
Mehmet Özturan*

Abstract: This research focuses on the previously unpublished treatise by Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Risāla fī taqsīm al-‘ilm. The research is based on comparative evaluation of available manuscripts and is composed of a critical edition of the treatise and its analysis. The treatise is about the division (taqsīm) of taṣawwur (conception) and taṣdiq (assent) as divisions of knowledge. Al-Jurjānī presents views from different schools of logic. In the analysis section, I discuss the treatise’s philosophical background and show that the aforementioned division is the first step of a chain of propositions on what the goal and methods of logic are focusing on the possibility of learning. Remaining sections focus on the references in the treatise to various views and summarise them. Finally al-Jurjānī’s position in this scene is made explicit through his critical analysis of competing views advocated by these different schools.

For al-Jurjānī, division of knowledge can be analysed formally and informally. Formally, the division should be restrictive and informally, it should emphasize methods of logic, that are proof (ḥujja) and definition (ta’rīf). The article shows that the goal of al-Jurjānī’s discussion on the division of knowledge as conception and assent is basically to take the discussion out the context of traditional discussions on quiddity but rather build it on the division formally and the goals of the division informally.

Keywords: al-Jurjānī, Risāla fī taqsīm al-‘ilm, conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdiq), proof, logic, knowledge, division (taqsīm).

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** Assist. Prof., Istanbul Medeniyet University, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophy.
Correspondence: mehmet80@gmail.com.
1. Introduction

When we look at the Islamic literature on logic, there are books that deal with a single problem in logic as well as holistic books written on the general problems of logic comprehensively. The former is more common than the latter and these treatises become more frequent in the post-Avicenna era. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), Afdal al-Dīn Khunajī (d. 646/1248) have been influential in revising the established logical system of Avicenna (d. 428/1037) which led to a comprehensive system of logic which was suitably simplified for educational reasons in the madrasas of twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This process is made possible through commentary traditions.¹ One of the lasting influences of Avicenna’s works was to shift the central focus away from Aristotle and (to some extend) from al-Fārābī (d.339/950). A similar affect can be claimed for post-Avicennan era as the frequency of references to Avicenna becomes less among the pedagogical texts used for educational purposes. These texts that generally are written on particular and more focused problems and written more concisely, maintained an increasing variety of discussions in the literature of logic. Some examples to this are: jihat al-waḥda², possibility of theory of definition, parts of proposition,³ and divisions of knowledge. One of the popular topics among logicians for these types of treatises that focus on particular problems is the division of knowledge.

My research is based on one such focused work by al-Jurjānī, Risāla fi taqsīm al-ʿilm.⁴ The article presents a critical edition of Risāla fi taqsīm al-ʿilm as well as an

² Conceptualization of jihat al-waḥda (aspect of unity/ unity of science) owes its existence to Mulla Fanārī (d. 834/1431 or 838/1434-35) who has a commentary on al-Abharī’s Īsāgūjī. This conceptualization is the result of questioning what unifies a discipline which in and of itself has various problems. For a recent study that exemplifies discussions, see: Muhammed Amin Shirwānī, “Birlik Yönü”, Ömer Mahir Alper, Osmanlı Felsefesi -Seçme Metinler-, trans. Mehmet Özturan (İstanbul: Klasik, Mart 2015), 373-403.
³ Parts of propositions is one of the liveliest topics in Ottoman logical circles and we have a large literature on the topic. For an analysis of the topic and the literature built on it, see Eşref Altaş, “XVIII. Yüzyıl Eczâü’l-każiiye Risâleleri ve Darendeli Mehmed Efendî’nin Risâle fi’t-tefrîka beyne mezhebi’l-müteahhirîn ve’l-kudemâ fi’t-kaziyye ve’t-tasdîk îsimli Eserî,” Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 38 (2010): 25-46.
analysis of the treatise. Additionally the analysis includes pre-Jurjānī discussions on the division of conception and assent basing the question on the issue of the goal and method of logic.

2. Attribution of the Treatise to al-Jurjānī

Kātib Chalabī and Ismail Pasha of Baghdād mention a book titled Risāla fi taqṣīm al-‘ulūm among the list of al-Jurjānī’s books.\(^5\) A book with the same title is attributed to al-Jurjānī by Brockelmann although I could not find a book with that title in my research.\(^6\) It is highly probable, though, that the aforementioned book is the same treatise we critically edited in this research. This book is recorded by Rudolf Mach-Eric L. Ormsby as Risāla fi taqṣīm al-‘ilm.\(^7\)

In addition to the records mentioned above, the most important indicator that the treatise belongs to al-Jurjānī is that his approach to the division of knowledge in this treatise matches the approach in his books written in commentary style.\(^8\) What is unique to al-Jurjānī’s approach is his emphasis that the main goal of the division is identification of methods that lead to knowledge with the division of knowledge. As far as I know, trying to solve the puzzle of division of knowledge according to method is unique to al-Jurjānī and the treatise in our focus takes the same unique approach. And this makes a strong case for the attribution of the treatise to al-Jurjānī.

Admitting the attribution of the treatise to al-Jurjānī, one can still not admit that it is an independent treatise. Can this be a part of larger one of his glosses? This is a sound question because al-Jurjānī has long glosses. However in this treatise, he goes on to explain his own words and this proves that this treatise is not a gloss (ḥāshiya). As an example, in the first page al-Jurjānī says ‘This division is flawless’. And later after a number of sentences, he comments on his own wording ‘our meaning in saying that ‘This division is flawless’ is ...’. The mood in the text signifies the author himself. However, the custom in commentaries and glosses is to explain words of others including statements such as ‘the words of the author...’. Yet, still, our judgement here is built on the idea that al-Jurjānī is not writing a gloss on his own work.

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8 Al-Jurjānī’s Risāla fi taqṣīm al-‘ilm will be abbreviated as Risāla from here on.
Another evidence which shows that the text is not a commentary or a super-commentary is also in the text. At the end of the text, al-Jurjānī says that the division of the author was not correct in terms of the first and the fourth approach (p. 123). When he says “the author” (al-muṣannif) here and the following lines, he means Ali b. 'Umar al-Kātibī. From here on, he criticizes al-Kātibī’s view of assent in al- Risāla al-Shamsiyya. Even though this criticism is very similar to al-Jurjānī’s criticisms in the commentary of al-Shamsiyya, the difference of wording and phrases between the two texts shows that the Risāla was written independently from the super-commentary.

3. Outline of the Treatise and the Background for the Division of Knowledge as Conception and Assent

In the pre-Jurjānī era, one of the (perhaps the first) treatises that focus on the division of knowledge is written by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (ö. 766/1365). We find that al-Jurjānī, who composed a number of commentaries, has a fond interest on the topics that Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī discussed before. Following this, his treatise reflects a similar outline to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Comparing these two treatises in detail is beyond the limits of this research, so I will only explain the differences briefly. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī only rarely discusses the division of knowledge in line with the methods and goals of logic. He explains the definitions of conception and assent, on the bases of formal rules for definitions, and what follows from the given definitions. In contrast to this, al-Jurjānī only summarises the topics that are given large space in Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s writing. Al-Jurjānī writes only with the agenda to base the division of conception and assent in relation to the goal of logic, and more particularly in relation to the formal methods of acquiring knowledge, i.e. theories of definition and proof.

This goal of al-Jurjānī’s treatise can be better understood once we analyse the division itself and the role it plays in relation to the goal of logic.

The division of knowledge as tasawwur and tasdiq requires an arrangement of the concepts of “known” and “unknown” which are necessarily related to the term of knowledge. The divisions of knowledge are also necessarily divisions of these two notions. In other words, since knowledge is divided into assent and conception, the known and the unknown too necessarily have two divisions: one part is conceptual and the other is propositional (taṣdiq). The most elementary notion among these is the concept of conception. The conceptual unknown is the most basic of the un-

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known. In other words, concepts are the unknown at atomic level and propositions are the unknown at molecular level. Accordingly, even when the constituting concepts of it are known, a proposition can still be unknown if the necessity for knowledge of the proposition itself did not occur. This case also exemplifies that one thing can be both known and unknown when different aspects are considered. And because the different aspects are possible, the case does not posit a contradiction. By showing that anything can be both known and unknown by the assistance of the division of knowledge as conception and assent, a possible case for a paradox is stopped as well.

The result is reflected in different disciplines, particularly to logic: “A human either knows logic or she doesn’t know”. If she knows, why should she learn? If she doesn’t know it at all how will she want to know? These two questions will be difficult to solve when we ignore that the unknown is divided into conception and assent. The first question is turned into a paradox by the proposition that “Bringing something existent to existence (tahsil al-hasil) is impossible”. And the second is turned into a paradox by the proposition “Wanting to know the absolute unknown is impossible.” If one knows logic, she cannot be taught logic a second time. In a similar fashion, if one does not know a thing about logic, she will not want to learn it as well. Consequently, learning and teaching logic are impossible in both cases. Dividing knowledge into conception and assent to sustain being known and unknown from different perspectives maintains an exit away from the paradoxes. According to this, if one knows the logic conceptually, logic is no longer an “absolute unknown” for her. The basic for this type of knowledge is to know the goal of logic. In a similar fashion, since this person does not know the principles of logic at the level of assent yet, for her then this does not cause the problem of “bringing something existent to existence” (tahsil al-hasil). In short, this division can also be viewed as an attempt to the paradox on the possibility of learning.

The introductory section of a logic book is completely about organizing the information that makes teaching/learning the discipline of logic possible. The structure of this section includes a chain of presentations that point to the questions I mentioned and the solutions to the questions as well as to the related paradoxes:

1. Knowledge is divided into two parts, as conception and assent.
2. Some conceptions and assents are necessary (zaruri) and some are theoretical (naqari).
3. Necessary knowledge is the base that leads to the theoretical knowledge.
4. There is possibility of mistake when one attempts to access theoretical knowledge through necessary knowledge. Namely, mistakes are possible in the process of thought.
5. Consequently we need a science that protects us from falling into mistakes.\(^\text{10}\)

The introduction to any discipline is not part of the essential principles that constructs that discipline. Likewise, the introduction of logic is not part of the chain of things that logic aims to teach. Among the chain of propositions mentioned, the division of knowledge as conception and assent is first. Thus the division is the foundation for five propositions that explain the goal of logic. Almost all the books include the division of knowledge as conception and assent. But have their authors all considered the above mentioned background for the division as a context for these discussions? The answer to this question connects us to the al-Jurjānī’s purpose for composing this treatise: the \textit{Risāla} is to discuss the division of knowledge in the context of the goal and the method of logic.

As I will discuss in detail later, what al-Jurjānī thinks his previous logicians is that they do not focus on the goal and context of logic. Once I present the claim and its justification as it is mentioned in the \textit{Risāla}, then I will elaborate the argument under the section titled “al-Jurjānī’s own analysis”.

3.1

Al-Jurjānī mentions four different approaches which depend on a particular logic of division. These are (i) Philosophers (ḥukamā), (ii) Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, (iii) Afḍal al-Dīn Khunaji-Shams al-Dīn Iṣṭahānī, (iv) Avicenna-Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. al-Jurjānī uses two criteria for his classification: (i) The division of knowledge as conception and assent: It will be clearer later that according to al-Jurjānī, Avicenna’s view is not division of knowledge into conception and assent, but rather that they are two conceptions each of which has different accruments. (ii) Assent and Judgement: The relation between these notions play an important role in determining different schools. For Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who views assent as a composite quiddity, judgement is one of the components of this quiddity. According to the philosophers (ḥukamā) who consider assent being simple, the assent should be identical to the judgement. To summarise, the views in the \textit{Risāla} are composed by considering the divisions of knowledge, the components of each part, and the accrument (āridh/ lāhiq) of each part.

The first view discussed in the \textit{Risāla} is claimed to be of “the first scholars and of the verifiers from the late period” (al-awāil and al-muhaqqiqūn al-muta’akhkhirūn): “Assent is but judgement”. References that refer to this view as the view of philosophers can be found in Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s \textit{Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal} and it became widely

distributed thanks to the works by Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī. Rāzī mentions philosophers as supporters of this view in al-Risāla al-Ma’mūla and in Taḥrīr.\(^\text{11}\)

This related view is not stated in detail in the books of Greek philosophers, so it is difficult to attribute this view to ancient philosophers. Moreover, it is not clear whom al-Jurjānī means with “first scholars and verifiers from the late period”. In addition, the vagueness about the names remains in the minds of logicians as well. However, an analysis on the commentary and glosses of Shamsiyya might help us have more idea on this point.

Some of the topics that are included at the textbooks of madrasas express the contrasting views of predecessors (qudamā’) and latter-day logicians. For example when Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Taftāzānī discuss Avicenna’s notion of differentia, they state that Avicenna belongs to the group of predecessors on the topic. This shows that Avicenna is regarded among the successor logicians (muta‘akkhirūn) in general but for this particular point, he exceptionally thinks like the predecessors.\(^\text{12}\) Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī uses both the notions, mutaqaddimin and qudamā’. Although there is no implication that the notions, mutaqaddimin and qudamā’ are used synonymously, it is clear that the notions mutaqaddimin and qudamā’ refer to pre-Avicenna logicians. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s approach implies that Avicenna is the beginning of the successor era of logic.

Now, then when Islamic logicians talk about pre-Avicenna era, who exactly are they talking about? In contrast to presence of many Islamic philosophers in the pre-Avicenna era, it is difficult to find them being referred to as a group. As an example, when al-Fārābī’s ideas are being transmitted, it is transmitted as “al-Fārābī’s view”. Pre-Avicennian Muslim philosophers do not get much attention, they are found referred to by Muslim logicians only in one or two places.\(^\text{13}\) Post-Avicennian logicians seem to be content with the contrast of Avicenna and philosophers (hukamā’).\(^\text{14}\) This vagueness comes to the extent that the philosophers turn into an ambiguous cloud for reference. Despite all this, we can come across names that are


\(^{13}\) Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-Qawā'id al-mantiqiyya, p. 253, 361.

thought to be part of the philosophers: Kātibī uses “the predecessor philosophers” (mutaqaddim ḥukemā) for “the likes of Plato and Aristotle”.15 From this usage then, we can assume that successor philosophers are those Aristotelians and Neoplatonists who commented on Aristotle’s books on logic.16 Together with this, though Ottoman Logician Muftuzāda Arzinjānī, in his gloss of Taşawwurât clearly explains that the predecessors are pre-Avicenna logicians and successors are post-Avicenna.17

During my examination of his books, I could not find any sentences written on how al-Jurjānī views Avicenna's place in logic. In only one case, he mentions Avicenna implying he is distinct from the successor logicians when discussing the conversion of possible propositions.18 This however, is not enough to clearly understand Avicenna’s place as successor or predecessor in al-Jurjānī’s mind.

3.2

The second group in al-Jurjānī’s work is the popular view of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. According to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, knowledge is divided into two as conception and assent. Assent is composed of three conceptions and a judgement, thus this makes assent a molecule of four atomic elements. Conception on the other hand is apprehension that is outside of this sum.

The idea that assent is composite is made explicit by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his Mulakhkhas, Sharḥ Uyūn al-ḥikma and al-Mabāhith al-mashriqiyya. According to him, the difference between conception and assent is like that of simple and composite.19 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī also expresses different views in his other works. However much Tūsī tries to distance al-Rāzī’s view from that of the philosophers,20 there are pas-

15 Al-Kātibī, Bahr al-fawā'id, Ragıp Paşa 1481, 74b.
16 (Hakīm) is also a title that is used by Islamic scholars to signify other Muslim scholars. For example Taftazānī refers to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī as al-ḥakīm al-muḥaqiq. He considers him among philosophers (Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Šamsiyya, p. 151).
20 Tūsī, Taḥkhiṣ al-Mukhaṣṣal, p. 6. Tūsī says Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī cannot be thinking in the same way as the philosophers, on the other hand, Tūsī does not mention that Imam agrees with the idea that assent is composite as well. Tūsī views Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī as taking conception as absolute apprehension and assent as apprehension together with judgement. Thus, as I will further discuss later, the relation between assent and judgement is not of whole and parts but of having as an accrement and subject to having accruements (āriz-ma‘ruz). If we add to this list that Imam also claims simplicity of assent, then
sages in the works of the Imam where he writes differently from *Mulakhkhaṣ* and regards assent as the same as judgement. Thus, assent is admitted to be simple.  

Also, the idea that assent is composite is a kind of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s stamp in the most of the places where the division of knowledge is discussed. In this context, how al-Kātibī and Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī evaluate Imam’s ideas is important. Qutb al-Dīn, explains Imām’s ideas over the notions of condition and part (*shart* and *shaṭr*). Accordingly, (i) subject, (iii) predicate and (iii) a connection between the two in the form of “is” and “is not” and (iv) apprehending that this judgemental relation (*al-nisba al-hukmiyya*) reflects truth, constitute an assent together. Consequently, assent is composite of three conceptions and a judgement. For an assent then both sides of subject and predicate should be apprehended. This requirement is more like the need of a whole to its parts rather than the relation of a condition to the conditioned.

According to Imam, presence of the three parts is not enough for an assent. If that were the case, we would have an assent wherever these three are conceptualized. Thus the apprehension of the judgemental relation is needed for presence of assent.

### 3.3

Third view in the *Risāla* is found in Afḍal al-Dīn Khunajī’s *Kashf al-asrār ‘an ghawāmiḍ al-afkār* and in Shams al-dīn Iṣfahānī’s *Maṭālib al-anzār*. Al-Jurjānī does not transmit the ideas in the books word by word. He however focuses more on the meanings these texts aim to carry. Al-Jurjānī thinks this view is different and contradictory to both the philosophers and to the Imam’s view. Khunajī and Iṣfahānī’s views are summarised by him as follows: “Knowledge is either pure conception, thus then no judgement accrues to it; or it is assent, then takes judgement as accrument or attachment.” Al-Jurjānī reports that Iṣfahānī and Khunajī view knowledge

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as absolute apprehension. The difference between philosophers and the Imam is explained by the relations of having as accrument and being subject to having accrument (‘ārid-ma’rūz/lāhiq-malḥūq). This approach is very different from the approach of philosophers for whom judgement and assent are identical and from the Imam for whom judgement is part of the quiddity of assent. In Isfahānī and Khūnaji explanation, judgement stays outside of the quiddity of the assent and accrues to it. Judgment is attached to subject and predicate and the judgemental relation between subject and predicate, and each three pieces of absolute conception.

3.4

The last position al-Jurjānī presents is like the third view, based on the implied views derived from the authors’ sentences. The names examined here are Avicenna and Tūsī.

Al-Jurjānī’s reading is based on Avicenna’s al-Shifā and Ishārāt, and Tūsī’s Tajrīd al-I’tiqād. I could not find any section that discusses the division in Tajrīd. On the other hand, in Asās al-iqṭībās fī al-mantiq, conception is discussed as being the conception without judgement (tašāwwur mujarradd ’ānil-ḥukm), and assent is the conception together with judgement (tašāwwur muqārin li al-ḥukm).29

The related sections to al-Jurjānī’s summary of Avicenna might be from al-Ishārāt, al-Shifā al-Madkhal and Mantīq al-mashriqiyya. In al-Ishārāt, (i) pure conception, (ii) assent that is together with a conception;30 in al-Shifā’s Madkhal (i) mere conception (tašāwwur faqat), (ii) assent together with a conception (taṣdiq ma’ā al-tašāwwur)31 are listed by Avicenna. Al-Jurjānī does not mention Mantīq al-mashriqiyyīn. However, in Mantīq there is conception without assent (tašāwwur la yāshabuhū taṣdiq) and conception with assent (tašāwwur yāshabuhū taṣdiq).32

Despite this, al-Jurjānī’s presentation of the division in Avicenna and Tūsī is such: “Knowledge is either apprehension without assent, thus it is apprehension without judgement, and namely it is mere conception. Or it is conception with assent and thus it is conception together with judgement.”33

So far I summarised the four views in the Risāla. Now the essence of al-Jurjānī’s criticism and analysis will be examined.

33 Risāla, 123.
4. Al-Jurjānī’s Analysis

Al-Jurjānī’s analysis has two bases; formal and contextual. Formally he first mentions conception and assent as results of division, thus what we have in hand is not a definition but a division. His criticisms are shaped on the formal conditions for a proper division. His criticisms are then not based on the theory of definition in logic but rather the rules formed by argumentation.

Second part of the analysis focuses on the where and why of the division. Al-Jurjānī implies with this, that the context of the division should be taken into consideration next, once a division succeeds the formal conditions. His criticisms at this second level are mainly on the mistake of “not being appropriate for the goal” of the division.

4.1. Formal Conditions of a Division

Risāla, as its title implies, classifies parts of knowledge and lists them. Al-Jurjānī defines the divided concept (maqsim), knowledge and its divisions briefly while doing this. The readers expecting to find long discussions based on genus and differentia (for the definition) would be disappointed to find no such discussion. This is because what is being done is a division, not a definition and this division has a specific goal. As a result, throughout the text the formal conditions of a division and how to satisfy the suitability of a division to its goal are central to the discussion.

Al-Jurjānī’s first criteria is about the formal conditions a division should maintain. Division should have at least two parts. These two parts are constructed by attaching restrictions and conditions to the universal divided concept. Each part should be opposite to the other. We can list the main rules accordingly: (i) between the divided concept and its divisions, there must be the relation of “absolutely inclusive and included” (‘umūm ḥuşuş muṭlaq) (ii) the divisions should be opposite each other (iii) the divided notion should be common in all divisions. The important thing in the division is to preserve these relations between divisions -and -divided, and division -and -division. First step is the aforementioned rules of argumentation for al-Jurjānī’s analysis. So al-Jurjānī discusses different groups

35 Argumentation discusses subject matters in two ways: the explicit (ṣarīḥ) and implicit (zimmī). The discussion topic in both cases should be a “claim”. Accordingly, propositions include explicit claims. Definitions and divisions include implicit claims. Al-Jurjānī’s criticisms continue to discuss over these implicit claims. His only treatise on argumentation, al-Risāla al-Sharīfiyya does not give space to discussions on division and definition but rather on explicit claims such as syllogisms made of propositions.
on division first by giving their definitions. Built on this knowledge, we might expect him discuss genus and differentia but he does not. He moves on to discussing apprehension, conception and assent and tries to determine the categories of the divided concept and its divisions. For example, when he is discussing the philosophers’ view, he claims that conception and assent should not be used as concepts of two different categories. In other words, conception and assent should be defined such that they are both of the same category. Because both are divisions of knowledge. So whichever category knowledge is, the rule “the divided concept should be common in the divisions of it” requires that the divisions should be of the same category. Here the aim is not to determine the real category of knowledge, but to discuss the formal conditions. If absolute knowledge is regarded from the category of action, then divisions of knowledge should be of the same category. The added conditions on this knowledge that is common in each part should be in this category as well. Again, requirement of following the same rule is that when absolute knowledge is of affection, the divisions of knowledge should signify affection. So, one cannot explain conception as affection and assent as action. In other words, one of the formal rules of division is categorical identity of divisions and the divided concept.

Another rule in al-Jurjānī’s analysis is as such: iv) the minimum requirement of a division, whatever the type of division is, is that the divided concept is constrained with the divisions of that divided concept. Al-Jurjānī evaluates the philosophers’ view that “Assent is simple, because it is merely judgement” with an application of this rule. He thinks that this division is flawless and divisions of the division are constrained clearly according to the type of the division. His words on this carries hidden implications on mental division: in mental division (taqsīm ‘āqli), it is possible to be sure that all divisions of the divided notion are expressed without any need to look at the divisions. This is because each part is the negation of the other. Let’s assume A is a divided concept, B is part of A, and non B is the other part of A. It is impossible to assume a third part. Within this scope, al-Jurjānī transmits the philosophers’ division as a mental one as follows:

In order to see a work on both explicit and implicit claims see Muhyiddin Abdülhamid. Risāla al-Ādab fi ’ilm ādāb al-baḥth wa al-munāẓara, ed. Orhan Gazi Yüksel (İstanbul: Yasin Yayınevi, 2009).

36 This rule is found in argumentation books as “the division should be constrained (ḥāṣr), that means collector and hindering (jāmi wa māni)”. See Muhyiddin Abdülhamid, Risāla al-Ādab, 26.

37 Risāla, 119.
As we see, the divided concept is apprehension. The negated concept is judgemental relation. Al-Jurjānī considers philosophers’ division as a mental one. Then in this division in which judgment as synonymous with assent, the divided concept and divisions signify the same category. As a result, the division is flawless.

Consequently his emphasis on “being of the same category” is totally related to the formal conditions of the division. Here we saw this through his evaluation of philosophers’ and others’ approaches.

4.2. The Context of the Division: The Goal of Logic and the Methods It Presents:

The second dimension in al-Jurjānī’s analysis is about the context and goal of logic. This can be claimed to be the real base for his criticisms. The philosophical problems solved by the division is related to the opportunities the logic maintain through the division. The presentation of division at the introductory sections of logic books, however, is not a logical necessity but of a pedagogical one. Main function of this division is to attract a learner’s attention to the aimed topic. If a person knows the aim of logic, then she will not spend time on unnecessary subjects and questions unrelated to logic. Knowing the goal of logic will maintain this special awareness. Placing the division of knowledge in the introduction sections of logic books is the first step for a chain of propositions that lead to understanding this goal.

If we consider the place of the division among the five propositions which we pointed before, it is obvious that the problem of division should not be seen only formal, without-context division. This is the essence of al-Jurjānī’s criticism on informality. If knowledge will be divided in a specific discipline, then the goal of that discipline is also the goal of that division. One question should be asked at this point: Can the other views mentioned in the Risāla not function explanatorily on methods of logic? According to al-Jurjānī, for this, the relations among the goal of logic, the method logic provides and the divisions of knowledge should be examined.

The mere reason for dividing knowledge into two parts is to separate these two sections for their peculiar methods. Judgement which is named as apprehension is also separated with a method that leads to its knowledge. This peculiar method is proof.38

In this quoted passage, the only goal of the division is to benefit from the divisions of knowledge in order to divide the different methods used in these parts; and with this, in order to achieve a real division of knowledge. When a division satisfies the formal conditions, it means that the elements in the divisions are enough to be separated from each other, so that it is enough to establish a relation of opposition between the divisions. Consequently there should be other elements that are attached to the formal separation and that is informal. What is attached to the formal separation is the issue of what will be used for separation. In other words, the goal of logic and the methods should be focused on. According to al-Jurjānī, more particularly, the goal of logic is established on the matching between divisions of knowledge with the method. Once this matching is established, at the second level the most important thing is the naming of this matching. If knowledge is two parts as A and B, there is a method C that leads to A and only A; and there should be another method D, that leads only to B. To summarise, C should be peculiar to A and D should be peculiarly for B. So, how is the idea that method and type of knowledge should be particular for each other produced?

The goal of logic is to explain the methods that lead to knowledge. There are two methods that are explained by this discipline: theory of definition and theory of syllogism. And these two are oppositely distinct methods and each lead to different knowledge. Thus this difference and separation should be emphasised in the division and the contents of the parts should preserve the distinctness of methods. If the goal of logic is to explain these distinct methods, then the goal of the division is to posit the knowledge types that are maintained by these methods. At this point, the quiddities of conception and assent lose their importance. Yes, the contents of these knowledge are important, but the interest about their contents is merely because their methods are expected to be distinct. The methods are totally separate, i.e each one is peculiar to its own; so the knowledge they lead to should be separate and peculiar.

At this point a new question strikes our mind: is the Imām’s approach which attaches judgement to the quiddity of assent and Iṣfahāni-Khunaji approach which views judgement as an accruement to the assent unsuccessful in maintaining the peculiarity of knowledge and the method that lead to knowledge? So in the case one admits the mentioned views, does the function of peculiar matching between parts of knowledge and its method disappear? Clearly any division that satisfies the formal conditions can achieve the matching of method and knowledge without adding anything else to the division. Since the relations between divided concept

39 Al-Jurjānī, “Ḥāshiya”, p. 36.
and the divisions are preserved in this division, and what is more, the opposition between parts is preserved as well. A similar discussion is presented by al-Jurjānī in *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. The problem of division is evaluated with an approach peculiar to Al-Jurjānī in this treatise. I name this approach as the plainness principle in division. This principle can be defined as reaching the goal of the division with the most economic and direct expressions.

In *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* and the treatise we examined in this research, the *Risāla*, what makes the classification of different groups is the notion of assent and its relation to judgement. Al-Jurjānī’s criticism through the principle of plainness is based on the main approaches taken against the assent and judgement. For example according to the philosophers, assent is the same as judgement. When judgement is evaluated from the viewpoint of a person, it is a cognitive state for uttering a proposition “is or is not” and from viewpoint of a hearer, it is a state to understand a proposition “is or is not”. There is only one way in quality and peculiarity to lead to this type of knowledge. I am avoiding the discussions on determining the category of judgement here. That issue is not related to the plainness principle. The necessity of being from same categories is related more to the formal conditions. As I have mentioned at the beginning, if what is aimed at with the division of knowledge is to explain that the methods are oppositely different; philosopher’s approach is successful. Because in this approach, the only way that leads to the knowledge of judgement is proof and judgement as a kind of knowledge can match proof directly and peculiarly. As a result, if any additions besides judgement is made in definition of assent, this simplicity will disappear.

The idea attributed to Avicenna that assent is conception with judgement (tasawwur ma’aḥū tasdīq), similarly maintains matching of method and knowledge by preserving the quality of peculiarity. However, al-Jurjānī thinks this is preferable only in the case that judgement is of the category of action. It is clear that if judgement is from the category of action, it will have no commonality with knowledge/apprehension as the latter is of affection or quality. No commonality means that judgement is no part of knowledge. Because during the process of division, one of the main rules is that the divided concept should be found in all of its parts as a

40 Ibid, p. 28.
42 *Risāla*, 122.
43 In order to be able to present Avicenna’s position in the sense we gave above, one needs to assume that he admits judgement from the category of action. However, Ḥāṣan Chalābī criticises others that notion of judgement from the category of action is not among the acceptable approaches for Avicenna. See Ḥāṣan Chalābī, “Ḥāshiya Sharḥ al-Mawāqif,” *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. I (Qum: Intishārāt-i Sharīf Rīzā, 1612), p. 89.
quiddity and as a category. Namely there must be commonality between the divided notion and the divisions. That knowledge or apprehension, which is the divided concept, is categorically distinct from judgement. Then apprehension’s division into mere conception” (al-taşawwur al-sādhij) and conception with assent (taşawwur ma’ahū taṣdiq) is not problematic according to the conditions of division because conception is the common in both divisions. But in this form, both divisions can be matched to only one method, the definition theory. However, if the goal of division is matching methods and types of knowledge, and that the judgement which is from the category of action, i.e. the assent, is impossible to be made one part of knowledge which is from the category of affection or quality, then what remains is making judgement an accruement to one of the divisions and proceed the matching of method and knowledge over the concept that is being the accruement. In accordance with this, division considers what accrues to the divisions of knowledge and what does not accrue and then knowledge is divided into (i) conception that judgement (assent) accrues to it and (ii) conception that is not accrued by judgement. The knowledge of the part to which judgement is not accrued, matches with definition; and the part to which judgement is accrued matches with proof. So the goal is succeeded in the division. Ok, then is this division suitable according to al-Jurjānī’s emphasised notion of matching the method and the part? The answer is yes. The division offers the method of syllogism for the knowledge of the accrued part, judgement offers definition for the knowledge of the conception part; and matches both of them successfully. However, it does also attract the attention that the matching are not made through the parts directly, but over the part that is either attached or not attached -the judgement-.  

The criticism against this approach is related to al-Jurjānī’s notion of judgement. Just like philosopher’s division, this division does not contain problems in relation to appropriateness of the goal. But how true would admitting judgement as an accruement to conception be? According to al-Jurjānī, judgement is a kind of knowledge. Since it is not accruement, it is certain knowledge that can be known by mere witmess of the inner senses. Consequently, the aforementioned division is appropriate when the judgement is regarded as an action. The formal conditions of the division is satisfied and the division succeeded its goal. However, considering judgement as an action is a philosophical mistake.

Actually, al-Jurjānī’s main criticism is against Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. He claims that assent is composed of judgement and conceptions, and assent is a molecular

44 Risāla, 122, 123.
sum. In terms of a definition, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s approach is not problematic. Problems from other aspects are (i) mistake of not constraining the division (‘adem al-inḥiṣār) and (ii) mistake of not being appropriate to the goal. The first one of these mistakes is due to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s assumption that judgement is of apprehension, i.e. it is from the category of quality or from the category of affection. The second mistake is about attachment of judgement to the quiddity of assent, which is of the same category as itself. We should state that al-Jurjānī does not talk about an option for Imam’s approach that the judgement is of category of action. There are two reasons for this: one is that we know through our inner senses that judgement is a kind of apprehension. If judgement is of category of action, then Imam will face the second problem. If the judgement is an action, then it becomes part of assent. The divided concept and the parts of the division will then become of different categories. This violates the condition of a proper division. In the evaluation on Avicenna and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, I said that if the judgement is action, the only way to avoid this mistake is to exclude judgement from assent. But Imam makes judgement part of assent. So excluding judgement from assent will be a contradiction for Imam. With these reasons, al-Jurjānī does not evaluate the option of judgement being an action. He does not like to attribute the approach and mistake of accepting that the part and the notion divided are chosen from different categories to Imam.

Mistake number (i) is caused by violation of formal conditions. This mistake takes place as such: if judgement is among the parts that make up the quiddity of assent, it is not an assent on its own. Although rational is part of the quiddity of human, it is not the same as human when considered on its own. So judgement is not assent. There remains one option: judgement is conception. However, we need to maintain knowledge of this category through definition as it is the case with conception. But what maintains its knowledge is proof. In this case, judgement is not conception. As a result, because of it failed to count judgement in any divisions of knowledge, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s division could not be constraint (ḥāṣir).

The second mistake is related to the violation of the rules about the context of division, its goal and the plainness principle. Three criticisms are gathered under this general title. First, according to al-Jurjānī, attaching conceptions to judgement is unnecessary and meaningless in the definition of assent as one judgement and three conceptions. Because the main goal of the division is to offer a division of knowledge for peculiar methods by considering the methods of logic. The method with which conception is maintained is definition. Assent is composed of three elements that are gained by definition and an element (which is judgement) gained by proof. The method with which knowledge of conceptions are maintained is definition. Con-
structuring quiddities of assent by adding them to judgement is to claim that the three ingredients in the assent are maintained through the method of definition and the other ingredient, the judgement is maintained through the method of proof.

But the discussions on division proved these methods as totally separate ones. Then the goal is already achieved by the judgement alone without the need of attaching the other three elements. This also violates the plainness/simplicity. Secondly, the method that leads to conception is definition and the only method that leads to assent is proof. If these two main principles are considered, it is useless to make the three elements parts of assent. The method of proof has no effect on composition of the conceptions. Thirdly, the adjectives of an assent such as certain and estimative (ganni), emerge thanks to the judgement. These are qualities of knowledge maintained by the method of proof. The conceptions are not attributed with any of these. This means that the qualities about assent are due to the judgement and judgement is only emergent with proof. The adjectives prove that assent and matching of the methods peculiar to it, the only thing needed is judgement. Then there is no benefit we gain from making the assent composite. Since assent is already separated from conception when assent is regarded identical with judgement (as in the philosophers’ approach), then there is no need for additional concepts to its quiddity. When the main goal is to maintain reference to the methods directly and establish the division accordingly, then the division suggested by Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī is not a successful proposal.46

Al-Jurjānī’s evaluation on philosophers, such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Avicenna focuses on the methods of logic that lead to the unknown. Whichever type the division is, what is expected from the division is to determine the parts of division presenting contents that maintain one method plainly. According to this, those that are added to the absolute knowledge can be accidental elements as well as essential ones. Each part then can be classes or species of the divided concept. The important thing is to match the parts of the division with different methods. Because this division is in order to explain the methods that will be taught in logic. Consequently this approach does not discuss the quiddity of different parts of the division. This is not the goal of the division.

The case of philosophers and the case of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī are composed by the attachment of “essential elements to the divided concept”. Thus two parts are maintained by making species out of one genus. But this is not the real aim. Thus, although the parts which are made by attaching differentia or accruements to the

divided concept, are totally separate (taqābul), this is not enough. At this very point, the goal of the division is important, in addition to the formal conditions. Al-Jurjānī’s main expectation from the division is that parts are separated from each other according to their methods. If the only goal were to separate (imtiyāz) the parts, we should have focused on the differentia or the proprium, in order to achieve the separation. Al-Jurjānī, on the other hand, emphasizes that the division should be peculiar to the methods of logic (definition and proof) and it should be made with indicated concepts directly. Division is based on the discipline of logic and is for someone who intends to learn logic. Each part of knowledge will then be separated by its peculiar method. One should be with definition and the other with proof. If the quiddity of the parts are composite, the components should be gained with the same method as its parts. Assume A is part of knowledge. If A is composed of b and c, the knowledge of both b and c should be gained with the same method as A. If b’s knowledge is maintained through the same method as A, and c’s knowledge is gained through a different method then A’s –let’s call it B- then making c a component of A is useless and meaningless in relation to the goal of division. The plainness principle is: let us assume b and c are parts of A. Both b and c are maintained by the same method as A. In order to indicate A’s method, one has to choose to refer to the peculiar method of either b or c. Because b or c can be matched with this method on their own. Involving them both in this, is useless.

Conclusion

One of the key features of logic books is the division of knowledge as conception and assent. But the essence of this division and the essence of the parts are not part of the main goals for the discipline of logic. As a result, the aforementioned division is not part of the discipline itself, but rather is part of the book of logic, as its introduction. In this respect, this division turns into the first step of chains of propositions explaining the goals of logic. With a clearer expression, al-Jurjānī claims that the goal of logic is the formal methods of logic that lead to know the unknown.

In order to understand that proof and definition are separate methods according to al-Jurjānī, the logical knowledge itself is required to be subject to division. Thus the division is restricted with this goal: the division and its contents should be established in a way that matches only the method of definition and syllogism. In other words, the goal of dividing knowledge as conception and assent is to divide the types of knowledge through the methods that lead to these types. This is because a formal rule for any division is that the parts of the division are opposite. This opposition can be maintained by various elements. If what is being done is merely dividing types of knowledge in relation to the parts of knowledge, then this could be well achieved.
through differentia (faṣl) and peculiar accruements. However, al-Jurjānī insists that the division should be linked to the methods of logic because the division is made in the discipline of logic. The real reason for the composition of this treatise, as well as the critical references to the other views, should be to remind of this forgotten context. The division should not be then made through differentia and proprium that are central to discussions of quiddity, rather it should be through the methods that logic itself offers. Accordingly, if the types of knowledge are knowable through the knowledge of the method peculiarly, then the division is successful.

It is then not enough if the division is successful only on the formal application of rules. These rules should be applied with regard to the informal aspect of the division too, such as context and goal of the division. In the light of all that is discussed, al-Jurjānī expects an equivalent to this division from the other schools: Knowledge is either by definition or by syllogism. According to this, each part of knowledge should be defined with a content that can be reflected to these methods. Any element that does not match directly or peculiarly to these methods, should be excluded.

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Information on the Various Copies of the Treatise

One copy of Risāla fi taqsīm al-‘ilm we could access is in Yüksek İslâm Enstitüsü Kütüphanesi and three of the copies are found in Süleymaniye Library. I could not find the copies mentioned by Mach and Ormbsy in their catalogues. Another copy in Yüksek İslâm Enstitüsü is not used in critical edition because it has many missing pages and is subject to alteration. The number of copies are enough for reconstruction of a true version of the original treatise.

Ātif Efendi Copy

This copy is recorded in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Âtıf Efendi nr. 1678/1 and it is first treatise in a compilation of treatises on logic and philosophy.

On the inside cover, it says:

[تمّت الرسالة الشريفة للسيد الشريف قدّس سرّه خط.[

Neither the name of the copyist nor the date of the copy are mentioned. The copy is of two pages (vr. 1b-2b). No notes (ta’līq) are found in the copy. This is the completest and closest to original among the copies we worked on. Our critical edition is based on this copy and we referred to it as [الأصل]. Page numbers in edition is from this copy as well.

Copy of Yazma Bağışlar

It is recorded in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Yazma Bağışlar nr. 607/16. This is sixteenth treatise in a compilation of treatises on logic and philosophy.

The inside cover page reads: [تمّت الرسالة الشريفة للسيد الشريف قدّس سرّه العزيز[

No mention of the copyist or date of copying is mentioned. It is of three pages (vr. 139b-141b). No notes (ta’līq) are found in the copy. This is a whole copy. However, there is alteration in the text. We mentioned this copy as [ب] in our edition.

Copy of Nazif Paşa

This copy is recorded as Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Nazif Paşa nr. 1350/9. It is ninth in a compilation of treatises on logic and philosophy. Its copyist is unknown and dated as 1172 hijri end of Safar. The copy is of three pages (vr. 36b-39a). This is not a whole copy and there are alterations in the text. It is [ن] in our edition.

Method of Critical Edition

I followed Isam principles of critical editing. Among the aforementioned four copies, I based my edition on the first one. First front of the first page is و (wajh), and second part is ظ (zahr). I compared this to copy numbers two and three. I did not consider the fourth copy because of the alterations and missing parts. The abbreviations in the copy are used in their original forms as «مقص» , ظاهر = «ظ» , حين = «ح» «باق» , مصنف = «مص» , مقصود = «مصعد».
وصف نسخ الرسالة:
وجدنا لهذه الرسالة ثلاث نسخ؛ إحداها في مكتبة «Yüksek İslâm Enstitüsü» والباقي منهما في المكتبة السليمانية.

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لا يوجد في هذه النسخة اسم الناشر ولا تاريخ النسخ، وعدد أوراق النسخة: 3 من 1 حسب إلى 2 حسب. لا يوجد فيه أي تعليق. النسخة كاملا، في آخرها: «تمت الرسالة الشريفة للسيد الشريف قدّس سرّه قديس سرّه»، هذه نسخة خالية من التصحيف والتحريف، واعتمدنا في التحقيق على هذه النسخة، ورمزنا اليها بالنسخة «الأصل»، وثنيتنا أوراقها.

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لا يوجد فيها اسم الناشر ولا تاريخ النسخ، وعدد الأوراق أربعة: من 139 إلى 141. النسخة كاملة، كنسخة عاطف أفندي، في أوها: «رسالة للسيد الشريف» وفي آخرها: «تمت الرسالة الشريفة للسيد الشريف قدّس سرّه العزيز» فيها تحريف وترويج، ورمزنا اليها بالنسخة «ب».

نسخة نافذ باشا:
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قيد الناشر أنه قد نسخها سنة 1172 للهجرة في أواخر صفر الحجر. ولم يصرح اسمه. وعدد أوراقه ثلاثة: من 36 إلى 39. وخطها جميل. النسخة ناقصة مقارنة مع نسخة عاطف أفندي، فيها تحريف وترويج، ورمزنا اليها بالنسخة «ن».

عملنا في التحقيق:
- اتباعنا أثناء تحقيقنا قواعد التحقيق لمركز البحوث الإسلامية «ISAM».
- وقابلنا ثلاث نسخ من بين الأربعة، وهي نسخة عاطف أفندي «الأصل»، ونسخة «ب»، ونسخة نافذ باشا «ن».
رسالة في تقسيم العلم

تأليف
السيد الشريف الجرجاني
رسالة في تقسيم العلم

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

اعلم أنّ في تقسيم العلم مذاهب أربعة:

المذهب الأول: للأوائل والمحققين من المتأخرين

ال علم إما تصور وهو إدراك ما عدا أن النسبة واقعة أو ليست واقعة؛ وإما تصديق، وهو إدراك أن النسبة واقعة أو ليست واقعة، وهو الحكم، ووجه الأخصار فيما ظاهر، وهذا التقسيم صحيح لا غبار عليه، إلا على تقدير أن يكون الحكم فعلًا، فإنه يصبح حين جعل التصديق المارد له قسمًا من العلم الذي هو إدراك لأنه من مقولات الكيف على تفسيره بالصورة الحاصلة في النفس أو الالتفاع ولي تفسيره بانتقاء النفس بالصورة الحاصلة من الشيء، والمقولات مبانية الفوات على ذات واحدة باعتبارات مختلفة كما ظن

وإذا فلنا: "لا غبار عليه" لأن كل واحد من القسمين ينفرد في ذاته بطريق يفسه؛ فالتصور سواء كان مجامعًا للحكم أو غير مجامع له، إذا كان نظريًا كان الموصل إليه هو القول الشارع؛ والتصديق إذا كان نظريًا فمصوله الحجة سواء كانت تصورات مكتسبة بالأقوال الشارحة أو لا، فإذا التقسيم يناسب بذاه لبما هو الغرض منه - أي تقسيم ما هو كاسب للنظريات إلى المعروف والمحتج - وهو الحق، لأن الحكم إذعان وإدراك في الحقيقة، كما يشهد به الوُجْدان عند التأمل الصادق.

1. رسالة في تقسيم العلم للسيد الشريف
2. ب: رسالة للسيد الشريف
3. ن: الحمد لله على ما أنعم
4. ن: الوقت
5. ب: المقولات
6. ب: مباني
7. ن: لا تصديق
8. ن: مفرد
9. ن: المناظر
10. ب: لا الفكر الكاذب

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المذهب الثاني: للإمام الرازي ومن تابعه

العلم إما تصديق وهو مجموع الإدراكات الثلاثة والحكم؛ وإما تصور وهو إدراكٌ مغايرٌ لذلك المجموع؛ وبقال: بيانٌ 11 الأخصار فيما على وجهٍ صحيحٍ مشكِّلٌ إذا كان الحكم إدراكاً كما إذا أوميَّ 12 إليه، وستقف على إشكاله.

قيل: والذي خملَه على ذلك أن التصديق يردٌّد القضية، وهي مركبَّة من الحكم وغيره انفًا.

واجيب: أن التصديق المرادٍف لها 13 بمعنى المصدَّق به، لأن القضية معلومةٌ لا علمٌ ولا يلزم من تركِّبَ المرادٌف التصور المتعلق. فإن قال: التصديق هو العلم بالقضية، ف一緒に مركبٌ كمعلومه. فلنا: هو العلم بعد بعض أجزاها الذي لا يتحقق إلا فيها؛ فذلك قيل: هو علمٌ بها، والتحقيق أن اعتبار التصريح جائز إلا أنه لا فائدة 14 فيه، ولا يلائم ما هو الغرض من الفن، كما عرفت.

وقيل: ينطبق على هذا التقسيم إن الحكم إذا كان فعلاً لم يصبح جعله حزُرًا من قسم العلم. وجوابه ما عرفت 15 من أن الحكم إدراك، فيرد 16 عليه إذا كان إدراكاً -ولا شك في ميغاريخ لمجمع المركب منه ومن غيره- كان داخلاً في التصور فيلزم صحة اكتسابه من [المعرفة] 17 أو خارجا عنه، أيضًا فيلزم عدم الأخصار العلم في هذين القسمين، ويرد عليه أيضًا إن الحكم إذا كان بعض تصوراته مكتسباً فإن جعل التصريح نظريًا لذللك 18 كان اكتسابه بالقول الشارح، وإن جعل 19 ضروريًّا بناياً على 20 أن الحكم الذي هو الجزء الأخير ضروريًّا كان تحكَّم، وكونه حزيرًا له أقوى لا بد فيه، ولا أقل من كونه تكليفًا لا حاجة إلى ارتكابه، وأيضاً أي فائدة في ضم التصورات إلى الحكم، وجعل المجموع قسمًا واحدًا من العلم، مع أن هذه التصورات يشترك سائر التصورات في طريق الإكتساب والذي يمتازه 21 في الطريق الكافٍ عن جميع التصورات هو الحكم وحده، فإن الحجة موصولة إلى الحكم ولا دخل لها في تصوراته أصلاً، ويدُ ببعض الأوصاف.
المذهب الثالث: هو الذي يُشيّر به عبارةُ صاحبٍ «الكشف» فيه ومن تابعه، وصرّح به الإصفهانيُّ في شرحه «المطلع».

العلم إما تصور ساذج وهو إدراك ليس مفروضًا للحكم وملحوظًا له، وإما تصديق وهو إدراك مفروض للحكم وملحوظًا له، لم يصرِّح به، مع أن تلك العبارة محتملة احتمالًا لا يُتجه على هذا لسائر التصورات في الطريق الموصى به، بل كُلّها صفاتٌ لاحقة، فجعلها قسمًا آخرًا باعتبار لاحقًا. تَتَسَسَّف، نعم، لا يُنفِّذ على هذا

22  ب: يجعله
23  ن: مختصَّة
24  ن - الذي
25  ب - عبارة
26  ن - إدراك ما ليس
27  ب + هي
28  ن: هذا
29  ب: للحكم
30  ن - المذهب
31  ن: الفهم
32  ن: لاحق
33  ب: لا
34  ن: الثلاث
35  ن: لاحق

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التقسيم ما وردَ على الأولين من أن الحكم فعلً كما لا يخفى على المتأمل؟! وهذا المذهب يشارك المذهب الثاني في أن تصورات الأطراف والنسب داخلة في التصديق ومخالفة؟! في أن الحكم داخل فيه على الثاني دون الثالث، والمذهب الثالثة تشارِك في أن التصديق اسم لما هو قسم من العلم دون الرابع،! وتنacles في أن الحكم على الأول نفس التصديق وعلى الثاني جزءه وعلى الثالث لاحقه.

المذهب الرابع: هو ما يبادر عن عبارات «الإشارات» و«الشفاء» و«التجريد»

وهو إما تصور ساذج وهو إدراك ليس معه تصديق، أي حكم،! وإما تصور معه تصديق، أي حكم. ويريدُ عليه إن الحكم إذا كان إدراكًا كان داخل في التصور الساذج أو خارجًا عن القسمين معًا، وكلاهما باطل، وتفصيل الكلام: إن الحكم إذا! كان فعلًا فالتقسيم المختار هو هذا، والمقصود منه إن الإدراك قد يلحق له! لاحق، هو الحكم، ولكن واحده من الإدراك ولاحقه موصَّل خاص،! يوَّصل به إليه، فإنه! ينقسم الإدراك إلى ما يملقه ذلك اللاحق إلى ما لا يملقه تعيينًا للإدراك ولاحقه لبيين أن لكل منها طريقًا موصَّلًا إليه، فالعلم يقسم إلى التصورين وكلاهما يشتركان في الطريق الموصَّل - يعني المعرف - وللعلم لاحق فعلًا يسمى تصديقًا وحكمًا، وله طريق آخر هو الحجة، ولنَا لم يوجد مشركون!

بين اللاحق والملحق ينقسم إليهما فقط اختاروا تقسيم الإدراك اعتبار اللاحق وعده، فكان وافًٍ، وما هو مقصودهما، وعلى هذا فمَّ قال! العلم إما تصور وإذا تصدقي أو أراد به الحكم فقد تسامح في العبارة، ووضع اللاحق ووضع الملحق بناءً على أنه المقصود. وإن كان الحكم إدراكًا! فالمختار هو التقسيم الأول، كما أشير إليه، وحينئذ فإن قال: العلم إما تصور ساذج! و إما تصور معه تقسيم لم يرد أن يحصا، في التصورين، بل في التصور والتصديق لكنه أراد أن ينبه بأسبق الإدراكات وأظهرها، أعني التصور على التقسيم الذي فيه نوع خفاء.
وهذان المذهبان أي الثالث والرابع يشتركان في أن الحكم خارجًا عما هو قسم من العلم، ويختلفان في أن التصديق هو الحكم على الربع وهو معرضًا على الثالث، وهذا المذهب - أعني الرابع - يشارك المذهب الأول في أن التصديق هو الحكم وحده، ويختلفون في أن التصديق لاحق للعلم 1 هنالك، وقسم من العلم هناك.

إذا عرفت هذا فقول: تقسيم المصنف لا يصح على المذهب الأول والرابع قطعاً لأن التصديق على ذينك المذهبان هو الحكم وحده، لا التصوير الذي معه حكمه ولا على المذهب الثاني أيضًا، وبيان ذلك أن حاصل ما ذكر المصنف أن أحد قسمي العلم هو إدراك غير مجتمع للحكم، والقسم الثاني هو إدراك مجتمع للحكم، ويرد على إدراك الحكم على إدراك مجتمع للحكم، فقلت أن يخرج عن القسم الأول ويبدو في النائب فتكون تصور الحكم عليه وحده تصديقًا، وكذا يكون تصور الاحترنت به وحده تصديقًا آخرًا، 49  ويتكون تصور النسبة المقارنة للحكم تصديقًا ثالثًا، ويكون تصور الحكم عليه وتصور الاحترنت به 50 معاً تصديقًا رابعًا، ويكون تصور الاحترنت عليه وتصور النسبة معاً تصديقًا خامسًا، ويكون تصور الاحترنت به وتصور النسبة معاً تصديقًا سادسًا، ويكون مجموع هذه التصورات المقارنة للحكم تصديقًا سبعة في نظر عدد التصورات في مثل قولك: "الإنسان كاتب" 51 على مفهوم تقسيمه إلى سبعة، ويكون الحكم في كل واحد منها خارجًا عن التصديق مجتمعًا له، فلا يكون تصديقه منطبقًا على شيء من المذاهب الثلاثة المذكورة - أعني الأول والثاني والرابع - بل لا يكون صحيحًا في نفسه لأن التصديق على هذا التفسير يكون مستفادًا من الفقول الشارح، ويكون ما يجامعه ويقترب به، أعني الحكم مستفادًا من الحجة. 52  ومنهم قال معنى هذا التقسم: إن الإدراك إن لم يكن معرضًا للحكم فهو القسم الأول، وإن كان معرضًا فهو التصديق، فيكون منطقيًا على المذهب الثالث، وحيثن Anda doubtful عليه 53 ما يرد على المذهب الثالث على ما ذكره عليه أيضًا أن يكون الحكم خارجًا عن التصديق عارضًا له. 54 فإن فلت قد صرح المصنف بأن المجموع من الإدراك والحكم يسمى بالتصديق، فذلك مذهب الإمام يعنه، قلت هذا...
لا ينبغي أن تقول: إما أن يكون التصديق عبارة عن الإدراك المجامع للحكم كما ذكرنا، وقد عرفت ما فيه، وإذا أن يكون عبارة عن المجموع المركب كما صرَّح به، وحينئذ لم يكن التصديق قسماً من العلم بل مرَّكِّبًا من أحد قسميه، مع أمر آخر مقارن له - أعني الحكم - فذلك باطل، وأيضًا يصدق على تصور المحكوم عليه والحكم معًا، أنه مجموع مركب من إدراك وحكم فيلزم أن يكون تصديقًا، وكذا يكون تصور المحكوم به مع الحكم تصديقًا آخر، وكذلك النسبة مع الحكم تصديقُ ثالث، وتحصل من تركيب الدين منهما مع الحكم ثلاثة آخر، وكذا المجموع المركب من هذه التصورات الثلاثة والحكم تصديقُ سابع، فيترقي عدد التصديقات إلى سبعة أيضًا، إلا أن أحد هذه السبعة هو مذهب الإمام، وهو السابع بخلاف السبعة

ب: لا ينفك لا زا.
ب: يصدق.
ب: أخذ.
ب: تمت الرسالة الشريفة للسيد الشريف قدس سره العزيز.
ب: هذه السبعة هو مذهب الإمام، وهو السابع بخلاف السبعة.