with al-Gazālī and Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī's efforts to build *kalām* as a scientific discipline and eventually gained its final form with al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233), al-Ījī (d. 765/1355), al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1390) and al-Jurjānī was deemed unimportant and considered as a field which needlessly mixed with ancient philosophy by some contemporary Muslim intellectual streams. The book *İslām Düşüncesinde Süreklilik ve Değişim, Seyyid Şerif Cürçânî Örneği [Continuity and Change in Islamic Thought: The Case of Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī]* edited by M. Cüneyt Kaya, which came out as collected papers presented in Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī Workshop convened in 7-8 December 2013 in Bilim Sanat Vakfı Medeniyet Araştırmaları Merkezi [The Foundation for Sciences and Arts, The Center for Civilizational Studies], seems to call for revisiting these approaches in studying al-Jurjānī. In this perspective, the book includes six articles, which aim to show the centrality of theological-philosophical tradition represented by al-Jurjānī in the historiography of Islamic thought and identify the characteristics of al-Jurjānī's approach of *verification (taḥqīq)*.

The first article in the book is Ömer Türker's article titled "Kelâm ve Felsefe Geleneklerinin Kesişim Noktasında Seyyid Şerif Cürçânî" [Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī at the intersection between the traditions of Theology and Philosophy]. In this article Türker argues that the critical methodology for the discipline of Theology, directed the efforts

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of establishing a scientific and universal theological discipline based on Fakhr al-din al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210)'s method of *verification* [*taḥqīq*]. According to him, Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) should be seen as the most important representative of this process of critique and re-establishment from the eleventh century until his time. Türker emphasizes particularly two factors that fostered this new philosophical-theological school in which al-Jurjānī's thought developed. First, the critique on methodology that was born with al-Juwaynī and developed by Fakhr al-din al-Rāzī transformed the hierarchy of proofs in Islamic theology. This led the Ash'arites to abandon the old theory of causality and revisit the theory of syllogism in theology. Second, closely connected to the first, as a result of a meta-critique on methodology and internal consistency Avicennian logic became a part of theology and theologians adopted the forms of logical syllogism. According to Türker, this second factor brought Ash'arite theologians to face Aristotelian metaphysics and thus changed their primary opponent. While the principal opponents of the Ash'arite theologians were other religions and theological schools of thought until al-Juwaynī, after al-Gazālī the new opponents were advocates of Aristotelian philosophy as expressed in Avicennian corpus. The dialogue between theologians and Avicennian philosophy created a common ground for both schools based on the terminological framework of logic. The most important component of this terminology is Avicennian concept of quiddity. As the concept of quiddity enabled the later period theologians starting with al-Jurjānī to explain God-world relations with the difference between the eternal and the created as well as between the necessary and the contingent, it also helped to accommodate the theory of definition and the idea of universals derived from the Aristotelian philosophy with theology. Besides, the theologians adopted the theory of quiddity by putting into critique through the principal metaphysical premises of theology. These premises are that God is an agent with free will and divine power and all other beings are temporally created and there is no any causal determinism in the world. Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī placed these premises in the center of his theological system and tried to reinterpret this system in relation to the Avicennian philosophy.

Ömer Türker tries to describe the principal transformations in the late period of Ash'arite theology by examining in detail al-Jurjānī's reinterpretation under the subtitles of the theory of soul, epistemology, ontology and theoretical physics. The most important point that the article draws attention on the approaches of later theologians in the case of al-Jurjānī is that when the metaphysical principles changes, the explanations on its implications also change for its nature and function. According to this, when the God is taken, unlike philosophers' *the Necessary Existence*, as an agent with free will and divine power, certain theoretical distinctions, such as quiddity and existence can be adopted by reinterpreting them in the context of this different metaphysical principles.

The second article of the book authored by Mustakim Arıcı with the title "Bir Otorite Olarak Seyyid Şerif Cürçânî ve Osmanlı İlim Hayatındaki Yeri" [Sayyid

Sharif al-Jurjānī as an Authority and His Place in Ottoman Scholarship] (pp. 61-97) intends to shed light on how al-Jurjānī's image was in Ottoman intellectual history. Arıcı attempts to draw a comprehensive survey of al-Jurjānī's image in Ottoman thought by consulting a rich variety of sources including al-Jurjānī's students in the Ottoman world, diplomas, madrasa curriculum, collected poems and commentaries on al-Jurjānī's works. Arıcı examines the direct influence of al-Jurjānī through his students like Qaḍī-zāda al-Rūmī (d. 824/1421) and Fethullah al-Shirwānī (d. 857/1453) as well as he traces indirect influences through the chains of diplomas reaching to al-Dawwānī through Muayyad-zāda (d. 922/1516) and to al-Jurjānī through al-Dawwānī. According to this analysis, the diplomas are going back to al-Gazālī through al-Jurjānī by combining the Aristotelian-Illuminationist tradition and theological tradition. According to Arıcı, another important aspect showing al-Jurjānī's influences is the place of al-Jurjānī's works in the madrasa curriculum. Al-Jurjānī's certain books *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, *Ḥāshiya al-Tajrīd* and *al-Miṣbāḥ* were not only adopted in the madrasas but certain special madrasas were established by the name of these books. In the remaining part of the article, Arıcı examines the reflections of the high respect for al-Jurjānī to the extent to call him as *ustādh al-bashar wa al-'aql al-hādī 'ashar* (the teacher of the humanity and the eleventh intellect) on Ottoman culture. Lastly, Arıcı attaches an appendix to his article listing the Ottoman literature on *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* and *Ḥāshiya 'alā Shaḥ Ḥikmat al-'ayn* and commentaries on these books. Arıcı's article shows clearly and successfully that Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī was very influential on Ottoman scientific and intellectual life, and Ottoman scholars were connected to pre-Jurjānī tradition through the works of al-Jurjānī, no matter whether it was in the form of critique like Qaḍizāda or Kamalpashazāda or in the form of appreciation like Tashkoprizāda.

Eṣref Altaş's article, titled "Varlık, Varlığın Birliği ve Var Olanların Mertebeleri: Cürcānī'nin Yaklaşımı" [Existence, Unity of Existence and Levels of Existents: al-Jurjānī's Approach] (pp. 97-131), compares the books *Risāla fī bayān marātib al-mawjūdāt and Risāla fī waḥdat al-wujūd* with *Ḥāshiya al-Tajrīd* and *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* and discusses how the beings are classified in respect to the relationship between existence and quiddity and how al-Jurjānī approaches to the issue. In this discussion, there are two issues: First one is whether what al-Jurjānī listed in *Risāla fī bayān marātib al-mawjūdāt* the classification of existents or of the theological, philosophical or mystical perspectives on existents. The second is after surveying different perspectives on the relation of existence and quiddity in *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* whether one can reach al-Jurjānī's own ideas through these treatises. For the first issue, Eṣref Altaş rightly argues that the categories listed in *Marātib al-Mawjūdāt* are not the classification of the existents but rather that of approaches on the existents. However, which one of the ideas that al-Jurjānī supports is not clearly understood through treatises. Therefore, does al-Jurjānī think like later theologians such as al-Gazālī and al-Rāzī that the mental imagination of quiddity-existence distinction about the Necessary Being is

possible and existence is an inseparable concomitant of its quiddity or does he argue like philosophers and Sufis that the Necessary Being is pure existence and even the imagination of a quiddity-existence distinction is not possible? If the second one is true, is God as pure existence, for al-Jurjānī a Necessary being like the Avicennian philosophers argue, or is it al-Ḥaqq as called by Ibn Arabī and his followers as *al-wujūd al-ḥaqq*? Altaş argues that al-Jurjānī confines the thought of *waḥdat al-wujūd* to a mystical revelation and vision and thereby comes to the conclusion that a right way to reach and express this thought through rational deduction or theoretical reasoning does not exist. From this one can conclude that al-Jurjānī sees both approaches right, but from different aspects and in different levels (*marâtib*) of intellection. Besides, as Altaş finds, if we consider al-Jurjānī as a part of attempts of the later period of Islamic theology to accommodate a truth by interpreting it in the framework of different levels, this mentioned experience of mystical revelation and vision should not be considered as a universal truth which excludes the philosophical and theological approaches like we see in Şadr al-din al-Qunawī. Altaş's article successfully shows and discusses these problems and complexions of the attempts of harmonization in the late period of Islamic theology in the case of al-Jurjānī.

The next article in the book is Hatice Toksöz's article titled "Cürcânî'nin Kudret Kavramıyla İlgili Değerlendirmeleri" [al-Jurjānī on the Concept of Power (*al-qudrah*)]. In this article, Toksöz analyzes the concept of power in relation to human actions and God's attributes and seeks to answer two basic questions with which theologians have been occupied. The first one, which is related to God-world relationship, is this: what is the difference between the created power (*al-qudrah al-muh-datha*) particular to the human being and the eternal power particular to God? The second question, which is related to the nature of the God's agency, is whether He is a necessitating (*al-müjib*) or free (*al-mukhtâr*) agent with divine power that includes will and intention. According to Toksöz, al-Jurjānī answers the first question, in accordance with the Ash'arite tradition by that the power as the ultimate principle of affecting actors belongs to God and human actions can be described with acquisition (*kasb*) by being in relation with this primary and perfect power. In this context, al-Jurjānī, who considers the power in the sense of "power including conditions of affecting" as homonymous name when it is used for the human being and God, calls the divine power as "perfect" and human power as "deficient" power. As Toksöz devotes the second half of her article to the analysis of the relationship between the divine power and the necessity and free will, here she first takes al-Jurjānī's methodological critiques addressed to early theologians on the proof of the divine power and then discusses how to attribute the free will to God with a method which does not depend on the analogy of the unknown to the known.

İhsan Fazlıoğlu's article titled "Seyyid Şerif'in *Nefsu'l-emr* Nazariyesi ve Matematik Bilimlere Uygulanması" [Sayyid Sharif's Theory of *nafs al-amr* and its Application to Mathematical Sciences] is one of the striking articles of the book. In this article,

Fazlıođlu examines how al-Jurjānī discussed certain issues and ideas of Adūd al-dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355)'s in *al-Mawāqif* such as the ontology of mathematical objects, the nature of knowledge on the mathematical objects, whether the models based on mathematical objects can describe nature and the epistemological value of this description. He further analyzes al-Jurjānī's interpretations of these problems around the concept of *nafs al-amr*. In this analysis, Fazlıođlu's argument answers the questions on the historical and philosophical context in which the concept of *nafs al-amr* appeared and on principal issues that the concept sought to answer. In this context, Fazlıođlu takes al-Mar'ashi from the eighteenth century, al-Shirwānī from the seventeenth century and Muşlih al-dīn al-Lārī from the sixteenth century and shows how these scholars used the concept of *nafs al-amr* to justify the legitimacy of the mathematical knowledge and how this usage is closely related to Sayyid Sharīf's analysis of *nafs al-amr* in *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. Al-Jurjānī responds to al-Ījī's critiques on the legitimacy of mathematical knowledge by saying that while the mathematical objects are estimative things (*al-umūr al-wahmiyya*), they become subject to judgments in a space called *nafs al-amr* and these judgments thanks to *nafs al-amr* are not different from judgments on the external beings in terms of giving certain knowledge. According to the author, the historical-philosophical process, in which al-Jurjānī was able to use the concept of *nafs al-amr* so effectively both in his *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* and in his treatise titled *Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-emr*, started with Bahā al-dīn Kharakī's incorporation of Ibn al-Ḥaytham's arguments into the madrasa curriculum and reached its peak with Shams al-dīn al-Chaghminī, al-Qāzerūnī and Quṭb al-dīn al-Shirāzī. At the end of this process, the concept of *nafs al-amr*, which provided an exact space for mathematical sciences, appeared as a response to al-Ījī's critiques by al-Jurjānī. After discussing this particular connection between the concept of *nafs al-amr* and mathematical sciences, Fazlıođlu adds to the end of article as appendix comprising nine classical texts including the critical edition and translation of al-Jurjānī's treatise on the subject. These texts show that the philosophical context, to which the concept of *nafs al-amr* also belongs, have developed to encompass a variety of discussions that Fazlıođlu mentioned in the context of the legitimacy of mathematical sciences and the ontology of mathematical objects and of the discussions on epistemological certainty. This concept, which lies at the center of certain doubts on the epistemological certainty of the universal knowledge rooted in the active intellect, deserves more attention for its importance in the discussions on the epistemological tendencies of post-al-Rāzī period of philosophical theology.

The book's last article titled "Mahiyetin Mec'ūliyeti Bağlamında Kemalpaşazâde'nin Cürçânî Eleştirisi" [Kamalpaşazâda's critique of Jurjānī on the Creation of Quiddities] is authored by Ömer Mahir Alper. Alper examines the issue of the creation of quiddities which corresponds to the discussion of whether there is a reason for the formation of A rather than the existence of A in the context of al-Jurjānī's general critique of Ash'arite perspective and also of Kamalpaşazâda's

(d. 940/1534) critiques toward al-Jurjānī. In this analysis, the author describes the philosophical background of the discussion on the creation of quiddities and explains how the subject is discussed in the later period of Islamic philosophy and theology starting from Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī until al-Taftāzānī. The description of these discussions successfully presented to show the historical-philosophical context of the problem. The author's conclusion is that al-Jurjānī argues that quiddities are not created based on the adoption of existence-quiddity distinction. Al-Jurjānī criticizes the approaches of the theologians like al-Ījī and Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī and attempts to reinterpret the subject by combining his Ash'arite premises with the Avicennian theory of quiddity. Kamalpashazāda who criticizes al-Jurjānī distinguishes the two meanings of the word *ja'l* as one being *taṣyīr* (formation) and the other being *ijād* (bring into existence) and argues that not only al-Jurjānī but also the philosophers like Ibn Sīnā did not notice this distinction and made mistakes on the subject. Kamalpashazāda criticizes al-Jurjānī not only for his failure to see this distinction but also for misunderstanding al-Ījī and therefore making mistake on the subject of *creation* and for his ultimate position he prefers Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī's formulation. Alper's study on the history of theology-philosophy between the twelfth and the sixteenth century should be considered as a good example for showing how any philosophical problem from the late period of Islamic philosophy can be studied and which historical-philosophical context should be applied for any subject.

Considering the common philosophical and theological background, which is discussed by all articles of the book, al-Jurjānī's thought should be discussed along with a special attempt which characterizes general feature of late period of Ash'arite theology. This attempt as an unnamed project corresponds to filling the gaps that were created by the Avicennian challenges related to method and content by the theologians of the post-al-Gazālian period. In this process, the theologians on the one hand tended to revise theological thought which had been weakened by the Avicennian critiques on the aspects of method, terminology and content by departing from the Avicennian philosophy, and on the other hand did not neglect to criticize the Avicennian philosophy by keeping the basic metaphysical principles of the earlier period of Islamic theology. In order to determine the essential nature and the extensions of this endeavor reminding the Athenian Neo-Platonic commentators' attempts of harmonization, we need to read the late period of Islamic theology in relation to the Avicennian philosophy with a logic of "terminological continuity-conceptual transformation and conceptual transformation-terminological continuity".

In conclusion, this edited volume including six articles that authoritatively examine the different aspects of al-Jurjānī's thought is a highly important study on a scholar who has indisputable influence on the late period of Islamic theology and philosophy. There is no doubt that this book will stand as a guidepost for subsequent studies on al-Jurjānī, which is still in its infancy.