The Model of Universals in *Kalām* Atomism: On al-Juwaynī's Theory of *al-Aḥwāl**

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Abstract: The theory of the states (*aḥwāl*) under the theological system of Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū al-Maālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) and that of the early Ashʿarites can be construed as the understanding of universals as well as the common truths of that system. In that period, however, two different conceptions of truth stand out: those who championed the theory in question and those who rejected it. While the rejecters of the states analyzed truths from a nominal perspective, those who defended this theory referred realistically to a common state and truth the existents (*al-mawjūdāt*) possess. Consequently, even though they gained closeness to the Aristotelian understanding of universals by adopting a realistic method using the theory of the *aḥwāl*, they have fundamental differences between them. Although the Aristotelian understanding of universals is about objects, theologians' states are confined to the substance-accident binary as the building blocks of objects in the temporal (*ḥādith*) universe. In other words, as far as al-Juwaynī was concerned, theologians are realists with regard to the building blocks of objects and nominalists when considering the entirety of objects. Moreover, unlike the Aristotelian universals, states are never accepted as a subject in propositions. Because of this aspect the states have, secondary substances were not included in the Ashʿarite theology of that early period. Ultimately, accidents (*aʿrād*) and divine meanings (*maʿānī*) were removed from the category of attributes and replaced by the states. In so doing, accidents and divine meanings have also been included in the category of essences (*dhāt*) along with proper substances and the divine essence (*al-Dhāt al-Ilāhī*). Hence, a new theological language emerged in the context of the substance-attribute binary, and an ontological position was assigned to the states. However, this position is not the word, mind, object, or space beyond the object. With this framework in mind, the discussion of the theory of the states throughout this article will revolve around three main points: form, scope, and place.

Keywords: al-Juwaynī, truth, *aḥwāl*, states, universals, secondary substances, realism, nominalism

Introduction

The states (*aḥwāl*) that the early theologians (*al-mutaqaddimūn*) designed as common attributes in order to indicate plurality have aspects that are compatible with the understanding of universals in classical philosophy. The conspicuous aspects of their compatibility are that the words representing these attributes are abstractedly referenced and not regarded as mere words; they are conceived as different (*zāid*) from the subject they are being predicated upon and most importantly are designed as common attributes. This theory is limited to only predicates of some propositions and is based on al-Muʿmmar's (d. 215/830) theory of meaning to which Abū Hashim (d. 321/933) had given shape for the first time under the name of *aḥwāl* [states] in order to overcome the paradox of the infinite regress contained in the theory.[1] For Abū Hashim, in a proposition such as "Allah is knowledgeable," the acceptance of the predicate in this proposition as a mere subject of the proposition renders the structure of the proposition meaningless (tautological). Therefore, according to Abū Hashim, the term knowledgeable, which in this case is the predicate, must be different (*zāid*) than the subject of the proposition (i.e., Allah). By evaluating the predicate in propositions separately from their subjects, Abū Hashim attempted to solve the most important problem in the field of theology: the problem of attributes. Because Abū Hashim's main concern and proposal were to offer a solution to such a problem, his design of the theory of the states corresponded to the dynamics of the Muʿtazilī school to which he belonged. Among the Ashʿarites, al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) and al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) used this theory by trying to adapt it to the Ashʿarite school.

Acknowledging the states as universals is almost a matter of consensus, particularly among al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) who was one of al-Juwaynī's students, the commentary writers on al-Juwaynī's book *Kitāb al-Irshād ilā qawāṭiʿ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-iʿtiqād*, and many later (*muta'akhkhir*) theologians. Based on this claim, the main purpose of this article is to contrast the *aḥwāl* against the models on universals (*kuliyyāt*) in classical philosophy while paying due consideration to theological atomism (the substance-accident binary). In line with this purpose, the views of al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī will be brought to the center of the discussion,

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1   Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press., 1976), 167–68; Mehmet Dağ, "The Causality Theory in Imam al-Ḥaramayn", *Ondokuz Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 2* (1987): 50; Hayrettin Nebi Güdekli, "Abū Hashim al-Jubbā'ī's Approach to the Essence-Attribute Relationship: The Theory of the States" (Yüksek lisans tez, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2008), 5.

each one having a section dedicated to them and examined on three points: form, scope, and place. For the first point, the basic axioms attributed to the states will be analyzed. For the second point, the attempt will be made to ground the idea that, for the states predicable upon particulars existents, their predication upon temporal existents is limited to the building blocks of bodies (i.e., substances and accidents). For the third point, this theory will be shown to not comply with any type of realism in the true sense, or even with conceptualism. Assertions that the theory of the states is an adaptation of a model of universals to theological atomism and that this theory has its unique aspects will stand out as the main claims of this article.

The theory of states is rejected in al-Juwaynī's works *al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh*[2] and *al-ʿAqīda al-Niẓāmiyya*, both of which correspond to al-Juwaynī's later thoughts. The theory of states is nonetheless championed in some of his other works such as *al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn* and *al-Irshād*, corresponding to his earlier thoughts that he wrote under the influence of al-Bāqillānī's theological views. While this study takes commentaries written on al-Juwaynī's work *al-Irshād* into consideration, it also focuses the discussion on his earlier works in which the theory of states was championed. In addition, works from al-Juwaynī's prominent students such as al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī (d. 504/1110), al-Ghazzālī, and Abū al-Qāsim al-Anṣārī[3] (d. 512/1118) also are primary sources in this study.

Many modern studies are found concerning and involving the theory of the states. Among those studies, are some that have proven very insightful toward the making of this paper, such as Richard M. Frank's article "Abū Hāshim's Theory of the 'States'" (1971) and many other similar studies from him, Mehmet Dağ's "İmam el-Haremeyn el-Cüveynî'de Nedensellik Kuramı" (1987), Orhan Şener Koloğlu's article "Ebû Hâşim el-Cübbâî'nin Ahvâl Teorisi Üzerine Bazı Mülahazalar" (2007), Osman Demir's article "Cüveynî'de Ahvâl Teorisi" (2008), Hayrettin Nebi Güdekli's master's thesis "Ebû Hâşim el-Cübbâî'nin Zât-Sıfat İlişkisine Yaklaşımı: Hâller Teorisi" (2008), Hüseyein Kahraman's doctoral dissertation "Cüveynî'de İlliyet

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2   For the intellectual change and transformation that al-Juwaynī underwent in his work called *Al-Burhân fî uṣūl al-fıqh*, see Ömer Türker, "Bir Tümdengelim Olarak Şâhitle Gâibe İstidlâl Yöntemi ve Cüveynî'nin Bu Yönteme Yönelttiği Eleştiriler", İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi 18 (2007): 1–25; Ömer Türker, "Eş'arî Kelamının Kırılma Noktası: Cüveynî'nin Yöntem Eleştirileri", İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi 19 (2008): 1–23

3   Al-Anṣārī's work *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, which we used as a source in this article, has several manuscripts. However, in this study, we only took a copy consisting of two volumes as the basis. The first volume of this copy is registered at Princeton University (Oversize Islamic Manuscripts, Garrett 634YQ), and the second volume is registered in the Süleymaniye Library (Laleli 2247).

Teorisi" (2006), Jan Thiele's "Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī's (d. 321/933) Theory of 'States' (*Aḥwāl*) and Its Adaption by Ashʿarite Theologians" (2016), and Fedor Benevich's "The Classical Ashʿari Theory of *Aḥwāl*: Juawynī and His Opponents" (2016), "The Rise of the Opponents" and "Avicennian Ashʿarite Metaphysics: Sharastānī on *Aḥwāl* and Existence" (2018). Having said that, we occasionally felt the need to provide footnotes clarifying the points in these studies upon which we disagreed.

Before engaging in examining the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism (i.e., the states) under its relevant three headings, a general introduction of this theory with a particular focus on propositions will prove useful. The Ashʿarites examined the states under two main headings in particular: causal states and non-causal states.[4] Parallel to classical *Kalām* ontology, the causal states (*al-aḥwāl al-muʿallala*) become manifested in the temporal universe through the carrier relationship between substances and accidents. In this context, when analyzing the proposition "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable,"[5] the metaphysical explanation of this proposition would suggest that "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable because it carries the accident of knowledge-1". In the explanatory sentence of this proposition, two particulars and real existents occur, namely substance-*a* and knowledge-1. These particular existents exist concretely in the external world. Of these, substance-*a* is the carrier while knowledge-1 represents the concrete attribute being carried by the substance. Because of the carrier relationship that takes place between them, substance-*a* as the carrier of the concrete attribute is characterized as being knowledgeable. The fact that substance-*a*, which is the subject of description in the abovementioned proposition, acquires the property of being knowledgeable arises from the carrier relationship. This is the case because by referring to the proposition of "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable," an inquiry such as "Why is substance-*a* knowledgeable?" might be made in demand for an explanatory sentence. The possible answer to this

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4   Regarding the dual distinction of *causal* and *non-causal,* see Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Ahvâl", in *Encyclopedia of Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı*, Vol. 2, 190–92. Especially regarding this distinction from proponents of the theory of states in the Ashʿarite *Kalām* tradition, see Richard M. Frank, "Al-Ahkām in Classical Ashʿarite Teaching", *Classical Islamic Theology: The Ashʿarites, Texts and Studies on the Development of History of Kalām III*, Richard M. Frank, Ed. Dimitri Gutas (Hampshire: Ashgate Variorum, 2008), 770–777; Hüseyin Kahraman, "The Theory of Causation in al-Juwaynī" (PhD diss., University of Marmara, 2015), 166–76.

5   In order to create a common language and prevent confusion in the language of the article, particular realities in the temporal world are symbolized by letters and numbers. For instance, we have expressed particulars (e.g., the accident of knowledge) numerically as the accident of knowledge-1; while the particular substance that is the carrier of this accident is expressed in letters as substance-*a*. We attempt thus to emphasize essences in the temporal world to be definite and particulars due to states, which are universal predicates, applying only to particulars.

question is that the subject in the proposition carries a concrete attribute such as knowledge-1. Therefore, since knowledge-1 is what confers onto substance-*a* the property and attribute of being knowledgeable, this accident is called the *'illa* [cause] in the vocabulary of the state theorists, and the resulting property is called the *maʿlūl* [effect]. In this respect, those predicates that are subjected to the question of why in theological propositions have been grouped under the heading of *causal states*.[6]

On the other hand, non-causal states are attributes in a proposition that require no explanation and are subjected to the question "Why?". These attributes are also known to be *ḥaqīqa* [truth], *al-ḥadd* [definition], *kh*āṣiyya [specific]*,* and *al-ṣifa al-nafsiyya* [the attribute of the thing itself].[7] For instance, the predicate in the proposition "Substance-*a* is an occupier of space (*mutaḥayyiz*)" indicates a non-causal state. In this proposition, the application (*ḥaml*) of such a predicate to the subject is not the result of the carrier relationship. In this context, because the question "Why is substance-*a* an occupier of space?" cannot be asked about the proposition "Substance-*a* is an occupier of space"; such attributes are called non-causal states. Al-Juwaynī pointed out the absence of explanatory sentences with regard to propositions with *al-ṣifa al-nafsiyya* as follows:

> If the following is asked: "You have spoken about the reality of command. Well, why is command a command?" We will say that: Command being a command arises from an attribute in the essence of the command itself (*waṣf yarjiʿ ilā dhātihi*). Which is that it cannot be subjected to any cause, nor can it be associated with will. When you are asked: "Why is command a command?" The following statement must be your most robust response: "Command is a command for no reason but [the command] itself."[8]

In the *Kalām* tradition, "occupying space" or "not being divisible" is similarly a common attribute and truth; accidents such as knowledge-1, will-1, and red-1, which

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6   The relationship of causality and the state of being knowledgeable, which arise due to substance-*a* carrying an accident as knowledge-1, should not be perceived as the causality of fire burning cotton (Abū al-Qāsim al-Anṣārī, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, I, Garrett 634Yq, 46a). On this subject of the states, the causality ('*illiyya*) is for a real and particular concrete property (knowledge-1) to necessitate an abstract state. This is interpreted as 'necessary implication (*luzūmiyya*).' For the condition of states' necessary implications, see al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn*, Ed. Richard M. Frank (Tehran: Muassasa-i Muṭāla'āt-ı Islāmī Dānishgah-ı McGill Shuba-i Tehran, 1981), 28.

7   These concepts are all synonymous according to the Ashʿarites of that period. See Richard M. Frank, "The Ash'arite Ontology: Primary Entities", *Classical Islamic Theology: The Ash'arites, Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām III*, Richard M. Frank, Ed. Dimitri Gutas (Hamphire: Ashgate Variorum, 2008), 178.

8   Al-Juwaynī, *al-Talkhīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, Ed. Muhammad Hasan İsmail (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2003), 57.

we may assume are being carried by substance-*a*, also possess non-causal states and truths. In this regard, being an accident is a common truth and the unifying basis for the abovementioned accidents. Meanwhile, they are differentiated by the non-causal states of being knowledge, being willpower, and being red. Bearing in mind that accidents possess non-causal states similar to substances, let us discuss the instance of command in the passage above. Because every accident possesses a non-causal state and a truth, speech (which in the temporal universe is considered a type of accident) also possesses a wide and narrow range of non-causal states known as being an accident and being spoken. Consequently, seeking the cause (*'illa*) as to why a command, which is a type of speech, is command is out of the question.

The *aḥwāl* can be construed as the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism. Before examining *al-aḥwāl* in terms of form, scope, and place relating to this theory, some minimal information about the semantic extension the concepts of essence and attribute have undergone must be touched upon because, after the theologians adopted this theory, the concepts of essence and attribute were reinterpreted in light of the states. In other words, according to al-Juwaynī at least, states and attributes became synonymous. A new theological terminology can be said to have emerged thanks to the theory of states. As a result of *al-aḥwāl* being brought to the center of discussion in this theory, both the concepts of essence and attributes, which constitute the center of focus in the literature on *Kalām*, gained extended meaning. Now, let us attempt to explain this terminological difference using propositions.

According to the pre- al-Juwaynī theologians who rejected the states, the metaphysical explanation of the proposition "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" is that "Substance-*a* acquires the appellation of being *knowledgeable* because it carries the accident of knowledge-1." The explanatory sentence of this proposition has two real existents (substance-*a* and knowledge-1), a causality (the conjunction 'because'), and an adjective (the appellation "knowledgeable"). Because of this group's rejection of the states (i.e., the theological universals), they attached no value except a linguistic one to the term 'knowledgeable,' which in the proposition here represents the predicate. In this context, the expression 'knowledgeable' for them does not indicate a common attribute or a constant, on the contrary, it only informs that substance-*a* is carrying knowledge-1. Therefore, according to the rejecters of the states, because the predicates of some theological propositions are considered as mere words, they do not possess the worth of an attribute. Thus, both the essence (*dhāt*) of substance-*a* occurring in the proposition "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" and the accident of knowledge-1 that the essence carries

are acknowledged as attributes in the true sense. In other words, an accident such as knowledge-1 that possesses a particular reality falls under the category of attributes. However, al-Juwaynī who adopts the theory of states, considered knowledge-1 only as a metaphorical attribute[9] because according to him, those existents such as knowledge-1 that possess a concrete reality cannot be regarded as being common attributes.

For al-Juwaynī in this context, the metaphysical explanation of the proposition "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" would be as follows: "Substance-*a* acquired the attribute of being knowledgeable because it carries the accident of knowledge-1." In this explanation occur two real beings (substance-*a* and the accident of knowledge-1), a causality (i.e., the conjunction "because"), and a causal state (i.e., the metaphysical attribute of "knowledgeable"). For al-Juwaynī, the accident of knowledge-1 is not an attribute of substance-*a*, rather it is the cause that confers onto substance-*a* the metaphysical attribute of being knowledgeable. As accidents are excluded from the scope of attributes from this standpoint, they have been added to an alternate scope the category of essences.[10] Hence, both the substances and the accidents being carried by the substances in the temporal universe have been included in the category of essence (*dhāt*). The recognition of accidents being essences just like substances is based on the acceptance of the generalization that "every *dhū al-ḥāl* [i.e., thing possessing a state] is an essence."[11] This is because both the substance-*a* occurring in the proposition "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" and the accident (i.e., knowledge-1) that it carries are characterizable by the other type of states (i.e., non-causal states). In this regard, each one of the predicates in the propositions "Substance-*a* is an occupier of space" and "Knowledge-1 is an accident" represents a non-causal state, a *kh*āṣiyya, a truth, a definition, and a *nafsī* attribute. For al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, theological atoms possess both causal states (being red and being knowledgeable) and non-causal states (occupying space), which aside from being reducible to the temporal universe are also known to be *al-Jawhar*. On the other hand, because the accidents (red-1 and knowledge-1) the substances carry have no potential to carry other accidents, they can only be characterized by non-causal states. Based on this, rejecters of the states amongst the Ashʿarites at

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9   Ibn al-Amīr, *al-Kāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn fī ikhtiṣār al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn,* Ed. Jamal Abd al-Nasir Abd al-Muʾmin, Vol. 2 (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2010), 722–23.

10   Richard M. Frank, "The Ashʿarite Ontology", 169.

11   For the expression of *dhū al-ḥāl* being used to denote the possessors of a state or entities who are being characterized by states, see al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Kalām 290, 84a.

the time had denoted substances with the term "essence" and accidents with the term "attribute," thus fundamentally recognizing two categories of particulars. On the opposite side, the proponents of the states among the Ash'arites referred to the term "attributes" to denote states that have no concrete reality and to the term "essence" to denote both substances and accidents that have a concrete reality. Thus, two categories were fundamentally recognized: the essences (i.e., substances and accidents) and the attributes (i.e., the causal and non-causal states).

This fundamental distinction regarding temporal beings in the Ash'arite thought of the time was also reflected onto the realm of the Eternal Being by applying the same logic. In this context, the metaphysical explanation of the proposition "God is knowledgeable" according to the anti-states Ash'arites is the following sentence: "God's essence acquires the appellation of knowledgeable because it carries the meaning of knowledge." This explanatory sentence has two particular beings (the essence of God and the meaning of knowledge), a causality (the conjunction because), and an appellation (i.e., knowledgeable). In this context, for the anti-states Ash'arites, God's essence falls under the category of substances while the meaning of knowledge there falls under the category of attributes. The term "knowledgeable" in this proposition is nothing but a mere word indicating the Divine Essence as a particular being to possess the meaning [ma'nā] of knowledge, which is itself another particular property. In other words, the referent intended by both the subject and the predicate in this proposition is the same.[12] However, according to al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī as proponents of the states, the metaphysical explanation of the proposition "God is knowledgeable" is the following: "God's essence acquires the attribute of 'knowledgeability' because it carries the meaning of knowledge." Occurring in this explanation of the proposition are two particular beings (the Essence of God and the meaning of "knowledge"), a causality (the conjunction "because"), and a causal state (the metaphysical attribute of "knowledgeable"). In light of this explanation, knowledgeable as a term represents the predicate of the proposition "God is knowledgeable" and indicates neither the essence of God nor the meaning of knowledge carried by the essence. The referent intended by this term is instead a common attribute that cannot be subjected to

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12 Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015), who interpreted the *Kalām*ī system of Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī (d. 324/935-36) as being against the states, explained the predicate of being knowledgeable as deserving (*istiḥqāq*) to be called *knowledgeable*. With this explanation, he points out that the predicate in question does not indicate any referent (state) other (*zāid*) than its subject. See Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarradu Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Hasan al-Ash'arī*, Ed. Ahmad Ibrahim al-Sāiḥ, (Cairo: Maktabat al-sakāfāt al-dīniyya, 2005), 319; al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn*, Eds. Ali Sāmī al-Nashār, Suhayr Muhammad Mukhtār and Faysal Budayr 'Awn (Iskandariyya: Munshaāt al-Ma'ārif, 1969), 636.

an arithmetic multiplicity while also transcending the eternal-temporal binary distinction. Sharaf al-Dīn al-Tilmisānī al-Fakhrī (d. 644/1246), one of al-Juwaynī's commentators, conveyed the following about what opponents and proponents of the states referred to with concepts such as substance and attribute:

> Know that theologians are divided into two groups: those who accept the states and those who reject the states. The statement used by proponents of the states such as al-Qādī [al-Bāqil-lānī (d. 403/1013)] and al-Imām [al-Ḥaramayn] regarding the attributes is as follows: The Creator (Exalted is He) Lives with life, Knows with knowledge, Wills with a will, is Powerful with power, speaker with speech, Hears with hearing, and Sees with sight: What is intended by hearing and sight is not the senses, but rather the [faculty of] perception itself. **They, therefore, consider these as existing essence(s). These essences are knowledge, power, and will**. They also argue that, because some meanings are carried by the essence, it permanently acquires certain states. That is the aspect of characterization subject to reason. As for these occurring states, they express them in the manner of being knowledgeable, being powerful, and so forth. They do not attribute existence to the states. On the contrary, they refer to them as mere realizations (maḥḍ thubūt). The statement used by the [Ashʿarites] who reject the states is as follows: "God is knowledgeable, and His knowledge exists (wa lahū ʿilm), He is Powerful and His Power exists…" They explain the knowledgeability of God by His possession of knowledge. For, according to them, there is nothing in the external world except for God's essence and the attribute possessed by the essence. [Through this explanation] they have rejected the states. During speeches, the one being characterized is referred to as essence, while the meaning is referred to as knowledge or power. When the essence is talked about with reference to its possessing meaning, it is referred to as knowledgeable or powerful. Therefore, the subjects of the reason are two, and the expressions used are three. On the other hand, the Muʿtazila did not accept the aforementioned meanings and asserted that the Creator (Exalted is He) is by Himself (li nafsih) alive, knowledgeable, and powerful.[13]

The context of the above passage shows that for those who adopt the theory of states, both the kinds of accidents and the divine meanings are also referred to as essences. However, when the proponents of the states refer to an accident such as knowledge-1 being an essence, they must be emphasized as not suggesting an accident to be <u>that which is self-subsisting</u> *(mā yaqūm bi-nafsih)*. On the contrary, they intend to indicate that these are possessors of states in the proposition.

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13   Sharaf al-Dīn al-Tilmisānī al-Fihrī, *Sharḥ Lumaʿ al-adilla*, Ed. Nizâr Hammadi (Kuwait: Daru'd-Diyâ, 2018), 174.; cf. Al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 174. Once again, for essence being used as a term to designate accidents and divine meanings, see al-Anṣārī, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, I, 46a. For the accidents being included alongside substances, which are the theological atoms, to the scope of the essences and each of them having *nafsī* attributes (non-causal states) according to the proponents of the states, see Richard M. Frank, "Abū Hāshim's Theory of the 'States': İts Structure and Function", *Early Islamic Theology: The Muʿtazilites and al-Ash'arī, Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām II*, Richard M. Frank, Ed. Dimitri Gutas (Surrey: Ashgate Variorum, 2011), 89–90.

After explaining what al-Juwaynī and the earlier Ashʿarite *Kalām* tradition meant by the concepts of essence and attribute through the proposition "God is knowledgeable," paralleling this by opening a short parenthesis about the Muʿtazilite tradition would be useful without going into too much detail. Similar to the Ashʿarites, this tradition also can be split up into two groups: opponents of the states and advocates of the states. For the opponents of the states, the referent intended by both the subject and the predicate in the proposition "God is knowledgeable" is the same (i.e., the essence of God).[14] Though for someone like Abū Hāshim, the first to formulate this theory of states, the entity intended by the predicate in the proposition in question is argued to be something other than the essence of God, and that is the state. To use the technical theological expression, knowledgeable as a term according to Abū Hāshim, which stands as the predicate in the aforementioned proposition, does not stand only as a mere word but is also additional to the essence it describes. Although in Abū Hāshim's thought this term denotes a state, his explanation is different from al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī's. For Abū Hāshim, God being knowledgeable does not arise from a particular being that is the meaning of knowledge. On the contrary, this additional attribute is one that arises directly from the essence.[15] Thus, the state of being knowledgeable in the

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14 Abū al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī reported Abū al-Huzayl al-Allāf to have explained the proposition "God is knowledgeable" as meaning that "God is knowledgeable with a piece of knowledge, but the knowledge is Himself (*huwa ʿālim bi ʿilm huwa huwa*)," see Abū al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa ikhtilāf al-musallīn*, Ed. Naim Zarzūr, I (Beirut: al-Maktabat al-Ashʿariyya, 2005), 136. See also Richard M. Frank, "Attribute, Attribution and Being: Three Islamic Views", *Classical Islamic Theology: The Ashʿarites Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām III*, Richard M. Frank, Ed. Dimitri Gutas (Hampshire: Asgate Variorum, 2008), 453–454.

15 Do the predicates of the propositions constructed about the Divine Essence require an explanation (can the judgements be *muʿallal*)? To this question, the Muʿtazilites responded negatively, while the Ashʿarites responded affirmatively. In this context, al-Juwaynī, who examined Abū Hāshim's understanding of attributes with a very critical approach, proceeded to analyze the proposition "God is knowledgeable." According to him, this proposition arises from the state of being eternal, which is the most unique attribute (*akhaṣṣ al-awṣāf*) according to Abū Hāshim. Therefore, according to al-Juwaynī, the statement, "God's essence is knowledgeable because He has the most unique attribute of being eternal" in Abū Hāshim's thought is the metaphysical explanation of the proposition "God is knowledgeable." Thus, according to al-Juwaynī's interpretation, because one state (being eternal) leads to another state (being knowledgeable), Abū Hāshim's understanding of attributes also is explained with the states. This is interpreted by al-Juwaynī as an inconsistency in the Muʿtazilites' understanding of the attributes. Al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.). However, the relation between the Divine Essence being eternal and being knowledgeable needs to be inquired into a little further. In fact, in the Muʿtazilite texts, the relationship between the essential attribute (being eternal) and the attributes of the essence (being knowledgeable) is explained with concepts such as *istiḥqāq*, *iqtiḍāʾ*, and *wujūb* (al-Qāḍī Abd al-Jabbār. *Al-Majmūʿ fī-l-Muḥīṭ bi-l-taklīf*, I, Ed. Jean Yusuf Houben [Beirut: al-Maṭbaʿat al-Kathūlikiyya, 1965], 152; al-Qāḍī Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa*, Ed. Abdulkarim Osman [Cairo: Maktabat Vahba, 1996], 129, 199; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn*, Eds. Martin McDermott & Wilferd Madelung [Oxford: el-Hoda, 1991], 183. This suggests that, between the two attributes in question is an epistemic appellation on the basis of the wideness and narrowness of the scope, rather than a causal relationship.

case of God is compatible with the official view of the Muʿtazilites, which is the rejection of divine meanings.

The perspective of the Muʿtazilite tradition regarding this proposition relating to the realm of the eternal is as was depicted earlier. Their classification regarding the realm of the temporal, on the other hand, is more complex when compared to the Ashʿarite theologians' understanding of the states. Contrary to al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī's understanding of the states, for Abū Hashim, all accidents do not confer to their carrier receptacle (*al-maḥall*) a causal state. Among accidents whose receptacles are not required to be alive (*ḥayy*), only the accidents of occurrence (*al-akwān*: motion (*ḥaraka*), rest (*sukūn*), arrangement (*ijtimāʿ*), separation (*iftirāq*), and combination (*taʾlīf*) can confer a state onto their carrier substances.[16] In this context, the metaphysical explanation of the proposition "Substance-*a* is mobile" is as follows: Substance-*a* acquires the state of being in motion because it carries the accident of mobility-1. In this explanation occur two particular beings (substance-*a* and the accident of mobility-1), a causality (the conjunction "because"), and a causal state (having motion). Apart from the accident of combination, such accidents do confer states onto their individual substances (i.e., the building blocks the body), but not onto the integrity of the bodies. As for accidents whose receptacles are required to be alive (*ḥayy*), they confer states onto the structure/body instead of the building blocks of the body, which are the substances. In this context, the metaphysical explanation of the proposition "Zayd is knowledgeable," wherein Zayd is conceived as a living structure, is as follows: Because the substance-*a* contained in the living structure that is Zayd carries the accident of knowledge-1, this structure is knowledgeable." Thus, in the thought of Abū Hāshim, while the state of knowing emerges based on a particular property such as knowledge-1 (causal state) in the realm of the temporal; in the realm of the eternal, the same state does not occur upon a particular property that has the meaning of knowledge.

Similar to the Ashʿarites' view, Abū Hāshim's view regarding non-causal states pertaining to the realm of the temporal is limited to the building blocks of the bodies that are the substances and the accidents.[17] The only difference is that while the Ashʿarite only refer to the *nafsī* attributes of existents (*al-mawjūd*), in the framework of Abū Hāshim, things possess the attribute of *nafs* (the essential attribute/the most unique attribute) long before coming into existence. In other

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16   Al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 630; Richard M. Frank, "Abū Hāshim's theory of the 'States'", 90.

17   Richard M. Frank, "Abū Hāshim's Theory of the 'States'", 89.

words, for al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, all things possessing a state are existent. However, Abū Hāshim allocated causal states to the realm of existence, and non-causal states, the truth, the definition, and the *khāṣiyya* [specific] to the realm of pre-existence.

Proponents of the states designed the general structure of their ontology with a central focus on the states. Thus, their ontology primarily stands out as having the dual distinction between essences and attributes (causal states/non-causal states). Under the heading of the essences are the substances, divine essences with the accidents, and divine meanings, while all states whether causal or not are incorporated under the attributes. Here, entities falling within the scope of essences represent the particular reality, while the states incorporated under the scope of the attributes stand out as mere properties.[18]

18   Although al-Bāqillānī rejected the theory of the states in his early works such as *al-Tamhīd*, he is understood to have championed this theory in works such as *Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn* and *al-Naqḍ al-kabīr* based on al-Juwaynī's report. Al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil*, (al-Nashār et al.), 630. Also, see Jan Thiele, "Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī's (d. 321/933) Theory of 'States' (*aḥwāl*) and its Adaption by Ash'arite Theologians", *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology*, Ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016), 376.
Al-Juwayni, who interprets al-Bāqillānī's different approaches to this theory to be that "attributes can either way be established by rejecting or accepting the states," must be noted as having discussed the subject of attributes in the Ash'arite *Kalām* using both methods in his work *al-Shāmil*, which he wrote before *al-Irshād*. However, in *al-Irshād*, he only approaches the subject of attributes through the method of states. Therefore, in a comprehensive work such as *al-Shāmil*, particular attention should be paid to the points where al-Juwaynī is just a transmitter of the Ash'arite heritage or an adopter of their views. In this context, when the theory in question is defended, other than the title of the states, no other category of attributes is discussed. Therefore, a *thing* is either an essence (substances, accidents or God's dhât, ma'na) or an attribute (causal states or non-causal states). While this is the approach an Ash'arite defender of the states such as al-Juwaynī would take to this subject, we believe the claim that the predicate in the proposition "God exists" not being a non-causal state but rather a *nafsī* attribute to be wrong. Fedor Benevich, who argued that not every *nafsī* attribute corresponds to a non-causal state according to al-Juwaynī, attempted to justify his claim by referring to *al-Shāmil*; Fedor Benevich, "The Classical Ash'arit Theory of Aḥwāl: Juwaynī and His Opponents", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 27.2 (2016): 143–44. For this reference, see al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 308. However, reaching such a conclusion from the relevant reference is quite difficult because, regardless of whether the states are being championed or not, the predicates in the propositions "Substance-*a* exists" and "God exists" indicate the subject of the proposition according to Ash'arite thought. In other words, existence is synonymous with essence (substances, accidents or God's dhât, ma'na). Accepting existence in some way to be a real attribute would have led the Ash'arite *Kalāmī system to the theory of pre-existence (shay'iyyat al-ma'dūm)* as widely accepted by the Mu'tazilites. In this context, al-Juwaynī asserted that no attribute named existence (*wujūd*) should occur in the six points in *al-Shāmil* and emphasized this attribute to only be an attribute *tawassu'an* [in a manner of speaking]. Al-Juwaynī, *Kitāb al-Irshād ilā qawāṭi' al-adilla fī uṣūl al-i'tiqād*, Ed. Muhammad Yusuf Mūsā (Cairo: Maktabat al-Hanjī), 31; al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.) 177, 576; Abū al-'Izz al-Muqtaraḥ, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, Ed. Naziha Ma'rij, I (Lebanon: Dār Ibn Hazm 2014), 222. Indeed, phrases that lead to the interpretation of existence (*wujūd*) as an attribute are encountered in the Ash'arite sources of that period. However, these phrases need to be analyzed within the integrity of al-Juwaynī's system of thought. In this context, Richard M. Frank divided attributes into two: those with reality (in the realm of the real/metaphysics) and those that are mere words (in the realm of words/logic). The perception

I. The Form of the States

The model of universals in *Kalām* atomism involves the states and has several axioms attributed to them. These axioms define the framework of the theory of the states. As a result of this framework, al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī's account of the theory of the states differ in some respects from both the theory adopted by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī and the philosophical models of universals. These axioms are as follows:

Axiom 1: The states are not the essence itself. In the *Kalām* ontology, real propositions are made for particular subjects and universal predicates. In this regard, the constituting subject of the proposition "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" indicates a concrete reality, while the predicate indicates a universal constant. The fundamental claim of states theorists is that the predicate is not merely a word but that a common state is intended by it. Therefore, as per Axiom 1, the constant indicated by the predicate of the aforementioned proposition in the temporal realm represents a common attribute for each substance (substance-*a*, substance-*b*, substance-*c*, etc.) that carries the accidents of knowledge (knowledge-1, knowledge-2, knowledge-3, etc.). In other words, the predicate of the proposition does not indicate substance-*a*, it instead indicates one common constant that cannot be the subject of arithmetic multiplicity. To use the technical theological expression, the states are other than the thing possessing the state (*dhū al-ḥāl*) to whom they are applied.

For the pre-Juwaynian theologians who rejected the theory of states, only the subject of a proposition such "Substance-*a* is an occupier of space" is accepted as real (truth). In this context, according to them, the predicate "occupier of space" only indicates the substance-*a*. In that sense, only one reality exists, and it is none other than substance-*a*. However, for those who adopt the states, if Axiom 1 is

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of an expression such as existence to be a common value for all existents does not transcend a linguistic description (see Frank, "The Ashʿarite Ontology", 177). Al-Anṣārī's statement about the attribute of *wujūd* being "it is the expression applicable to all beings/*al-ʿibāra al-sahīha li kull mawjūd*" also supports this interpretation (see al-Anṣārī, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, I, 42b). In addition, the relevant reference contains the question "What is the *nafsī* attribute according to you?" The [plural] pronoun for you in this question is not meant only to al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī. It is asked to all Ashʿarites of that period as a whole. Therefore, for the Ashʿarites, even if the states were not defined as *nafsī* attributes, they would still be referred to. However, because these attributes are reduced to essences, they do not possess an ontological value and cannot be more than the *tawassuʿ* [so-called] attributes. In short, if the states are not defended, the predicates and judgments in "substance-*a* is an occupier of space, is existent, and is temporal," mean nothing more than substance-*a* from an ontological standpoint.

not accepted, several of the propositions that are constructed become meaningless (tautological) because when the terms representing both the subject and the predicate are held to indicate only the substance-*a*, the proposition "substance-*a* is an occupier of space" is rendered equivalent to the statement "substance-*a* is substance-*a*." That would result in the meaninglessness of propositions. Al-Juwaynī refers to Axiom 1 using the following statements:

> Anyone who knows the existence of the substance but is unaware of its space-occupying [property] can later on become fully knowledgeable of this information. So, when the knowledge about the existence of the substance and its being space-occupying come together in that person, the opponent [known as the rival in the argument] cannot avoid the following two situations: either[19] the admission that both are the same information, in which case he will be dumbfounded because we have firmly demonstrated that information about the existence of the substance can be confirmed even though the space-occupying [property] is not known. Had the information about being space-occupying been the same as the information about the existence of the substance, it would have been impossible not to know it as being space-occupying when the existence of the substance is known… As it has come to light that both are two [different] pieces of information in themselves and that one can be known without the other being known, we will break down the argument: We say, "Are these two pieces of information related to one piece of knowledge or two pieces of knowledge? If the opponent claims it to be related to two pieces of knowledge, one of these two pieces of knowledge is the existing substance to him." Then he will be asked, "Can you show us the other piece of knowledge?" Thus, his claim is shaken and he has no choice but to show something other than the existence of the substance.[20]

Abū Hāshim, whose main purpose in formulating the theory of the states was to make propositions such as "God is knowledgeable" meaningful, attempted to solve the problem of divine attributes using Axiom 1. In fact, as indicated above, the terms representing the subject and the predicate in the proposition indicating the same thing lead to a meaningless construction of the proposition. In other words, it gains a repetitive propositional structure such as "God is God." This axiom applies to both state proponents and realists,[21] regardless of their schools of thought.

Axiom 2: Unification and dissociation are provided through states. Substances, through non-causal states and *nafsī* attributes such as being a

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19 In Arabic, the expression "immā … wa-immā…" [either… or…] is always employed together. But in this passage, al-Juwaynī employs "either" [immā] without employing "or" [wa-immā].

20 Al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 635.

21 For example, as per the determined Axiom of Unity of Idealism, 'A predicate such as B indicates only one, and only one idea of B-ness exists. This idea itself is called B' is then an inference indicating that the predicates in the propositions are 'other' than their subjects. For this axiom, see Teo Grünberg & David Grünberg, *Metafizik*, Ed. İskender Taşdelen (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi, 2010), 36.

substance, occupying space, or being indivisible dissociate themselves from the kinds of accidents. Likewise, although red-1 and blue-1 unite in being a color, they are dissociated from each other in terms of being red or being blue. If Axiom 2 is rejected, these predicates that are applied to particulars will amount to nothing but mere words. This will essentially lead to the conclusion that the dissociation of substances from accidents or the dissociation of the kinds of accidents from each other is based on absolute nothingness. Therefore, because substances and accidents are self-evidently known to dissociate from each other through certain properties, these properties having an ontological status necessarily follows. Abū al-ʿIzz al-Muqtaraḥ (d. 612/1215), one of the commentators on al-Juwaynī's *al-Irshād*, classified the debate about general and specific meanings obtained through words as follows:

> The debate on this issue revolves around the issue of ʿumūm and khuṣūṣ [general and specific]. That is because we know that [the accidents of] black and white have a common point, which is color. However, both are different from each other in terms of blackness and whiteness. What they have in common must be meaningfully different from what makes them different in meaning. On this issue, people are divided into three groups: one group states the idea of general and specific to relate to the property of words and not their meanings. For them, while the meaning of a general is the capacity of a word to encompass multiple referents, the meaning of a specific is the allocation of a word to only one referent and its limitation to only that. Another group objects to connecting such things to words and states color to be an attribute and blackness to be a different attribute. Thus, the accident called black possesses two attributes; being a color and being black. A third group of theologians, on the other hand, reduces these to an item of consideration or conceptual entities and avoids the possibility of these becoming attributes for the attributed. Sometimes the third group pronounces the statement, "Mental concepts are part of reality." Philosophers, meanwhile, say that these are just things belonging to the mental and have no existence beyond a mental one; they also say that absolutes (al-muṭlaq) do not possess an existence in the external world apart from a mental one.[22]

By also adding the philosophical view in the above passage while pointing to Axiom 2, al-Muqtaraḥ examines the predicate of the proposition "white-1 is a color" under four main groups: (i) the word, (ii) the *nafsī* attribute [the non-causal state], (iii) *wujūh/iʿtibār* [mere consideration/merely conceptual], and (iv) mental existence. The first three of these views belong to the *Kalām* tradition, and the fourth one belongs to the philosophical tradition. However, the tripartite classification in question does not apply to al-Bāqillānī or al-Juwaynī for, according to them, before the emergence of the theory of states, such attributes had already

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22   Al-Muqtaraḥ, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, I, 307–308.

been expressed in the form of *wujūh/i'tibār*, and those who resorted to these expressions had implicitly used the theory of states.[23] In short, for al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, theologians are divided into two groups: those who accept the theory of states and those who do not.

Axiom 2 is about the non-causal state, the truth, and the *nafsī* attributes. As per this axiom, the unification and dissociation between beings are provided through non-causal states. Therefore, the identical (*mithl*) nature of substance-*a*, substance-*b*, and substance-*c*, stems from their being singular in all of the *nafsī* attributes.[24] According to al-Juwaynī and his fellow predecessors who defended the states, true definitions in the *Kalām* tradition in this context are to be produced on the basis of states because of this axiom. In fact, because the philosophical tradition considers universals to be the material for definitions in that they provide the unification and dissociation between being and concepts, states have been conceived to perform a similar function as the states are also the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism.

For Abū Hāshim, the axiom is as follows: "[The property of] being the identical or being different between essences is provided through *akhaṣṣ al-awṣāf* [the essential

23   Among the early theologians, al-Bāqillānī and Ibn Fūrak had different opinions on whether or not the states as used by Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī are necessary implications of the system. Ibn Fūrak argued that, in the thought system of Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī, the predicate (i.e., judgment or causal state) in the proposition "Substance-*a* is moving" is no different (*zāid*) from its subject, which is substance-*a* (*wa laysa kawnuhū mutaḥarrikan akthar min dhātih*). The claim that the subject and the predicate indicate the same thing in this proposition leads to the conclusion that the theory of states had been rejected by Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī. Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad*, 319. On the other hand, al-Juwaynī, who referred to al-Bāqillānī, pointed out the states to have been used implicitly by Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī: al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 631. Al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, a student of al-Juwaynī, expressed this situation by quoting a striking passage from al-Bāqillānī: "al-Qāḍī [al-Bāqillānī] said: Why do you continue bothering me in saying that I accepted the states while Shaykh Abū al-Hasan [al-Ash'arī] did not accept them?" This is a misunderstanding. Abū al-Hasan used the states and his books are full of states. For he used to say, 'Something can be known in one aspect and not known in another aspect (*qad yu'lam shay' min wajh wa yujhal min wajh*).' This, is a defense of the states. He just used to say aspect (*wajh*) where we say state". (al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 116b). al-Bāqillānī, who argued the concepts of *wujūh* and *i'tibār* to be synonyms for the states, clearly agreed with al-Juwaynī (al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p. 83). However, al-Muqtaraḥ, one of the commentators of *al-Irshād*, asserted that he had not agreed with this claim (al-Muqtaraḥ, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, I, 310-311). What these concepts meant for the theologians before al-Ghazzālī and the theologians after al-Ghazzālī is worth mentioning.

24   This unity and dissociation achieved through non-causal states was conceptualized as *mumāthala* and *mukhālafa* in the *Kalām* literature of that period. Our opinion is that translating *mumāthala* in particular to be meaning homogeneous would not be appropriate. Indeed, *mushābaha* between two bodies can be indicated by the concept of *mushābih* (i.e., being homogeneous). But, two particulars and concrete entities such as substance-*a* and substance-*b* being one in all *nafsī* attributes is not explained by the concept of *mushābaha* [homogeneity] because substance-*a* and substance-*b* are the identical in all aspects. Therefore, defining the concept of *mumāthala* as being identical would be more appropriate.

attribute]." According to Abū ʿAli al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916), the condition of necessity (*wujūb*) embedded in the attribute of the essence is what sets the eternal essence apart from temporal essences. In other words, even though Zayd and God share the attribute of being knowledgeable, because God's attributes are conditioned with necessity, they do not stand in unison with the attribute Zayd possesses. Therefore, the occurrence of God and Zayd as one in the predicate of some propositions does not entail a complete unity. However, Abū Hāshim underscored the insufficiency of this condition of necessity based on several reasons. According to him, every single essence can only be dissociated from others through a unique attribute. He then refers to this unique attribute as '*akhaṣṣ al-awṣāf*'.[25] For Abū Hāshim, the unique attribute of God, which is being eternal in this regard, is His non-causal state. The essence of God is differentiated (*mukhālafa*) from others through this attribute, and God possesses such an attribute by virtue of His Being (*li-dhātih*). States such as being knowledgeable or being alive or being existent have been dealt with under a separate concept due to the necessary implications of this attribute (*limā huwa ʿalayh fī-dhātihī*).[26] Each one of these attributes, including God's most unique attribute, is a state.[27] The reason for this is that, according to the proponents of the states, being identical (*mumāthala*) or having differences (*mukhālafa*) among the essences is something that is achieved through non-causal states. The difference is therefore that while the inequivalence between two essences' non-causal states is sufficient for them to have differences for the Ashʿarite defenders of states, such difference only arises alongside the most unique attribute for Abū Hāshim and his followers. Hence, if the eternal essence differs from temporal essences on the basis of the most unique attribute, the most unique attribute (i.e., essential attribute) must also be a state just like the other attributes mentioned. If the classification of attributes ascribed to Abū Hāshim were to be evaluated from the point of view of al-Juwaynī, the dual categorization of essences appearing under separate headings such as the essential attribute (being eternal) and the attributes of essence (being knowledgeable, being powerful, being existent) would be rather artificial.[28] This is

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25 According to al-Juwaynī, the concept of *akhaṣṣ al-awṣāf* was first introduced to Muʿtazilite thought by Ibn al-Ikhshīd (d. 326/938), a contemporary of Abū Hāshim. See al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 292–93.

26 Richard M. Frank, *Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of Basrian School of the Muʿtazila in the Classical Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), 53.

27 For the essential attribute also being acknowledged as a state. See Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, 183, 9; al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 308–18.

28 Al-Juwaynī classified the attributes of the Muʿtazilite in four ways. Under the first two titles, he placed the attributes of the *nafs* (non-causal states) and the attributes of meaning (causal state) respectively

because, had Abū Hāshim been able to dissociate the essence of God from other essences using attributes such as being knowledgeable or being powerful, no need would exist for the essential attribute. From an ontological point of view, no exact distinction would be able to exist in this context between the essential attribute and the attributes of the essence. From an epistemological point of view, however, one can speak of the existence of a necessary relationship between these two types of attributes. In fact, when the most unique attribute of essence is apprehended, its attributes of essence are also apprehended. For example, the accident of black-1 carried by substance-*a* possesses the most unique attribute that is the essential attribute and is different (*mukhālafa*) from other essences though that attribute. When the essential attribute of this accident is apprehended, its attributes of essence such as being a color, being an accident, and being a thing are also apprehended. Therefore, the epistemic relationship between these two kinds of attributes is occasionally considered to be an ontological relationship. In other words, this type of distinction between the *dhāt* [essence] of being eternal and the *dhātī* [essential] of being knowledgeable or being powerful or so forth is the result of an aspiration to demonstrate the narrow scope of God and the broad scope of God and Zayd. Al-Muqtaraḥ, one of the commentators on al-Juwaynī's *al-Irshād*, connected this relationship between the *essence-attribute* binary and the *essence-based* attributes to concepts of classical logic within the context of *akhaṣṣ al-awṣāf* because as long as an essence (*māhiyya*) is known to be rational, knowledge of its being a human, alive, and a substance also follows. Al-Muqtaraḥ argued thusly that this relationship is one of necessary implication and then underscored the idea of *akhaṣṣ al-awṣāf* in Mu'tazilite thought to have been borrowed from classical logic.[29]

Axiom 3: **States are ontological.** This axiom is mostly valid for the thought system of the Ash'arite school. In fact, the properties in this system of thought

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(al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil*, al-Nashār et al., 309). It would seem that for al-Juwaynī, who interpreted the Mu'tazilites' understanding of the attributes from an ontological standpoint, no significant distinction appears to exist between the essential attributes and the attributes of the essence in the realm of the eternal. Therefore, for Abū Hāshim, only a difference in scope might exist between the essential attribute of being eternal and the attribute of the essence being knowledgeable. This is because, while the state of being knowledgeable encompasses Zayd, the state of being eternal is valid only for the essence of God. However, Richard M. Frank, while asserting that this division of the attributes attributed to prominent Mu'tazilite scholars does not fully reflect the Mu'tazilite view, he drew attention to this division having been shaped in accordance with al-Juwaynī's sectarian concerns, see Frank, *Beings and Their Attributes*, 38. Nonetheless, Jan Thiele stated Abū Hāshim's followers to have been unable to secure a particular standard in this regard, especially with regard to the essential attribute (*ṣıfat nafs*; see Thiele, "Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī's", 371).

29   Al-Muqtaraḥ, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, I, 234.

are only applicable to particular or real existents in the temporal realm. Therefore, every state (*ḥāl*) necessarily entails a particular and real possessor of state (*zu al-ḥāl*). For Abū Hāshim, however, this axiom is more flexible, and states are indexed to more than real existence. In other words, things possessing a state are eligible to carry the attribute of existence even before their existence. In fact, existence (*wujūd*) is considered an attribute according to the vast majority of Mu'tazilites.[30] We can exemplify the idea of existence being considered as an attribute or the idea that the *nafsī* attributes (i.e. non-causal states) apply to pre-existing constants (essence and things) as follows: Substance-*a* and accident-1 have the potential, even before their existence, to carry the attribute of existence here considered a property. However, both of these can also be subjected to the intellect even before their possession of this property. Based on this, what then makes substance-*a* a substance or red-1 red? According to the defenders of the states in the Mu'tazilite tradition, the answer to this question is the non-causal state (*akhaṣṣ al-awṣāf*). Therefore, the starting point of this axiom for Mu'tazilites is the realm of pre-existence.

As per Axiom 3, states can only be addressed from a propositional standpoint. The reason for this is that states are attributes and, as attributes, cannot be conceived except through an immediate preconception of the essences they are describing.[31] In this context, unlike the system of philosophical thought, knowledge in theological thought is not classified into concepts (*taṣawwurāt*) and propositions (*taṣdīqāt*). The proposition-centered way of thinking is especially prominent in the theological literature of al-Juwaynī and early theologians, so much so that even the states, which had been designed by considering the dynamics of *Kalām* atomism, could not be said to have paved the way for conceptual thinking. In this context, instances of the theory of the states have constantly been expressed in the format of *kawnuhū kadh*a *kadhā* (it being such and such).[32] In short, this axiom confines the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism (i.e., the states) to the predicates of propositions.

Axiom 4: States cannot be applied to states.[33] This clearly distinguishes the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism (i.e., the theory of the states) from the

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30   For the differences of opinion regarding this issue in the Mu'tazilite school, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *al-Fāiq fī uṣūl al-dīn*, Ed. Faysal Budayr Han (Cairo: Dār al-kutub wa-l-wathāiq al-qawmiyya, 2010), 82, 133.

31   Richard M. Frank refers to Axiom 3 in that states do not have independent ontological reality like substance and accidents; Frank, "Abū Hāshim's Theory of the 'States'", 92–93. Orhan Şener Koloğlu described this aspect of the states as "the critical point of the theory," see Orhan Şener Koloğlu, "Ebû Hâşim el-Cübbâî'nin Ahvâl Teorisi Üzerine Bazı Mülahazalar", *Uludağ İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 16/2 (2007): 208.

32   For these type of examples see al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 630.

33   Al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 698.

model of universals in classical philosophy. In fact, the prominent aspect of the Aristotelian model of universals is that, beyond the figurative narrative, universals can be predicated on universals in a real (*ḥaqīqī*) sense. This mindset enables the application of abstract universals to other abstract universals and led the way to abstract entities being championed. The following can be quoted from Aristotle regarding this acceptance:

> Species becomes the predicate to the person, the genus to the species, and both to the person.[34]

> Human [as a universal] can be a predicate to any human being. Animal [as a universal] can also be a predicate to the human being. Therefore, an animal necessarily becomes a predicate of the [particular] animal. For the human being [as a particular] is both a human and an animal.[35]

The above section and passage make a clear statement: Classical philosophy does not adhere to Axiom 4 of the theologians who champion the theory of the states. Following this Aristotelian framework, a human (as a universal in the real sense) can be subject to another universal predicate,[36] whereas states, which represent the universals in *Kalām* atomism, are only accepted as predicates in propositions. The subjects of these propositions also can only consist of particulars. In this context, we can make the following generalization: In the Aristotelian framework, universals are predicable to both particulars and universals, whereas states are only predicable to particulars. The main difference between these two schools has also shaped how concepts are viewed. In fact, the aforementioned understanding of the predicates in classical philosophy laid the groundwork for the depth of concepts (*intension/mafhūm*), the relations between the four relationships (*al-nisab al-arbaʿa*), the understanding of the five universals (*al-kuliyyāt al-khams*)[37], and the

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34 Aristotle, "Kitāb al-Maqūlāt", *en-Naṣṣ al-kāmil li-mantiq Aristū*, Tran. Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus al-Kunnāī, Ed. Farīd Jabr, I (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1999), 44 (3a: 30).

35 Aristotle, *Kitāb al-Maqūlāt*, I, 36 (1b: 10).

36 The consideration of universals as the subject of propositions in the real sense without the need for reduction (*taʾwīl*) is a matter of general agreement in the scholarly field of Aristotelianism. However, the debates and disagreements among the commentators of Aristotle regarding the relation of universals to each other should be stated as being beyond the scope of our topic. For these discussions and in-depth analyses, see İbrahim Halil Üçer, İbn Sînâ Felsefesinde Suret, Cevher ve Varlık (İstanbul: Klasik, 2017), 123.

37 Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī referred to three kind of states on behalf of Abū Hāshim; Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna al-Firaq wa bayna al-firqa al-nājiya minhum* (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1977), 183. Harry Wolfson also argued, by paying due consideration to the essences, for four of the five universals of Porphyrus (d. 304) to be able to be achieved through this classification from al-Baghdādī (Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 188). However, to reach such a conclusion when considering Axiom 4 would be very difficult. In fact, universal subjects had no place for the theologians

categorical way of thinking. However, because of Axiom 4, this phenomenon did not gain validity in the context of the states as the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism.

Axiom 5: States transcend existence. Regardless of ontological differences regarding the eternal and the temporal, states are designed to incorporate only existence in Ashʿarites thinking, but both existence and the permanently pre-existing things in Muʿtazilite thought. The attribution of such an axiom to states basically aims to provide the basis for talking about God. In fact, the predicates in the propositions "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" and "God is knowledgeable" are one. Axiom 5, attributed to the states, is what provides the basis for such oneness (i.e., unity). Had the term of being knowledgeable, which assumes the position of predicate to both propositions, not been indicative of the constant that is one, the information they represented would lead to ambiguity. The reason being that the proposition "substance-*a* is knowledgeable" would have turned into the form of "substance-*a* is *X*" and the proposition "God is knowledgeable" into "God is *Y*." In this case, what is meant by the attribute of knowledgeable as attributed to God would be rendered unclear. Al-Juwaynī's student, al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, summarized this point as follows:

> These [*meaning the states*] *are universal propositions, and you can only know them in a general manner. It is ingrained in your mind (*fī fahmik*) that being knowledgeable stems from knowledge, that the Eternal Being is knowledgeable, and that He possesses knowledge as well. Therefore, there is no distinction between the invisible and the visible. On the contrary, your invisible is your visible and your visible is your invisible. This indeed is certainty. Let us turn this into an example. An example of this is when you say: When it is certain to me that all* As *are* B *and all* Bs *are* C*, it is also certain that all* As *are* C.[38]

The logical implication of this axiom is the removal of the states outside the scope of creation. The technical theological expression of this would be that states are not *majʿūl* [a product of creation].[39]

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of that period. In addition, although the term *sifāt al-ajnās*, which evokes the genus from the five universals, had been used by the theologians of that period, they did not intend the genus in classical philosophy (Frank, *Beings and Their Attributes*, 72–73). Even in everyday language, communication should be noted to have been ensured by establishing four relationships between concepts. Therefore, the theologians of that period can be said to have established relationships between concepts. The point being emphasized is that, if the states are the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism, Axiom 4 eliminates the relation network of states.

38   Al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 22b.

39   In the tradition of Muʿtazilite *Kalām*, both states and *dhū al-ḥāl*s [pre-existing things] are not considered

II. The Scope of the States

The theory of the states differs from the philosophical model of universals in terms of scope as much as it differs in terms of form. In classical philosophy, the predicate of the proposition "Zayd is a human" is universal, and this universal is applicable to people or objects such as Zayd, Amr, and Hind. Therefore, the realm of bodies (i.e., objects) is the primary addressee (i.e., target) of philosophical universals. Keeping this point in mind, the scope of the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism (i.e., the states) must be investigated. In respect to this, one needs to question whether the predicates in the propositions "Zayd is a human" or "This date palm is a palm tree" correspond to the kind of state from a theological point of view just as the predicates in the propositions of "Substance-*a* is an occupier of space" and "Substance-*a* is red" are states. When inquiring into the subject of states from this perspective, one notices that the Ash'arites championing the states view theological universals and truths in the temporal world to be limited to the building blocks of bodies/objects (the substances and the accidents). Hence, one can easily assert that the states differ from the philosophical universals in terms of scope, similar to the way they differ in terms of form. To clarify this point of view, examining two key terms becomes imperative. These two terms (*qalb al-ḥaqāiq* [the transformation of truths] and *ta'līf* [combination]) frequently occur in the *Kalām* literature.

Similar to the essentialist perspective, theologians also agree that truths cannot be transformed. They express this aspect in the form of *qalb al-ḥaqāiq muḥālun*. Based on this, a substance cannot be separated from its *nafsī* attribute. It cannot transcend its own definition and become something else. For instance, being a substance, occupying space, and being indivisible are all *nafsī* attributes for substances and simultaneously stand as common truths. Thus, according to the principle of the non-transformation of truths, a substance-*a* cannot be separated from the truth of being a substance and acquire the state of being an accident. This is true for accidents as well. Because the accident of red-1 possesses the *nafsī* attributes of being red, being a color, and being an accident, its transformation from red to green or from a color to a smell or from an accident to a substance is deemed impossible because that implies the transformation of truth.[40] While this is the case for the building blocks

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maj'ūl. The Ash'ari *Kalām* tradition, on the other hand, was indecisive about the existence of states. For more information, see Mehmet Aktaş, "Cüveynî'de Tanım Teorisi" (PhD diss, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2020), 143–51.

40   Among the theologians are different views on the possibility of bodies transforming into accidents and accidents into bodies. Accordingly, the majority consider substances transforming into accidents

of objects in the temporal world, this situation is inversed when it comes to objects. In fact, although theologians consider a substance transforming into an accident to be impossible as well as for a given accident to transform into another kind of accident, they evaluate the transformation of a staff and a snake, both of which are objects, into each other within the domain of rational possibilities. This perspective theologians have can be explained by restricting *nafsī* attributes only to the building blocks of objects. Al-Juwaynī also referred to this topic found in many theological works by using the following expressions:

> If one asks, "What is impossible for the substance," we will say, "It is impossible for it to transcend its nafsī attribute because in this case, the transformation of the genus would occur."[41]

As understood from the passage above and other similar ones, no possibility logically exists (*muḥāl ʿaqlī*) for a substance in its true sense to transform into another substance or any other accident. For a substance has *nafsī* attributes, and for this substance to transcend its *nafsī* attributes and therefore contradict its true definition is contradictory to the perception of truth as designed by theologians. Likewise, the transformation of the accident of red-1 into a substance or another accident is considered to fall under this domain of impossibility. This aspect is attributed to the building blocks of objects but is ignored when dealing with the entirety of objects out of concern for some theological explanations regarding miracles. For this reason, this perception of truth (i.e., immutability and non-transformation) does not apply in reality at the level of objects, which have been built from stockpiles of substance and accidents. Therefore, although the transformation of a staff into a snake and a snake back into a staff being considered impossible under normal conditions does not contradict the understanding of truth on which *Kalām* atomism is based. On the contrary, it is compatible with it. The following passage from al-Juwaynī and other similar thinkers should be evaluated within this framework:

> It is possible for fresh blood to flow in valleys and for mountains to turn into solid gold. However, for a rational person to express in life that such a thing is possible means they have lost their mental stability.[42]

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or accidents into each other to be impossible. For different theologians' views on the subject, see al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, II, 276.

41   Al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 165. For similar expressions, see 233–234, 541; al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, 22.

42   Al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, 180. cf. pp. 311–312, 317–319.

Ta'līf [combination] is another key term designating the non-inclusion of objects in the *nafsī* attributes, as per Axiom 3, in which the states only include existents according to Ash'arites. In other words, only the particular and real existents can have a common truth. In this context, non-existents (*ma'dumāt*) cannot be said to possess any truth. As clearly stated above, substance-*a* and substance-*b* have a common truth (i.e., being a substance). This is also the case for the accidents of black-1 and black-2, both of which can be said to possess the common truth of being black. However, will a new truth emerge when substance-*a* and substance-*b* are brought side by side in certain proportions and put in contact with each other? The answer to this question can give an idea about whether *nafsī* attributes, non-causal states, and truths exist at the level of objects.

According to the Ash'arites' theory regarding substance and accident, every accident can be carried by only one substance. As per this acknowledgment, because the existence of an accident shared by substance-*a* and substance-*b* is unacceptable, some kind of accident called *ta'līf* that will serve as a concrete link between substances is not acknowledged.[43] Therefore, if an accident called *ta'līf* does not exist, it can have no stable truth either. In other words, substance-*a* and the accident of red-1 existing causes them to possess the *nafsī* attribute. However, no permanent truth exists that speaks of some kind of accident that we could choose to call *ta'līf*-1. For the Ash'arites, because *ta'līf* is not considered an accident, the predicate in the proposition "substance-*a* and substance-*b* are combined (*mu'allaf*)" does not indicate a state. In fact, the explanatory statement of the proposition "substance-*a* is red" is that of "substance-*a* is red because it carries the accident of red-1," with the predicate here indicating a causal state. However, the explanation of the proposition of "substance-*a* and substance-*b* are combined" in the manner of "substance-*a* and substance-*b* combine because they share the accident of combination," is not valid according to the Ash'arite advocates of the states. In light of this information, the terms *ta'līf* as an accident and *mu'allaf* as a causal state have no significant value beyond being mere words. Therefore, why should the truth, which cannot be attributed to the structure of the smallest volume consisting of two substances, be attributed to bodies such as humans and palm trees? In light of

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43   For *ta'līf* being an accident and for a judgment having been given regarding the combination of two substances, see Ibn al-Muttawayh, *al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-l-a'rād*, Eds. Sāmī Naṣr Latif & Faysal Budayr 'Awn (Cairo: Dār al-Saqāfa, 1975), 35, 583. Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/931) from the Mu'tazilite school does not accept *ta'līf* as a kind of accident, see Abū Rashid al-Nīsābūrī, *al-Masāil fī-l-khilāf bayna al-Baṣriyyīn wa-l-Baghdādiyyīn*, Ed. Ma'n Ziyāda & Riḍwan al-Sayyid (Beirut: Ma'hadul İnmā al-Arabi, 1979), 219.

these explanations, the following passage from Abū al-Qāsim al-Anṣārī, one of al-Juwaynī's students, regarding the acceptance of truths to be limited to substances and accidents is particularly striking:

> If we are asked, "What is the definition of a human according to you?" we would say, "Those who have this body and shape (form) are human. All linguists and lexicographers are of this opinion. The Qur'ān also has declared the same. Scholars and Arab sayings are also in agreement about this visible body being what a human is. This is what is commonly meant by human." What the [linguists] mean by the [words] horse, house, and palm is the knowledge of this horse, this palm, and this mosque. If anyone claims that a human is not this body, then he must say the same to everything he points at. Similar to the way we know for certain that linguists mean by the words horse, house, and palm tree the [apparent] horse, house, and palm tree, we know that by the word human they also mean the visible body.[44]

For the Ash'arites who champion the states, expressions such as the truth of the substance, the truth of the accident, and the truth of the body clearly do not have the same depth of meaning as to the usages of truth. In fact, truth as a term in the first two expressions refers to *nafsī* attributes (i.e., the non-causal states), whereas truth as a term in the expression "the truth of the body" refers to a certain proportion of contact between substance-*a* and substance-*b*. The Ash'arite theologians call this rapprochement and contact *ta'līf* and indicate that what the name in question refers to is a stockpile of substance and accidents. For instance, similar to the way the expression "shoulder to shoulder" would be used for Zayd and Amr walking shoulder to shoulder, the expression "being/body *ta'līf/mu'allaf*" is used for the contact between substance-*a* and substance-*b*. In this context, just as being shoulder to shoulder does not give rise to a common truth, neither does being *ta'līf/mu'allaf* generate any truth. Therefore, the predicates of the propositions "substance-*a* is indivisible" and "red-1 is a color" stand as the *nafsī* attribute, the non-causal state, the true definition, and the truth for their subjects. This truth has a reality that transcends language. However, from the above passage, no true common truth is clearly understood to be attributed to bodies/objects apart from

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44   Al-Anṣārī, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, II, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Laleli 2247, 95b–96a. For similar expression, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad*, 308. Richard M. Frank drew attention to the idea that only the substances and accidents have *nafsī* attributes while the bodies consist of [their togetherness as] a whole. Therefore, no unifying element such as the soul/*nafs* exists beyond the bodies (Richard M. Frank, "Abū Hāshim's Theory of the 'States'", 90). Parallel to the background of this view, Ayman Shihadeh, who examines human anthropology in detail in the context of the early theologians, argued the theological meaning of human as a term does not go beyond the linguistic structure, see Ayman Shihadeh, "Classical Ash'arī Anthropology: Body, Life and Spirit", *The Muslim World* 102 (2012): 441.

a linguistic one. Therefore, one should not equate being a substance with being a palm tree, as used by the Ashʿarites of that period, nor thusly subject them to the same evaluation.

According to the Ashʿarites who championed the states, no object arising from a pile stock constituted of substance and accident is considered in itself (i.e., as an object) a carrier of property/quality. Propositions about objects have a figurative narrative, regardless of the objects having an accident of life or not. Such propositions can only be freed from their metaphorical (i.e., figurative) nature by reducing them to the substance-accident format. Let me once again quote an example from al-Anṣārī:

> The difference of opinion between us [and the Muʿtazila] revolves around judgments. Judgments for us are based on the whole. According to us, judgements have an extensive usage (tawassuʿ) and a metaphorical form based on the whole. They, in contrast, base [judgments on the body] with no metaphor.[45]

The states, which theologians consider to be the common predicates of particular and true existents, are also referred to as judgments. Judgments are mostly used in instances of causal states. Namely, only one substance such as substance-*a* can carry the accident of knowledge-1. Whatever substance is carrying the accident of knowledge-1 acquires both the state and the attribute emerging from the process of carrying. Therefore, if substance-*a* carries the accident of knowledge-1, the judgment is made that substance-*a* is knowledgeable. This is a real proposition that requires no reduction (*taʾwīl*). However, the situation differs for the proposition "Zayd is knowledgeable" because Zayd as a body consists of the juxtaposition of huge numbers of substances in certain proportions. According to the Ashʿarites of that period, the accident of knowledge-1 cannot be carried by Zayd's body due to every accident being carried by only one substance. As an example, among the substances belonging to Zayd's body in this regard, only substance-*a* would carry the accident of knowledge-1. For this reason, Zayd's body is not what deserves the judgment of being knowledgeable but rather the substance-*a* in his body.[46] In this context, the proposition "Zayd is knowledgeable" is reduced to the proposition "Because substance-*a* belonging to Zayd's body carries the accident of

45   Al-Anṣārī, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, II, 93b.
46   Richard M. Frank, "Bodies and Atoms: The Ashʿarite Analysis", *Classical Islamic Theology: The Ashʿarites Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām III,* Richard M. Frank, Ed. Dimitri Gutas (Hampshire: Ashgate Variorum, 2008), 289.

knowledge-1, this single substance is knowledgeable." This perspective also shows that, until propositions constructed by the Ashʿarites theologians of that period about objects were reduced to the layer of substance and accidents, they had been unable to free themselves from the metaphorical narrative.[47] Therefore, while the subject and addressee of a predicate such as being knowledgeable is the essences (i.e., quiddities) or the bodies in classical philosophy, in the Ashʿarite *Kalām* they are the building blocks of bodies. Thus, the proponents of the states in the Ashʿarite tradition can be concluded to have nominalist reflexes with regard to the domain of objects but realist reflexes with regard to the building block of objects (i.e., the domain of substance and accidents). The sharp division of reality in the temporal world into objects and their building blocks and the application of *nafsī* attributes to only the building blocks can be said to have brought the Ashʿarite scholars of that period to the position of semi/partial essentialists. Although semi/partial essentialism as a term does not occur in the history of thought, we believe that such a conceptualization can be made with regard to the scope of the states that are the model universals of *Kalām* atomism.

III. The Place of the States

The works of al-Ghazzālī and other later works at times explicitly and at other indirectly stated the states to correspond to the universals (*kuliyyāt*).[48] The fact that they were designed to encompass all of existence by considering a common denominator can be shown as the primary reason for evaluating the states in the category of universals. However, similar to the way the states differ from these models in terms of form and scope, they also differ in terms of their place. Using the introductory passage in Porphyryus' famous work *Isagoge*, let me first list how the philosophical universals are modeled in terms of place. Afterward I will talk about the place of states:

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47   Richard M. Frank, who asserted the *nafsī* attributes to be limited to substances and accidents without distinction between Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites (Richard M. Frank, "Abū Hāshim's The 'States'", 89–90), underscored the judgments about states to be metaphorically ascribed to bodies according to Ashʿarites, see Richard M. Frank, "Al-Ahkām in Classical Ashʿarite Teaching", 757.

48   Richard M. Frank is reserved concerning associating the states with the universals. According to him, reconciling the *Kalām* system with the understanding of universals would undermine the system (see Frank, "Abū Hāshim's Theory of the 'States'", 89). However, Frank does not provide any explanation as to the points in which the understanding of universals undermines the *Kalām* system. If he meant the interpretation of the states as the Platonic or Aristotelian model of universals, his concerns are justified. However, why should an adaptation of the states to *Kalām* atomism as a model of universals undermine it?

First of all, I shall not deal with matters such as whether the genera and species have an existence outside of the mind (a'yān) or are abstract thoughts in the mind, whether their existence is outside of the mind, as a body or not, or whether they are independent of or consist of sensory objects. This is a difficult subject that needs extensive explanation.[49]

Based on this passage, the predicate of human that shapes the proposition "Zayd is a human" indicates a universal. Where is the place of this universal to which existence is attributed? The possible answers to this question can roughly be divided into four: (i) in the mind, (ii) outside of the mind and transcendent of Zayd, (iii) outside the mind and immanent to Zayd, or (though not included in the passage) (iv) in the word.

With regard to the place being (iv) in the word, for those who champion the states, states are clearly designed in a way that transcends words because the explanatory sentence of the proposition "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" according to al-Juwaynī and the theologians before him who rejected the states is as follows: "It is because substance-*a* carries the accident of knowledge-1 that it acquires the appellation of *knowledgeable*." The appellation of knowledgeable as an expression in the explanatory sentence is proof that the opponents of the states in that period approached the propositions regarding objects and the building blocks of the objects with a nominalist reflex.[50] On the other hand, appellation as an expression should not be included in the explanatory sentence of this proposition according to the defenders of states as the term of knowledgeable denotes a state that is considered permanent and transcendent of words. In fact, in his metaphor of an island inhabitant living alone and being deprived of any language, al-Juwaynī states:

One who grew up on an island alone and to whom no language education had ever reached should not be capable of finding a method to prove attributes due to not knowing the language. Likewise, if languages disappear or change and transform while in existence, the truths must also disappear or change and transform, and this is such a great ignorance that is not hard to notice.[51]

49 Porphyry, *İsāgūjī*, Tran. Abū Uthmān al-Dimashqī, Ed. Ahmad Fuād al-Ahwānī (Cairo: Dāru ihyā al-kutub al-Arabiyya, 1952), 67; Porphyry, "Isagoge", *Five Texts on the Medieval problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham*, Tran. & Ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1994), 1.

50 Al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 632; cf. al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (Frank), 48.

51 *Ibid*, 634. For similar expressions. See Abū Bakr Ibn Maymūn, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, Eds. Ahmad Hijāzī & Aḥmad Şaqqā (Egypt: Maktabat al-Angle al-Miṣriyya, 1987), 109.

In this way, he expressed his belief regarding the extent to which truths are transcendent to words. Therefore, the theory of states cannot in any way be reconciled with nominalist theories.

In the Aristotelian model of universals known as moderate realism with regard to the place being (iii) outside the mind and immanent to Zayd, universals are considered to be inside objects. As per this model, what stands as the subject in the proposition "Zayd is a human" arises from the combination between him existing as a tangible object and his human essence (i.e., his quiddity). In other words, human as a universal is one of the essential components of the object Zayd. However, in the theory of states, particular existents constitute the principal category, whereas states or truths are dependent on this category due to their nature as attributes.

With regard to the place being (ii) outside the mind and transcendent of Zayd, the Platonic model of universals/ideas known as extreme realism has ideas as the principal category. Ideas are both real existents and the principle of particular beings that are considered shadows. Plato summarizes this model of universals as follows:

> *What is that which is Existent always and has no becoming? And what is that which is becoming always and never Existent? The first of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning because it is ever uniformly existent. Whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of an unreasoning sense because it becomes and perishes and is never really existent.*[52]

Yes, states do not fall within the scope of the created (*gayr maj'ūl*) and they represent the common truth that provides uniformity to particulars. However, while the ideas are designed to be the principles of particular existents, states are continuously dependent on their *dhū al-ḥāl* due to their nature as attributes. In other words, particular existents are the principle of states. In fact, the explanatory statement of the proposition "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" is as follows: "Because substance-*a* carries the accident of knowledge-1, it acquires the state of knowledgeability." In this explanatory sentence, the cause and principle of the state of knowledgeability is the accident of knowledge-1.

With regard to (i) being in the mind, the utilization of the Aristotelian model of universals that began with al-Juwaynī's *al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh*[53] which was written

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52   Plato, *Timaios*, Trans. Erol Güney & Lütfi Ay (İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınlar, 2001), 23 (28a)

53   Regarding the transition of *Kalām* atomism, which is limited to the kinds of substance and accidents, from its model of universals to the Aristotelian model of universals, which addresses the kinds of objects, having started with al-Juwaynī's *al-Burhān*, see Aktaş, "Cüveynî'de Tanım Teorisi", 257–59.

toward the end of his life and reached its peak through the works written by al-Ghazzālī, culminated in the states being adapted to the universals and also being interpreted as merely mental existents by al-Juwaynī's students and commentators. The theologians who were close to al-Juwaynī's time had the opinion that the theory of universals and the theory of the states were two different expressions of the same thing.[54] Reducing the states from an existence outside the mind to a merely mental existence led to this theory being detached from ontology to becoming a theory evaluated epistemically. However, the origination of this theory is rooted in the resolution of the divine attributes,[55] and as such, this interpretation creates the danger of the divine attributes being merely a design of the mind. Also, given the examples presented regarding this theory, interpreting the states as mental designs would be far-fetched. In this regard, the clearest statement about the place of the states was expressed by al-Shahristanī as:

> Those who reject the states have committed an error by reducing general-specific (ʿāmm-khāṣṣ) expressions to words. But they found the truth through their statement that neither generality nor mental consideration applies to those whose existence is fixed in the aʿyān [outside]. As to those defending the states, they have committed an error by reducing the general-specific expressions to attributes in the aʿyān. Yet they too have found the truth through their statement that these are mental meanings that transcend words. However, proponents of the states should have replaced the phrase "states are neither existent nor non-existent" with the phrase "states are existents as thoughts in the mind.[56]

Al-Shahristānī clearly asserted the states to have an existence that transcends the mind with his statement in the above passage saying, "those defending the states [sic] have committed an error by reducing the general-specific expressions to attributes in the aʿyān (i.e., outside the mind)."[57] In this context, introducing

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54 For interpretations on the theory of states being mental universals. See al-Ghazzālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, Ed. Salah al-Dīn al-Hawārī (Beirut: al-Maktabat al-Aṣriyya, 2010), 188; al-Ghazzālī, *Miʿyār alʿilm fī-l-mantiq*, Ed. Salah al-Dīn al-Hawārī (Beirut: al-Maktabat al-Asriyya, 2015), 17; al-Ghazzālī, *Miḥakk al-naẓar fī-l-mantiq*, Ed. Ahmad Farīd al-Mazīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 213-14; al-Ghazzālī, *al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilmi al-uṣūl*, Ed. Muhammad Tāmir, I (Cairo: Dār al-Hadith, 2011), 62–63; Ibn Maymūn, *Sharḥ al-Irshād*, 199-200; Ibn Bazīza, *al-Isʿād fī Sharḥ al-Irshād*, Eds. Abdurrazzak Basrūr & Imād al-Suḥaylī (Kuwait: Dār al-Ziyā, 2014), 199–200.

55 Yavuz, "Ahvâl", 190.

56 Al-Shahristānī, *Nihāyat al-iqdām fī ʿilm al-kalām*, Ed. Ahmad Farīd al-Mazīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), 144.

57 Louis Gardet interpreted this theory as a sort of conceptualism; Louis Gardet, "Al-Djubbāʾī", *EI²*, II, 570. Yet Frank believed such an interpretation to be erroneous (Frank, "Abū Hāshim's Theory of the 'States'", 85). However, in many modern studies, the interpretation of the states in later (*mutaʾakhkhir*) texts to be mental existence also is not welcomed, see Robert Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence in the Eleventh-and Twelfth-Century Islamic East (*Mašriq*): A Sketch", *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, Eds. Dag Nikolaus Hasse & Amos Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 37;

the states as "neither existent nor non-existent" needs to be interpreted and evaluated according to the substance-accident theory on which the understanding of the existence of the theologians of that period is based. In fact, the following quote from al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī as cited by al-Bāqillānī provides an idea for this interpretation and evaluation:

Qāḍī [al-Bāqillānī] said, "I assert that states do not exist because there is a term on which my predecessors (shuyūkh) agreed. They said, 'Everything except Allah is either substance or accident.' Therefore, after you come to the truth, you can use whatever expression you choose for the states. These have a level of distinction and are known to be permanent. We do not use mawjūd or maʿdūm as an expression for states.[58]

When this passage is analyzed along with the passage quoted from al-Shahristānī, the theologians championing the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism under the name of the states are realized to have not wanted to go beyond the established concept of substance-accident. In this context, when the only answer given to the question "What are the things that exist in the temporal world?" was substances and accidents, asserting that states could not take their place in the literature of that period as a third type of existence was easy. Therefore, the introduction of states as neither existent nor non-existent should not be perceived as challenging the principle of the excluded middle.[59] In a way, states being a type of existence can be intuited from al-Bāqillānī's words. However, this type of existence does not have a particular and tangible reality like substance and accidents because states are closer to the realm of existence.[60] Because their promotional aspect was found to be weak, they have been described with many different terms in modern studies.[61]

Murat Kaş, "Seyyid Şerîf Cürcânî'de Zihnî Varlık" (PhD Diss., University of Marmara, 2017), 179; Fedor Benevich, "The Metaphysics of Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Šahrastānī (d. 1153): *Aḥwāl* and Universals", *Islamic Philosophy from the 12th to the 14th Century*, ed. Abdelkader Al Ghouz (Göttingen: Bonn University Press 2018), 350.

58   Al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 115b.

59   According to Osman Demir, theologians did not introduce states as 'either existent or non-existent' in order to avoid the violation of the principle of the excluded middle. *See* Osman Demir, "Cüveynî'de Ahvâl Teorisi", *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi* 20 (2008): 74. In addition, when following al-Juwaynī's works, one notices from an epistemic standpoint at least that this logical principle is firmly championed. In fact, al-Juwaynī expressed this principle as *wa laysa bayna al-nafy wa-l-ithbāt daraja* (there is no middle in between affirmation and negation). *See* al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (al-Nashār et al.), 139, 314, 152, 639; al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil* (Frank), 37; al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, 37.

60   Ibn al-Hadīd (d. 656/1258), one of the last Muʿtazilite scholars, who wrote an annotation on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *al-Muḥaṣṣal*, analyzed states within their degrees of existence. For this analysis, see Ibn al-Hadīd, *Tāʿliqā ʿalā al-Muḥaṣṣal*, İstanbul Ünviersiteli Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi, AY274, 52–53.

61   The theory of states is expressed as "modes" by Harry A. Wolfson (Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 167). Richard M. Frank, on the other hand, used the expression "state" in his early works.

Conclusion

Subjects based on the states consisting of predicates for some propositions are grouped together under essences. However, for al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, these concepts have a broader scope. According to the Ashʿarites who championed the states, substance-*a* is an essence. The accidents carried by this essence are attributes in the real sense. Their perspective was reflected in the same manner to the domain of eternal existence, and thus divine meanings were accepted as *attributes* in the true sense. Thus, the proposition "God is knowledgeable" consists of both the essence of God and the meaning of His knowledge, both of which are particular existents. According to the Ashʿarites of that period who rejected the states, the predicate of a proposition that evokes an abstracted referent consists of words (*alfāẓ*) that have no ontological value. In this regard, only substances and the divine essence (*al-Dhāt al-İlāhī*) are included in the category of the essences. However, according to al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, every being possessing a *nafsī* attribute (non-causal state) falls within the scope of definitions and is included in the category of essences. Thus, along with the substances and the divine essence, accidents and divine meanings that possess a particular reality are also evaluated in the category of essences. Therefore, according to the proponents of the states, attributes do not have a particular reality.

The states designed as common attributes and truths for particular existents are included in the category of universals in that they are not considered to be mere words: they are evaluated to be different (*zāid*) from the essence to which they are applied and to possess an abstract referent. However, although the states are considered to be universal, they portray a different image of the universals when considering their form, scope, and place. From the point of view of their form, this model of universals was designed in harmony with *Kalām* atomism and only

For an example, see Frank, "Abū Hāshim's Theory of the 'States'"; Richard M. Frank, "Al-Maʿdūm wal-Mawjūd: The Non-Existent, the Existent and the Possible in the Teaching of Abū Hāshim and His Followers", *Early Islamic Theology: The Muʿtazilites and al-Ashʿarī, Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām II*, Richard M. Frank, Ed. Dimitri Gutas (Surrey: Ashgate Variorum, 2011), 195. However, Jan Thiele, while pointing out that this expression does not fully capture the theory of states, asserted in his later works regarding the Ashʿarite that Frank had included "feature" as a term that means characteristic. See Frank, *Beings and Their Attributes*, 37; Richard M. Frank, "Al-Ahkām in Classical Ashʿarite Teaching", 771; Jan Thiele, "Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī's", 381. Meanwhile, Fedor Benevich in reference to Frank favored the idea of not capturing the states with any concept at all. However, he expresses the states as a "metaphysical reality". Fedor's expression seems more adequate given the problem that universals represent, see Benevich, "The Classical Ashʿarī Theory of Aḥwāl", 137, 142.

gains value as an attribute when positioned as a predicate. Therefore, propositions constructed with the states can only consist of a particular subject and a universal predicate. Namely, the subject of the propositions must consist of *dhāt,* and the predicates must consist of attributes known as *ḥāl*. Given the parameters of the theory of the states in this context, because one state cannot be predicated to another state, the states' depth of conceptual and dimension does not arise. In other words, states are only scope-centered, and because they are scope-centered, the relationship between concepts, the five universals, and the categorical ways of thinking are not manifested within this system. Therefore, the intensional dimension of the states (i.e., the conceptual understanding of the theologians of that period) did not gain prominence. This aspect of the states that we have evaluated under the name of form propelled the states to the most general conceptual level. In this regard, thanks to the form ascribed to the states, a contextual bridge was built between the eternal existent and the temporal existent. In a way, because the predicates in "God is knowledgeable" and "Substance-*a* is knowledgeable" coincide in a common set, in this way, the predicate of knowledgeable as applied to God ceases to be an undefined predicate. In addition, because the states in the sense of common attributes predicable to essences are considered different (*zāid*) from the essences they are being predicated to, tautologies that may arise from propositions are prevented. Otherwise, if the subject and the predicate of the proposition indicate the same thing, the proposition of "Substance-*a* is an occupier of space" turns into the form of "Substance-*a* is substance-*a*." Because the predicate in this proposition brings together every substance over a common denominator, a true definition is achieved. In this way, being the same (*mumāthala*) and being different (*mukhālafa*) among essences is achieved through states.

Philosophical universals are entirely related to the level of objects, and in the Muʿtazilite tradition, universals are partially related to the level of objects. Therefore, for both systems, the proposition "Zayd is knowledgeable" is considered a real proposition far from a metaphorical narrative without undergoing any changes or transformation. However, from the perspective of al-Juwaynī and the Ashʿarite theologians before him, the same proposition has a figurative narrative (*dhikr al-kull wa irādat al-juz'*) and requires reduction (*ta'wīl*). The form of this proposition when stripped of the figurative narrative has the form, "Because substance-*a* contained in Zayd's body is the carrier of the accident of knowledge-1, only that substance is characterized as knowledgeable." In this context, although the object that is referred to as being knowledgeable is Zayd in common usage, according to the Ashʿarites, the substance such as substance-*a* that carries the accident of knowledge-1 is what

is knowledgeable in the true sense. Therefore, according to the proponents of the states among the Ash'arites, predicates about the object are actually about the building blocks of the objects (i.e., the substances and accidents). The scope of the states, which are the model of universals in *Kalām* atomism, is limited to the domain of substance accidents in the temporal world. This limitation puts the Ash'arite *Kalām* system of that period in a semi-essentialist position.

The most important claim from the theologians who champion the theory of the states is their acceptance that the predicate in the proposition "Substance-*a* is an occupier of space" is considered to be different (zāid) from substance-*a*. In principle, considering the term of "occupying space" and similar other terms as more than mere words distanced the proponents of the states from nominalist reflexes at the level of substance and accidents and brought them closer to the realist point of view. Despite that, al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī's theory of the states cannot be fully embedded in any realist theory, the reason being that this theory, whose essential points differ from the extreme and moderate models of universals, is simultaneously far removed from the conceptualist model of universals. Therefore, on the basis of the texts studied here at least, difficulty occurs in designing the states as a universal that finds a place in the mind, transcends the object as an independent entity, while being inside the object. Despite all these differences, we believe the states, which are theorized to be compatible with *Kalām* atomism, should be considered as one of the models of universals.

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