

I. Introduction:

I was struck by an intriguing idea I encountered in *al-Burhān*, the renowned work of the Turkish-Ottoman polymath Ismâ'il Gelenbevî (d. 1791), concerning the logical relations of concepts. Gelenbevî argued that statements such as “this laugher” and “this writer,” although singular terms referring to the same individual, exhibit a relation of equality. Despite indicating the same entity, he reasoned that these expressions have different meanings (*ḥāziyyatān*), thus representing two distinct notions with the same extension. I was interested in this account for both historical and theoretical reasons. The reason why I find it historically important is that such a narrative is absent in earlier writings, such as al-Rāzī's (d. 605/1209) *al-Mulakhhas*, al-Khūnājī's (d. 646/1248) *Kashf al-asrār*, al-Abharī's (d. 663/1265) *Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq*, al-Kātibī's (d. 674/1276) *al-Shamsiyyah*, and al-Urmawī's (d. 682/1283) *Matāli' al-anwār*. And the theoretical framework for my finding it essential was that “singular terms” were not taken into account in the relations between “concepts”. To put it more precisely, two real singular terms such as “this is my book” and “that is your book” referring to different particulars, could have a relation of opposition, just as between the objects they refer to, not equality; and this was not recognised in logic. However, there is a different situation here. The terms given in the example are not real singulars (*al-juz'īyy al-hakīkī*) referring to different objects, however, they are constructed singulars (*al-juz'ī al-i'tibānī*) that referring to the same object with different meanings. Overall, it is noteworthy how these terms evolved into concepts treated in logic, gaining increasing significance over time.

Therefore, a set of logicians before Gelenbevî acknowledged at least these two alterations. (i) The rule that “only universals must be considered in the logical relations of concepts” has been stretched, and several non-universal concepts, viz. singulars, have come to be considered. (ii) The demonstrative pronoun “this” has somehow come to be assumed as a logical concept, moreover relations among concepts in which the demonstrative pronouns are employed have begun to be probed within logic. We were thus compelled to pose two questions, one touching on historical angles and the other theoretical: 1. When did logicians begin to acknowledge the alteration? 2. Influenced by what remarks and how did they render demonstrative pronouns into logical concepts?

Through the works on *al-wad'* (the positing of utterances), the semantic value of demonstrative pronouns have been vetted within Islamic thought. Consequently, it has also been incorporated into the logical corpus. Aside from 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 1355), who had a significant impact on the tone of disputation by shifting the seman-

tic value of demonstrative nouns in the field of *al-wad'*, al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī also began to discuss the logical status of these terms. We assert that al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī adopted different attitudes toward the meanings of demonstrative pronouns within their respective philosophies of language. Concordantly, they also dissented on the logical position and function of the constructed singulars employed by these pronouns.

II. Regarding The Ways of Treatment of Context-Sensitive Terms within the Islamic Philosophy of Language

In the Islamic philosophy of language, the semantics of utterances, such as personal pronouns and demonstrative pronouns, is a significant matter. The main feature of these utterances is that their senses or references are not constant in and of itself; on the contrary, they depend on the context in which they are uttered. These utterances, whose semantic value is examined within the science of *al-wad'*, evoke context-sensitive terms in contemporary language philosophy due to their pertinent features. Considerations from Frege to Kripke regarding semantics in the contemporary philosophy of language have preoccupied many philosophers. David Kaplan is, ultimately, the one who has advanced the most influential theory of context-sensitive terms.¹ Although modern and traditional thoughts differ metaphysically in their grounds, i.e., in their foundations, there are striking affinities between the two sides when this topic is treated as a matter of language philosophy. In the Islamic linguistic tradition, the context of the pronouns can be considered as the sentences in which they are uttered; conversely, the context of demonstratives can be regarded as the pointing acts of the speaker. Abdullah Yıldırım explains these terms' meanings in the Islamic linguistic tradition:

A language comprises several types of utterances, such as demonstrative pronouns, relative pronouns, and particles. The distinctive quality of these utterances is that their meanings vary depending on the context in which they are used and are not overt in and of themselves. For instance, a specific person denoted by the pronoun "I" in the sentence

1 In contemporary philosophy, the theory of context-sensitive terms developed by David Kaplan (1933) is about the semantics of words whose meanings emerges in their use, such as pronouns and demonstrative names. The course of the debate goes back to the philosophical efforts of Gottlob Frege (d. 1925) and Bertrand Russell (d. 1970) to construct an ideal semantics that would determine the meaning of all terms in order to establish a language free of subjectivity. See David Braun, "Indexicals", <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/>, 18.04.21.

“I am a student” is concerned. However, the person denoted by “I” would be someone else in each new sentence that is formed. Many individuals can refer to themselves by employing the pronoun “I” during interlocution. In this case, as the individual who utters the sentence changes, the meaning denoted by the pronoun also changes. Therefore, the pronoun “I” does not have a constant meaning that applies to all circumstances.²

While inquiries into the meanings of these terms in the Islamic tradition date back further, Muslim linguistic scholars began to discuss this subject with a fresh approach in the fourteenth century. The *Risālah al-waḍ'īyya*, namely the *Epistle of waḍ'* by 'Aḍudal-Dīn al-Ījī, served as the basis for the discussion. The subject at the root of the treatise is the meanings of utterances, such as demonstrative pronouns that have been posited to signify and by which methods they were posited.³ Unlike previous linguistic scholars, al-Ījī, for the first time, asserted that these terms have been posited in response to the meanings of the extramental specific individuals they designate rather than a universal meaning present in the mind. In this respect, we can state that al-Ījī equated the sense and reference of these terms—an attitude that recalls Russell's position on the topic.⁴ Likewise, around the same period, logical works attempted to examine the purpose and significance of singular terms containing demonstrative pronouns. Al-Taftāzānī, who rejected al-Ījī's view of semantics, appears to have been the first philosopher to propose the logical examination of singular terms within which the demonstratives are employed. Thus, the semantic value of demonstratives turned into a heated disputation among linguists and logicians. Al-Ījī states that these terms are posited in response to a specific meaning as follows:

اللفظ قد يوضع لشخص بعينه وقد يوضع له باعتبار امر عام. وذلك بان يعقل امر مشترك بين المشخصات، ثم يقال هذا اللفظ موضوع لكل واحد من هذه المشخصات بخصوصه بحيث لا يفاد ولا يفهم منه الا واحد بخصوصه دون القدر المشترك. فتعقل ذلك الامر المشترك آلة للوضع لا انه الموضوع له. فالوضع كلي والموضوع له مشخص، وذلك مثل اسم الإشارة، فان “هذا” مثلا موضوع ومسماه المشار اليه المشخص بحيث لا يقبل الشركة.

The utterance is either posited to a specific entity or in the sense of being subsumed under a general concept. This occurs through recognizing the typical situation that appears among particular individuals. It is then said: This utterance has been posited to

- 2 Abdullah Yıldırım, “Vaz İlmi”, *İslam Medeniyetinde Dil İlimleri: Tarih ve Problemler*, ed. İsmail Güler (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2015) 506.
- 3 Yıldırım, “Adudüddin e-İcî ve er-Risâletü'l-vaz'īyye”, *İslam İlim ve Düşünce Geleneğinde Adudüddin el-İcî*, ed. Eşref Altaş (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2017). 82, 87.
- 4 Zeynep Düzen, “David Kaplan'da Bağlam Duyarlı Terimlerin Anlambilimi Üzerine”, *Felsefe Arkivi*, 49 (2018). 53-63.

each of those specifics in the sense of their being specific, such that when the utterance is employed, it expresses, unlike the common situation among specific entities, one of the specifics and is recognized. The commonality among the particulars has been considered as the tool of positing (*alat al-wad'*) that enables the realization of *wad'*, i.e., the act of positing, but not the meaning itself to which the utterance was posited. Therefore, positing is general, and the meaning (*al-mawdū' lah*) is specific. It is just as the demonstrative pronouns are. For instance, the utterance “this” was posited, and the entity it denominates is, in a way that does not admit jointness among many things, however, externally specific and pointed out.⁵

These very statements revealed how al-Ījī achieved substantial revisions to the *wad'* tradition regarding the semantic value of these utterances. By the treatise, he used the distinction of the *meaning (posited to)* and *tool of positing* and has transformed “the common meaning considered among particular individuals,” which was respected by previous linguists as *mawdū' lah* viz. meaning, into a tool of positing instead of the meaning of an utterance. Herewith, demonstrative pronouns have evolved into singular terms whose “tool of positing” is general, yet the meaning is specific. However, the alternative view embraces the fact that the terms’ meanings are also general. As can be noticed, al-Ījī’s approach has aligned with the idea that these terms do not have constant meanings in and of themselves but instead have contents that vary from context to context in which they are used. When their meanings are considered, it can be thought of that al-Ījī, so to speak, drives forward the context sensitivity of these terms because, for his theory, these terms do not designate a general and abstract meaning that is present in the mind. Instead, they term the meaning of a concrete particular that can be denoted to itself. The theory has led these terms to acquire a new status in the *wad* tradition.

However, al-Taftāzānī took the opposite stance, arguing that these terms—apart from singulars with extramental references—constitute a general notion content in the mind. In other words, even if they refer to singulars, for him, their meaning is a universal concept present in the mind. When we compare these two philosophers, al-Ījī considered the usage of terms (*al-ist'māl*) and assigned their meanings based on this, viewing them as terms whose meanings vary depending on context. Al-Taftāzānī, on the other hand, posited that these terms respond to a universal meaning in mind but are assigned (*ta'yīn*) to indicate singulars. Thus, while the references of

5 Translation by Yildirim, with minor revision. See., Yildirim, “Adudüddin e-Ġcî ve *er-Risâletü'l-vaz'îyye*”, 94-95.

terms may vary with each usage depending on the context, their meanings remain constant. Al-Taftāzānī thereby dissociated the senses and references of utterances, regarding them as general meanings that encompass all their references. The philosopher al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, as can be seen below, supported al-Ījī's view against al-Taftāzānī's semantic approach. Here, we can claim that the disagreement between al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī's semantic methods aligns with the discord found in logic.

Concerning the historical period of *al-wad'* literature after al-Ījī, it has been stated that the most significant breakthrough was the debates that took place between al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī on this subject.⁶ al-Taftāzānī appointed his very own position based on the views of linguistic scholars who preceded al-Ījī. Earlier scholars known as "Arabic Linguists (*Ahl-al-Arabiyyah*)" treated the phenomenon of *wad'* based on genus versus proper nouns. Accordingly, utterances, without any exception, can only be posited in response to meaning in two ways: either by specific position (*al-khâss*) or general position (*al-âmm*). The designation of genus nouns such as "human" is posited in response to a general meaning. In contrast, the designation of proper names, such as Ahmad posited in response to a single individual, is specific. Linguists before al-Ījī considered utterances such as demonstrative pronouns and pronouns—since they are not proper names—as words with a general position that denote multiple entities just as the genus names do.⁷ For instance, the demonstrative term "this" is posited in response to a general meaning such as singular-masculine-pointed-out in all objects denoted by the demonstrative. Their endorsement is based on the following grounds:

i. i. If individuals were considered in the positing of the terms in question instead of general meaning, and these terms were posited for only one of the individuals they referred to, then their usage to the individual they were first posited would be real and usage to others would be figurative.

ii. ii. On the other hand, if they were posited separately for all the individuals employed, they would become homonymous terms, as they would have different meanings in each reference and would have been posited independently for each reference.

6 Yıldırım, "Adudüddin e-İcî ve *er-Risâletü'l-vaz'iyye*", 100.

7 İbrahim Özdemir, *İslam Düşüncesinde Dil ve Varlık: Vaz' İlminin Temel Meseleleri* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2006), 107; Yıldırım, "Vaz İlmi", 506-507; ibid. "Adudüddin e-İcî ve *er-Risâletü'l-vaz'iyye*", 90-92.

Furthermore, it is crucial to note that these scholars, including al-Taftazānī and those before al-Ījī, have put forth the view that a vocable should not be posited in response to ambiguous entities, those that are yet to be fully understood. They rejected the notion of positing an act that encompasses the particulars that have not yet emerged, instead asserting that terms are posited in response to a certain meaning in the mind. This understanding, shared by these esteemed scholars, maintains that demonstrative pronouns and pronouns are posited in response to a general sense.

al-Taftāzānī states in his book *al-Mutawwal* that an utterance posited to a singular individual can be only proper nouns, as pronouns and demonstratives must be excluded:

لأن اللفظ الموضوع لمعين إنما هو العَلَمُ، وما سواه إنما وضع ليستعمل في معين... . فإنها لا تفيد أولَ زمانٍ ذكرها إلا مفهوماتها الكلية. وإفادتها للجزئيات المرادة في الكلام، إنما تكون بواسطة قرينة معينة لها في الكلام، كتقدم الذكر، والإشارة، والعلم بالصلة، والنسبة، ونحو ذلك.

Likewise, the utterance in response to specific things is solely a proper name. Other utterances, except proper names, are posited to be used for particular things. Other than proper names, vocabulary words express nothing except their universal notions when first cited. Their reference to particulars intended during interlocution is made through specific evidence, such as *qarina muayyina*, within the sentence. This variety of evidence includes being mentioned beforehand, the presence of demonstratives, prior knowledge of the relative-relata, and relative pronouns.⁸

Following the linguists who preceded al-Ījī, hence al-Taftazānī, who addressed the fact of positing (*wadʿ*) by way of genus versus proper nouns, claimed that the meaning of demonstratives that cannot be categorized under the proper names at all must be universal. He distinguished between positing utterances in response to a specific meaning and their designation to refer to that meaning. According to him, pronouns and demonstratives are terms not posited in response to specific and concrete particulars that can be subject to the pointing act; on the contrary, the terms posited to a general meaning are yet designated to be employed over particulars.

8 al-Taftāzānī, *al-Mutawwal*, I, ed. Abd-Al-azīz ibn Mohammad al-Sālem-Ahmad ibn Sāleh al-Sudays, (Riyād: Maktaba-al-Rushd 2019), 251; cf. Turkish trans. (Zekeriya Çelik), *el-Mutawvel: Belağat İlimleri-Meânî*, I, (Istanbul: Litera Publishing, 2019) 219.

In his commentary regarding *al-Risālah al-wad'iyyah*, al-Jurjānī presents his justifications by taking on al-Ījī's views. To him, the objective of the speaker who employed demonstratives within interlocution is not the general meaning (*al-ma-fhūm al-mushtarak*) in mind; instead, the individuals themselves singly to whom these demonstratives refer. As a matter of fact, for al-Jurjānī, when said "this came to me," what is meant by "this" is not the general meaning in mind such as singular masculine pointed-out, etc., but entirely rather the particulars themselves who bear this meaning.⁹ Unlike al-Taftāzānī, al-Jurjānī becomes a representative of a-Ījī's novel conception of the *wad'*.

In his gloss on al-Taftāzānī's *al-Mutawwal*, al-Jurjānī construes al-Taftāzānī's view and then confirms al-Ījī's approach, which he considers correct, by stating that al-Taftāzānī's view is a misconception (*wahm*). The part in quotation marks below expresses al-Taftāzānī's views:

"المعتبر في المعرفة، هو التعيين عند الاستعمال دون الوضع؛ ليندرج فيها الأعلام الشخصية وغيرها من المضمورات، والمبهمات، وسائر المعارف. فإن لفظة ((أنا)) مثلا: لا تستعمل إلا في أشخاص معينة؛ إذ لا يصح أن يقال: ((أنا)) ويراد به متكلم لا بعينه. وليست موضوعة لواحد منها وإلا لكانت في غيره مجازا. ولا لكل واحد منها وإلا لكانت مشتركة موضوعة أو ضاعا متعددة بعدد أفراد المتكلم. فوجب أن تكون موضوعة لمفهوم كلي شامل لتلك الأفراد، فيكون الغرض من وضعها له، استعمالها في أفراد المعينة دونه؛" هذا ما توهمه جماعة.

والحق ما أفاده بعض الفضلاء من أنها موضوعة لكل معين منها، وضعا واحدا عاما؛ فلا يلزم كونها مجازا في شيء منها، ولا الاشتراك، وتعدد الأوضاع. ولو صح ما توهموه لكانت: ((أنا))، و((أنت))، و((هذا)) مجازات لا حقائق لها؛ إذ لم تستعمل هي فيما وضعت لها من المفهومات الكلية، بل لا يصح استعمالها فيها

أصلا. وهذا مستبعد جدا.

"The designation during employment matters in the definite noun, not the act of positing. This applies to proper names, pronouns, ambiguous utterances, and other definite nouns. For instance, the vocable "I" is used only for a specific person; it is not valid to say the vocable "I" and intend it for a speaker other than oneself. The vocable is not posited

9 al-Sayyed al Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *Sharh al-Risālah al-Vad'iyyah*, (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli, 3021), 30^b-31a; cf., *Risālah Vad'iyyah li-Sayyed Sharīf Jurjānī*, (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Laleli-3653) 156b-157a; al-Risālah al-Farfiyyah (İstanbul: Hacı Selim Ağa Kütüphanesi, Kemankeş, 341a-b); Yüksel Çelik, *es-Seyyid eş-Şerīf el-Cürçânî'nin "el-Misbâh fî Şerh el-Miftâh" Adlı Eserinin Tahkik ve Tahlîli* (Edition) (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2009), 8-10.

for any specific person; otherwise, using it for others would be a trope. Likewise, it is not posited for each specific person; otherwise, it would be a common utterance posited as many times as there are speakers. Therefore, it must be posited in response to a universal notion (intension) that encompasses all individuals. The purpose of its being posited to this notion is to use it for individuals of this universal notion, not for others. (Al-Jurjānī) This is the speculation of a group of scholars. What is true, as some grandmasters state, is that these utterances are posited simultaneously for each of these specific individuals through general positing. This avoids figurative use, homonymy, or multiplying the positing. If their misconception were true, the utterances 'I,' 'you,' and 'this' would be figurative and have no actual meaning because they would not be employed for the universal notion to which they are posited. Furthermore, their usage for these notions would also not hold. This is indeed a weak speculation.¹⁰

Thus, al-Jurjānī declared al-Taftāzānī's view invalid. Mastjizādah expresses this difference of opinion in his treatise, where he compiled the controversial topics between the two as follows:

(اختلفا) في ان الضمائر واسماء الاشارات هل هو موضوع بالوضع العام للموضوع له العام او هو موضوع بالوضع العام للموضوع له الخاص. فذهب إلى الثاني المحقق الجرجاني وإلى الأول المحقق التفتازاني.

"Those two -disagreed- on whether pronouns and demonstratives are posited by way of general positing to general meaning" or by way of general positing to specific meaning". The latter view was stuck up for by muhaqqiq, i.e., the investigator al-Jurjānī and the former was by the investigator al-Taftāzānī"¹¹

A novel occurrence similar to that al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī adopted opposite approaches toward the semantic value of these terms manifests itself where the singulars containing these terms are addressed in logic. We have various justifications for linking the influence of al-Taftāzānī's semantic approach with his views on logic: (i) As will soon be shown, al-Taftāzānī' underlines his own semantic standpoint regarding the meanings of demonstratives while categorizing the terms in his commentary on the Sun Epistle i.e., *al-Risālah al-shamsiyyah*. (ii) He turned the matter into a discussion about logic, asserting that there can also be logical relations among singular terms in which demonstrative pronouns are employed. In doing so, he has

10 al-Jurjānī, *al-Hāshiyah alā al-Mutavval*, ed. Rāsshed A'radī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 2007), 89.

11 Al-Mastjizādah, *Ihtelāf al-Sayyed wa Sa'duddīn li Mastjizādah*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Mekteb-i Harbiye-i Şāhāne, 1278), 43.

demonstrated that the rule “only universals must be taken into consideration in relations of concepts”, which had already been an entrenched practice in the literature and was later well articulated by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/1365), can also be stretched out. (iii) Furthermore, in his commentary on *al-Taḥdhīb*, Isām al-Dīn al-Isfārāyīnī (d. 943/1537) reported it as a historical finding that the author -viz., al-Taftāzānī raised an objection to that rule.

Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, in his glossary on al-Shamsiyya, anonymously criticized—i.e., without explicitly referring to him—al-Taftāzānī’s remarks on logic and presented an opposing position. The discussion they ignited continued among later logicians such as al-Dawwānī (d. 908/1502), al-Isfārāyīnī (d. 1537), his pupil Mīr Abu’l-Fath (d. 976/1568), Khalkhālī (d. 1014/1604 either 1630), his pupil Sadraddinzādah al-Shirvānī (d. 1036/1627), Siyālkūtī (d. 1067/1657), Gelenbevī (d. 1791), and al-Ḍasūqī (d. 1239/1815). The evidence and arguments of al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī concerning the issue of relations among concepts are examined in the works of these philosophers. Let us now discuss how these terms have been transformed into logical concepts by incorporating them into relations among concepts.

III. Logical Relations of Concepts and Logicalization of Demonstrative Pronoun

The matter of the four relations among concepts (*al-nisab al-arbaʿ*) is one of the topics that Islamic philosophers meticulously pondered in detail. Their strenuous interest in the topic led them to investigate concepts along with their contradictions, or the predication relations between one concept itself and the contradiction of another concept, even going as far as to analyze the realization of relations in statements that form proposition components. The four relations cited arise from the extensional relations that occur among concepts. Until al-Taftāzānī’s fresh interpretation, the concepts considered in these relations were the universal concepts of Peripatetic logic. In other words, the ground criterion for one concept to relate to another was its ability to have an intension that could be predicated to multiple things in existence. Concepts thus formed relations based on whether they could be predicated on the “same multiplicity” or “various multiplicities.” However, with al-Taftāzānī, the idea emerged that a concept could be considered not only in terms of being predicated on diversity but also in terms of being predicated on the same particular in different constructions (*al-iʿtibārāt*) or in terms of its intensions and notions.

Here, the four relations that may occur between two concepts are: (i) absolute-general-specific (*al-'amm wa'l-khâss mutlaqan*), (ii) relative-general-specific (*al-'amm wa'l-khâss min wajh*), (iii) equality (*al-tasâwî*), and (iv) opposition (*al-tabâyun*). To put it another way, if one of these concepts can be predicated upon all things where the other can be predicated, the relation of absolute-general-specific would appear. The relation of relative-general-specific occurs if the two concepts can be predicated upon several things where the other is also predicated. The relation of equality appears if both concepts are equally predicated upon things where the other is predicated. Ultimately, if neither concept can be predicated upon anything where the other is predicated, the relation of opposition is concerned. For instance, the concepts “man” and “animal” exhibit an absolute-general-specific relation, “father” and “teacher” exhibit a relative-general-specific relation, “laughter” and “baffled” exhibit equality, and “book” and “man” exhibit opposition.

Until al-Taftâzânî proposed the notion of constructed singulars distinct from real particulars, the formulation of concept relations, which Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî had embarked upon forming, involved only relations among universals. According to this traditional approach, since real singular terms are utterances that refer to particular objects or facts, they could at most hold the relation of opposition among them, just as the entities to which they externally referred. For instance, the statements “that book” and “this book,” referring to two different books, bear the same relation of opposition as the objects they refer to. However, other statements pointing to the same reference, such as “here, this is my favorite book” and “here, that is the book you disliked at all,” used for any one of these books, can form different concepts solely in terms of their senses/intentions. Moreover, despite being singular terms, equality may occur among them as they are equal in their extension. They are singular and equal terms, yet different in their notions. This is precisely the point that al-Taftâzânî stands for. This novel insight regarding logic has been grounded upon linguistic and logical bases. Linguistically, the idea in the science of *wad'*—contrary to 'Aḍud al-Dîn al-Ījî—that demonstrative names have been posited in response to a common meaning present in the mind instead of a concrete particular, hence their intension, unlike their references, is general, set the ground for al-Taftâzânî's view. Logically, the idea that “the concept cannot be restricted only by the conception of universality offered by peripatetic logic” constitutes the background for this perspective. To better understand the historical transformation in this topic, it would be helpful to focus on how the matter was handled during the period between al-Râzî and al-Taftâzânî. This examination can provide a clearer picture of the evolution of these logical and linguistic ideas.

In his book *al-Mulahhas*, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī centering particularly around absolute-general-and-specific and relative-general-and-specific has stated the relations among two terms as follows:

كل معقولين فلا بد وان يكون احدهما مع الاخر اما اخص منه مطلقا، او اعم منه مطلقا،
اولا اعم ولا اخص، او اعم من وجه و اخص من وجه، كالحيوان والأبيض. وكل ذلك
ممكّن. فاما اعم منه مطلقا واخص منه مطلقا من وجه، فذلك محال.

Each pair of intelligibles must exhibit one of the following relationships: either absolute-specific or absolute-general, or neither, or either relative-specific or relative-general, as exemplified by the concepts “animal” and “white.” All these cases are possible, but a concept can’t be simultaneously absolute-general-relative and absolute-specific-relative.¹²

In this text, al-Rāzī did not explicitly articulate the relations of equality and opposition with specific terms. Instead, he used al-Kātibī’s words to describe equality and opposition more broadly as “neither subsumes nor is subsumed.”¹³ Shortly after that, al-Khūnājī, in contrast to al-Rāzī, adopted the four relations with their distinctive names and explicitly cited the remaining two as well. It is also noteworthy that al-Khūnājī used the concept of “notion” instead of “intelligible” and differentiated between the universal and particular under this crucial concept. This usage became established in subsequent traditions. In this context, one notion can be either universal or specific, and the relations among universals are as follows:

والعام يصدق علي الخاص وغيره. فان شمل جملة افراد الخاص كان عمومه مطلقا، والا
فمن وجه. ولا يخرج من ذلك الا احد القسمين: المتساويان في العموم والخصوص وهما
اللذان يشمل كل منهما جميع افراد الآخر، والمتباينان وهما اللذان لا يصدق احدهما علي
شيء مما يصدق عليه الاخر.

The general term encompasses the specific and others. If it includes every instance of the specific term, its generality is absolute; if vice versa, it is relative. Otherwise, only two possibilities remain: they are equal terms because each encompasses all instances of the other, both in general and specific terms, or they are opposite terms where one applies to instances that the other does not.¹⁴

12 Fahreddin er-Rāzī, *Mantuku'l-Mūlahhas*, 31.

13 Kātibī, *Ṣerhu'l-Mūlahhas*, Süleymaniye Ktp., Şehid Ali Paşa-1680, vr. 15b.

14 Afdal al-Dīn al-Khūnājī, *Kashf al-asrār*, ed. Khaled El-Rouayheb (Tehrān: Moessese-i Pejūheş-i Heakme wa Falsafa-i Īrān, 1389/2010), 25.

Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī reiterated the idea that the four connections occur amongst universals despite expressing the four relations by its very own sui generis concepts. In addition, the same standpoint also has taken part in *Maṭālī' al-anwār* that written by his contemporary Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī.¹⁵ The esteemed logician al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī, who wrote commentaries on the fundamental works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Khūnajī, also expresses the relation matters in his treatise *on al-Shamsiyyah* as follows:

الكليان متساويان ان صدق كل واحد منهما علي كل ما يصدق عليه الآخر كالانسان والناطق؛
وبينهما عموم وخصوص مطلق، ان صدق احدهما علي كل ما يصدق عليه الاخر من غير
عكس كالحيوان والانسان؛ وبينهما عموم وخصوص من وجه ان صدق كل منهما علي بعض
ما صدق عليه الاخر فقط كالحيوان والأبيض؛ ومتباينان إن لم يصدق شيء منهما علي شيء
مما يصدق عليها الاخر كالانسان والفرس.

They are two equal universals, such as “man” and “rational,” if each universal encompasses everything that falls under the other. The relation of absolute-general-and-specific applies when one universal encompasses everything the other does, but not vice versa, as exemplified by “animal” and “man.” The relation of relative-general-and-specific occurs when each universal encompasses some things where the other does not, like “animal” and “white.” Opposition arises between them when neither encompasses anything the other does, such as “horse” and “man.”¹⁶

As observed, al-Kātibī also discussed relations in terms of universal terms. However, in his commentary on *al-Shamsiyyah*, Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1365) sought to emphasize the prevailing view of his time, known as *lex lata*, which insisted that only universal concepts should be considered in relations between concepts. He reiterated this after stating that a concept can be universal or particular. Shortly after Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's commentary, al-Taftazānī raised objections to this rule in his commentary on *al-Shamsiyyah*. Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī then critiqued al-Taftazānī's objections in his glossary on Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's commentary. Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's notable statements on this matter are as follows:

15 Serāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī, *Maṭālī' al-anwār wa Sharhuhū Lavāmi' al-Asrār*, 165.

16 Kātibī, *al-Shamsiyya*, ed. Mahdī Fadl Allah, (Beirut: al-Markaz- al-Sakāfi al-Arabī, 1998), 208, 209.

وانما اعتبرت النسب بين الكليين دون المفهومين، لان المفهومين اما كليان او جزئيان، او كلي وجزئ. والنسب الاربع لا تتحقق في القسمين الأخيرين. اما الجزئيان فلانهما لا يكونان الا متباينين، واما الجزئي والكلي، فلان الجزئي ان كان جزئيا لذلك الكلي يكون اخص منه مطلقا، وان لم يكن جزئيا له يكون مابينا له.

Indeed, unlike two universals, relations are only considered between two universals. This is because two notions can be universals or both be particulars, or one can be particular while the other is universal. The four relations do not apply in the last two cases (where both are particulars or one is particular). As for the two particulars, those two cannot be except for opposite; and for the particular and universal, if the particular is subsumed under the universal it would be its absolute-specific whereas vice versa -i.e., not subsumed under the universal then opposition concerns.¹⁷

In Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's remarks, two crucial points stand out regarding our research question. The first is his emphasis on the idea that relations can only exist between two universals. The second point concerns his principle that two singular terms can only have a relation of opposition. From this second viewpoint, it appears that Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī did not consider the concept of the "constructed particular (*al-juz' al-i'tibārī*)" in this context. On the other hand, in his commentary on *al-Shamsiyyah*, al-Taftazānī reiterated and elaborated upon al-Rāzī's assertions, stating that "all four relations occur only between two universals" and reinforcing the idea that two real particulars can only be in opposition. However, al-Taftazānī introduced a novel perspective distinct from Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's approach by suggesting for the first time that singular terms could also be considered logical concepts.

كذا قيل، وفيه نظر، لأن زيدا إذا كان ضاحكا، فهذا الإنسان وهذا الضاحك جزئيان من الإنسان والضاحك غير متباينين بل متساويان، وأيضا الإنسان الكلي ليس مابينا للجزئي من الضاحك بل أعم، نعم؛ لا يجري العموم من وجه في غير الكليين، فلهذا اعتبر الكليان.

Likewise, it has been said so: herein another conception-is concerned-: if Zayd -were-laughter, 'this man' and 'that laughter' would be the particulars of universals laughter and man in this way they are not two opposite but equal terms. Also, the universal man is not opposite to the laughter's particulars but per contra comprises it. And yes; the relative-general doesn't occur among except two universal concepts thence universals are regarded where relations turn out to be considered.¹⁸

17 Kutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tahrīr al-kavā'id al-mantkiyya fi Sharh al-Risālah al-Shamsiyya*, in *Shurūh al-Shamsiyya*, I, (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li al-Turās, 2011/1432), 297-98.

18 al-Taftāzānī, *Sharh al-Imām al-Sa'd al-Taftāzānī alā al-Shamsiyya*, ed. Cādullah Basmām al-Sāleh (*Amman: Dār al-Nūr al-Mubīn*, 2013/1434) 175.

In contrast to the idea that only an opposition relation (*al-tabāyun*) can exist between two singular terms, al-Taftazānī argued that a relation of equality can also occur among singular terms. According to him, the following relations should be considered: Opposition can occur between (i) two real particulars and (ii) between a particular and a universal under which the particular does not fall. On the other hand, equality may occur between two distinct constructed particulars. Furthermore, when it comes to the relation of absolute-general-and-specific (*‘amm wa khāṣṣ mutlaq*), which exists between a particular and its universal that encompasses it, other pairs involving singular terms may give rise to different relations except for absolute-general-and-specific. Contrary to Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s view, who only acknowledged opposition and absolute-general-and-specific relations for singulars, the notion of equality between two singulars did not find prominence in his discourse. However, al-Taftazānī expanded the scope by asserting that constructed singular terms can be involved in various relations. He illustrated this by considering Zayd as falling under the universals “man” and “laugher,” and the terms “this man” and “this laugher” referring to Zayd from different perspectives as particulars subsumed under these universals. Therefore, the relation of equality between the universals “man” and “laugher” also extends to their particulars. Despite these terms being different in their notions, they do not denote different real particulars in the external realm, thanks to the differentiation in their intensions and the use of demonstratives. Al-Taftazānī’s approach aligns with Frege’s theory, distinguishing between sense and reference. According to him, demonstratives do not denote different real particulars in each usage but rather form terms that share the same reference while differing in notion. In his commentary on *al-Shamsiyyah*, al-Taftazānī emphasizes this linguistic perspective and its transfer to logic, marking a significant shift in how singular terms and their relations were conceptualized.

واما المضممرات وأسماء الإشارة مثلاً فليست مفهوماتها التي وضعت هي لها مشخّصة لان لفظ انا مثلاً موضوع للمتكلم من حيث هو متكلم ولفظ هذا موضوع لمشار اليه مفرد مذكر. وهو معني كلي والتشخص انما يكون بحسب الخارج لا بانظر الي مفهوم اللفظ.

To illustrate this point, consider pronouns and demonstratives. The meanings of these are not specific in themselves. For instance, the pronoun “I” is posited in response to the speaker as he is the speaker himself. On the other hand, the demonstrative “this” is posited about a masculine singular referred. Its meaning is universal, encompassing the idea of singularity within its scope. However, the specification of singularity arises from external reference, not from contemplation over the intention or meaning of the word itself.¹⁹

19 Tefṭâzânî, *Sharh al-Imâm al-Sa’d al-Taftâzânî alâ al-Shamsiyya*, 133.

Through the statements above, al-Taftazānī applied his semantic approach from the field of *wad'* into logic, reflecting the unique understanding that emerged from his contemplation.

In contrast, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī disagreed with al-Taftazānī's semantical perspective. In his glossary on *Matalī' al-anvār*, he acknowledged a debate regarding whether pronouns and demonstratives have singular or universal meanings. Some argued for universality, positing that these utterances denote a single meaning applicable to multiple things. However, al-Jurjānī categorically rejected this view. He argued that the demonstrative "this (*hāzā*)" is posited about each individual it denotes. This semantic insight influenced his works on logic²⁰, wherein he opposed the treatment of demonstratives as logical concepts, as proposed by al-Taftazānī in his glossary on *al-Shamsīyyah*. Al-Jurjānī staunchly refuted al-Taftazānī's approach, highlighting the risk that terms like "this laugher" and "this writer" might mistakenly be classified as universals under al-Taftazānī's interpretation.

(قوله فلائهما لا يكونان إلا متباينين) أقول: فإن قلت هذا الضاحك وهذا الكاتب جزئيان متصادقان فلا يكونان متباينين. قلت: إن كان المشار إليه بهذا الضاحك زيدا مثلا، وبهذا الكاتب عمروا فهناك جزئيان متباينان، وإن كان المشار إليه بهما زيدا مثلا، فليس هناك إلا جزئي حقيقي واحد هو ذات زيد، لكنه اعتبر معه تارة اتصافه بالضحك، وأخرى اتصافه بالكتابة، وبذلك لم يتعدد الجزئي الحقيقي تعددا حقيقيا ولم يتغير تغيرا حقيقيا، بل هناك تعدد وتغاير بحسب الاعتبارات. والكلام في الجزئيين المتغايرين تغايرا حقيقيا كما هو المتبادر من العبارة؛ لا في جزئي واحد له اعتبارات متعددة، ولو عد جزئي واحد بحسب الجهات والاعتبارات جزئيات متعددة لزم أن يكون الجزئي الحقيقي كليا. فإننا إذا أشرنا إلى زيد بهذا الكاتب وبهذا الضاحك، وهذا الطويل، وهذا القاعد كان هناك على ذلك التقدير جزئيات متعددة يصدق كل واحد منها على ما عدها من الجزئيات المتكثرة، فلا يكون مانعا من فرض اشتراكه بين كثيرين. فيكون كليا قطعاً، وأمثال هذه الأسئلة تخيلات يتعظم بها عند العامة، ويفضح بها عند الخاصة، نعوذ بالله من شرور أنفسنا من سيئات أعمالنا.

As for his (Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's) statement, "Two particular terms can only be opposite terms" viz., between them relation of opposition concerns," I say the following: If you say, "The terms 'this laugher' and 'this writer' are two particulars that overlap with each other, and therefore they are not opposite terms," I say: For example If what is pointed out by 'this laugher' is Zayd; and by 'this writer' is Amr, then herein there are two distinct particulars. If what is pointed out by the two is, for example, only Zayd, there is only one real particular, and that is Zayd himself, however, Zayd is taken into account in one sense by

20 Kutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharh-al-Matālī'*, I, 182-183.

being characterized by laughing and in another sense by being characterized by writing. Thus, the real particular is neither multiplied in real sense nor differentiated in real sense, on contrary, therein in terms of constructions multiplying and differentiation concerns. As is immediately clear from the phrase, it has not concerned a single particular with multiple constructions, but about two different particulars with real differentiation between them. For if a single particular were to be considered as more than one particular in terms of its various angles and constructions, then the real particular would have to be universal. When we pointed out Zayd by “this laugher”, “this writer”, “this tall one”, and “this sitter”, there would be multiple particulars, each of which would hold true for the others, and each of which would be composed of particulars multiplied in number. Thus, there would be no obstacle preventing us from assuming that this particular is common to more than one thing, and the particular would certainly be transformed into a universal. Questions of this kind were imaginary things that caused pride themselves in the eyes of the masses and shame in the eyes of the elites. We seek refuge with Allah from the evils within ourselves and from the burden of our evil deeds.²¹

In this text, it is evident that al-Jurjānī opposes al-Taftāzānī’s perspective. Initially, he elucidates how, according to al-Taftāzānī, terms containing demonstrative pronouns are transformed into concepts with logical content. Al-Jurjānī then asserts the logical-philosophical risks associated with this idea, ultimately rejecting the notion of a “constructed singular.” He argues that accepting such an idea would imply that singular terms could predicate upon each other akin to universals, a consequence he deems unacceptable. Consequently, he dismisses the notion of constructed singulars as lacking essential distinctiveness. Moreover, al-Jurjānī maintains that Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s assertion that “there can only be a relation of opposition between singular terms” applies strictly to real singulars and not to constructed ones.

In response to al-Jurjānī’s objections, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī (d. 1502) presents a counterargument defending al-Taftāzānī’s stance. In his commentary on al-Taftāzānī’s *al-Taḥdhīb*, al-Dawwānī²² acknowledges that not all four relations occur between singular terms. However, he argues that relations of equality, alongside oppo-

21 al-Jurjānī, *Hāshiya alā al-Shamsiyyah*, in *Shurūh al-Shamsiyyah*, I, (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li al-Turās, 2011/1432), 298-300.

22 At the part of the division of the utterances of his work, al-Dawwānī also brings up al-Taftāzānī’s semantic approach to demonstratives and reminds us that he did not take into account the usage in the matter of the meaning of demonstratives and pronouns, and therefore he argued that these words were given the universal meaning. Accordingly, while these terms denote particulars in usage, they were put into universal meaning in terms of *wad’*. See al-Dawwānī, *Sharḥ al-Taḥdhīb* li-Jalāl al-Dawwānī, (Istanbul: Muharrem Efendi Matbaası, 1305) 16-17

sition, can indeed exist between singular terms. Al-Dawwānī appears to be the first philosopher to provide a substantial defense of al-Taftāzānī's viewpoint on this matter. He subtly refers to al-Jurjānī's criticism without explicitly naming him, closely paraphrases al-Jurjānī's objections, and engages in a scholarly discourse by acknowledging the controversy surrounding this issue.

وأيضاً لا يجري جميع النسب في الجزئيين ولا في الجزئي والكلي، إذ ليس في الأول إلا التباين أو المساوات، وليس في الثاني إلا التباين أو العموم المطلق.

وما قيل من أنه لا تصادق في الجزئيات. فإن مثل هذا الضاحك وهذا الكاتب إن كان المشار إليه بهما مختلفاً فهناك جزئيان متباينان، أو واحداً، فليس هناك إلا جزئي واحد اعتبر تارة مع وصف الكتابة، وأخرى مع الضحك، وبذلك لا يتعدد الجزئي تعدداً حقيقياً. فلا يتغيران تغيراً حقيقياً، بل هناك تعدد وتغير بحسب الاعتبار. والكلام في الجزئيين المتغيرين بحسب الحقيقة كما هو المتبادر من العبارة لا في جزئي واحد له اعتبارات متعددة. ولو عد جزئي واحد بحسب الجهات والاعتبارات جزئيات متعددة لزم أن يكون الجزئي الحقيقي كلياً. فإننا إذا أشرنا إلى زيد بهذا الكاتب وبهذا الضاحك، وهذا الطويل، وهذا القاعد كان هناك على هذا التقدير جزئيات متعددة يصدق كل واحد منها على ما عداه من الجزئيات المتكثرة. فلا يكون مانعاً من فرض اشتراك بين كثيرين؛ فيكون كلياً قطعاً.

فأقول فيه بحث إذ لا شك أن التغير الاعتباري كاف في كونهما مفهومين كما في الكليين. فإن النسب تشمل الكليين المتغيرين بالذات والمتغيرين بالاعتبار. فلا وجه لتخصيص الجزئيين المتغيرين بالذات. وما ذكره من لزوم كون الجزئيات كلية ممنوع. فإن الكلية علي ما حقق أنفاً هو إمكان فرض تكثر المعني الواحد في النفس بحسب الخارج اعني تجويز صدقه علي ذوات متكثرة لا صدقه مع مفهومات اخر علي ذات واحدة. والمتحقق هناك هو الثاني دون الأول.

Likewise, not all relations occur between two singulars or between a singular and a universal, since in the first case there is no relation except equality and opposition, while at the latter case, -there are no relations except opposition or absolute-general. Likewise, not all -types of- relations occur between two singulars and between a singular and a universal, since in the first case there is no relation except equality and opposition, while at the latter case, -there are no relations except opposition or absolute-general. As for the view what said that there is no overlapping between singulars in the sense of that: "For instance, terms 'this laugher' and 'this writer', if the pointed out by these two are different, then there are two distinct singulars or if the pointed out is single, then there is only one singular that is considered in one sense by the quality of -the act of- writing and in another sense by laughing. The singular thus does not multiply by way of real multiplying. And therefore, these two are not differentiated from each other in a real sense on the contrary, herein multiplication and differentiation with respect to construction. As is immediately obvious from the statement, herein the remark isn't about single particular with multiple constructions, but two discrete singulars differentiated in terms of reality.

And if one singular was counted according to various angles and constructions as multiple singulars then, the real singular would be universal. Thus, when we refer to Zayd by terms “this laughter”, “this writer”, “this tall one” and “this sitter”, there would be multiple singulars, each of which would apply to where the other does and increased in number. Thus, there would be no obstacle preventing us from assuming a commonality between more than one thing, and the particular would certainly be transformed into a universal.

I say that there is controversy on this issue, because, of course, undoubtedly, differentiation by construction is sufficient for two singulars to be two separate notions, just as it is at two universals. And relations encompass universals differentiated of themselves and those that differentiated by construction. If then there is no reason to allocate the issue to two singulars that are differentiated in essence. As for what he said about “need of the singular should be transformed into a universal,” this is forbidden, because the universal is - as has already been investigated- the possibility of supposing that the meaning, which is one in itself, can be multiplied in terms of externality. I mean the possibility of this meaning holds true for more than one entity, not to be held true for sole individual with other notions. The situation that arises here is the latter, not the former.²³

al-Dawwānī at first, just as al-Taftāzānī, enumerated the relations that can occur between singular-singular or universal-singular pairs of concepts that might arise from the inclusion of singular terms alongside two universal terms, and after acknowledging that there might also be a relation of equality between two singular terms, he responded taking in charge to al-Jurjānī’s criticism which is cited at his gloss on al-Shamsiyyah. Thus, he made carry over the debate that al-Taftāzānī launched in his commentary on al-Shamsiyya to the literature of the commentaries on al-Tahdhīb So to speak, this issue has become an ongoing debate in later al-Tahdhīb commentaries and glossaries. Such al-Dawwānī’s response allows us to draw the following conclusions:

- Firstly, al-Dawwānī asserts that any differentiation in construction between terms suffices to consider them distinct notions, akin to the treatment of universal terms such as “laughter” and “writer.”
- That is to say, in the relations between concepts, the constructed universals are already considered prior to the constructed singulars. They arise from the predication of different notions to the same multiplicity. Therefore, the fact that the concepts are constructed does not prevent them from being considered in the relations.

23 al-Dawwānī, *Sharḥ al-Tahdhīb*, 19.

According to al-Dawwānī, constructional differentiation among terms leads to differentiation in their content and intention (notion), giving rise to distinct concepts and facilitating the formation of relations between them. Al-Dawwānī does not admit al-Jurjānī's claim that singulars can be treated as universals, which he deems a philosophical-logical risk, because what makes a universal universal is "the fact that a meaning that is singleton in itself can be said to multiplicity in terms of extra-mental reality, i.e., to more than single entity," not the fact that multiple meanings can be said to a single entity. As a matter of fact, what is actualized here is not the being said of a term to the multiplicity in the extra-mental world, but that said of more than one constructed meaning to a single entity. Then, according to al-Dawwānī, it is possible to examine constructed singulars in relations.

This perspective represents a significant development in the history of logic in two main respects: firstly, the logical treatment of singular terms based on constructionality marks a notable departure. Secondly, it introduces an alternative to the Peripatetic tradition's emphasis on extension and reference in conceptualization by considering the notion (intension) alongside the ontic aspects. This shift indicates that semantics and ontology began to play a crucial role in understanding concepts. Furthermore, al-Dawwānī employs the demonstrative noun "this" to illustrate this transformation, showing how it can signify a term not merely as a real singular but as a constructed singular within logical discourse.

Isām al-Dīn al-Isfarāyīnī emerges as a significant figure bridging the realms of language and logic within Islamic scholarly discourse. His contributions include commentaries on al-Ījī's *al-Risālah al-wad'iyyah* and al-Taftāzānī's *al-Ṭahdhīb*, as well as a glossary on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's commentary on *al-Shamsiyyah*. This comprehensive engagement places him at the intersection of linguistic and logical debates, embodying both discourse facets. In his discussions on the meaning of demonstrative pronouns, al-Isfarāyīnī aligns with al-Ījī's viewpoint, which posits that these terms refer to specific, concrete, denotable singular individuals.²⁴ This perspective underscores his commitment to grounding language in concrete referents, thus influencing his approach to logical analysis. Al-Isfarāyīnī's treatment of logic is evident in both his commentary on *al-Ṭahdhīb* and his glossary on *al-Shamsiyyah*.²⁵ The

24 al-Isfarāyīnī, *Isām alā al-Risālah al-wad'iyyah*, 33-37.

25 I am very grateful to Dr Mehmet Ankan for his help in accessing the manuscripts of these two texts.

chronological placement of these works, noted by the Ottoman scholar Veliyyuddin Jârullah Efendi in his collection, suggests a developmental aspect in al-Isfarâyîni's thought.²⁶ This temporal sequence may provide insights into evolving perspectives or shifts in emphasis between the two works.

In his commentary on *al-Taḥdhīb*, al-Isfarâyîni delves into the semantic aspects of logic, particularly focusing on the notion (*al-maḥḥūm*) as elucidated by al-Fahkr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his works on *Usūl*. This notion is defined as “that which originates in the mind from the vocable,”²⁷ highlighting a shift towards linguistic elements rather than other terms that represent mental concepts.

Al-Isfarâyîni distinguishes the semantics of demonstrative names and pronouns from that of proper names. He underscores the importance of investigating notions for logic, encompassing universal and singular notions and their interrelations. He references al-Taftāzāni's perspective that terms other than proper names do not denote specific meanings and emphasizes the significance of usage in this context.²⁸

A pivotal addition by al-Isfarâyîni in his commentary on *al-Taḥdhīb* pertains to the incorporation of singular terms, including those containing demonstratives, into logical relations. He explicitly attributes the objection against the rule “only universals must be considered in relations” to al-Taftāzāni. This perspective challenges traditional views by suggesting that singular terms can also participate in logical relations, expanding the scope beyond universals.

Moreover, al-Isfarâyîni presents al-Jurjāni's objection to al-Taftāzāni's stance and explores alternative responses to this objection.

قيل وجه التخصيص ان النسب الأربع لا يتحقق إلا بين الكلّيتين إذ لا يجري بين الكلي والجزئي الحقيقي إلا التباين والعموم والخصوص المطلق ولا يتحقق بين الجزئيين²⁹ إلا التباين الكلي واعتراض المصنف بأنه يجري بين الجزئيين المساواة أيضا كما في هذا الضاحك وهذا الكاتب. فالوجه في بيان عدم جريان الأربع بين الجزئيين أنه لا يجري بينهما إلا التباين والمساواة. وأجيب عنه بأن هذا الضاحك وهذا الكاتب المشار بهما إلى شخص واحد ليس بجزئيين مختلفين بالذات بل بالاعتبار، وبذلك لا يتعدد الجزئي متعددا

26 al-Isfarâyîni, *Isām at-tasavvurât maa' al-tasdikât*, (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Küttüphanesi Carullah Efendi, 1387), zahriyyah.

27 al-Isfarâyîni *Sharh al-Taḥdhīb*, (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Küttüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, 1719), 229^{a-b}.

28 al-Isfarâyîni, *Sharh al-Taḥdhīb*, (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Küttüphanesi, Cârullah Efendi, 1403), 18^a.

29 al-Isfarâyîni, *Isām Sharh al-Taḥdhīb*, (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Küttüphanesi, Cârullah Efendi, 1403), 24^b.

معتبرا فيما بينهم إذ لو اعتبر لكان كل جزئي كلياً لصدقه على كثيرين متغايرين بالاعتبار. وفيه نظر إذ التعدد الاعتباري معتبر في بيان النسب حيث يجعل الحد التام مساوياً للمحدود ولا يلزم من اعتبار هذا التعدد كلية جزئي إذ المعتبر في الكلية هو الصدق على كثيرين متأصلين في الوجود ولا اعتبار للكثرة الحاصلة بالاعتبار.

It has been argued that the allocation of logical discussion to two universals is due to the assertion that the four relations occur exclusively between two universals. According to this view, opposition and the relation of absolute-general-specific exist between one universal and one real singular. However, between two singular terms, only opposition is possible. Al-Taftazānī objected to this position by asserting that equality can also occur between two singulars, citing examples like ‘this laugher’ and ‘this writer.’ He argued that while the four relations may not all occur between two singulars, opposition and equality can occur between them. The explanation for why the full spectrum of relations may not apply to two singulars hinges on the understanding that singular terms differentiated by construction are not differentiated in essence. In other words, terms like ‘this laugher’ and ‘this writer,’ denoting the same individual, are distinguished only by their linguistic construction rather than by essential differentiation. Critically, if singular terms were treated as universal based solely on such linguistic differentiations, each singular term would potentially become universal. However, universality in logic is not contingent upon linguistic constructions that imply multiplicity but rather on the essential property of being predicable of more than one entity in actual existence. Therefore, while constructional differentiation allows for specific logical relations like opposition and equality between singular terms, it does not necessitate their classification as universals solely due to linguistic multiplicity.³⁹

Thus, al-Isfarāyīnī addressed the issue by outlining the arguments of both parties. He noted al-Taftāzānī’s objection to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s principle and Sayyid Sharīf’s support for it, arguing that considering the constructional multiplicity in particulars would blur the distinction between singulars and universals. However, al-Isfarāyīnī points out that this objection can be countered by distinguishing between constructional multiplicity in concepts and the essential universality of concepts, which depends on their applicability to entities that exist in reality, not merely in terms of construction.

In his gloss on *al-Shamsiyyah*, al-Isfarāyīnī discusses Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s assertion that “relations are taken into account only between two universals,” reflecting a longstanding practice among philosophers. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī aimed to exclude sin-

30 al-Isfarāyīnī, *Sharh al-Tahdhīb*, (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Kültüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, 1719), 231^b.

gular terms from such considerations. Sayyid Sharif also supported this exclusion to maintain the clarity and validity of logical relations, arguing against extending them to singular terms, which he considered a misleading notion.³¹ Although al-Isfarāyīnī acknowledges that initially, singular terms were not included in these discussions, their inclusion sparked debates on the nature of singulars within logical frameworks.

أن المناقشة بأن الجزئيين فيه التساوي أيضا لأنه هذا الضاحك وهذا الكاتب مفهومان متغايران بالاعتبار متصادقان ابدأ. فيكونان متساويين.

The debate centers on whether “this laugher” and “this writer” can be considered two distinct but equal notions. Despite their different constructions, they overlap entirely about the same individual, which proponents argue establishes equality between these two singular terms.³²

After recalling al-Jurjānī’s criticism here, al-Isfarāyīnī voices another response:

فان قلت المفهومان الذان ان جعلنا مقسما للنسب اعم من المتغايرين حقيقية او اعتبارية يرشدك اليه جعل الحد التام مساويا للمحدود. فالجزئيان المتغايران تغايرا اعتباريا داخل في المقسم. فيجب ان يدخل في الأقسام والا لاختل التقسيم. فالمعتبر في التقسيم للنسب مطلق التعدد.

If you say: If two different notions are taken as parts of relations, regardless of whether the difference between them is real or constractional, then the division in question shows that the notions of “defining (al-hadd)” and “defined (al-mahdūd),” which differ constractionally, are equal notions. Therefore, terms that vary in construction can also fit into this framework; otherwise, the division would be invalidated. Thus, whether the multiplication is conceptual in an absolute sense, real, or based on construction, it remains relevant in the context of relational divisions.³³

This response suggests that singular terms should be logically considered analogous to constructed universals that refer to the same extension, because these terms appear not in their extension but in their intension like other terms. However, while al-Isfarāyīnī accepts this for universals, he rejects it for singulars, aligning with his semantic understanding:

31 al-Isfarāyīnī, *Isām tasavvurât maa’ al-tasdikât*, (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Kutüphanesi, Carullah Efendi, 1387), 140^a.

32 al-Isfarāyīnī, *Isām al-Tasavvurât maa’ al-tasdikât*, (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Kütiüphanesi, Carullah Efendi, 1387), 140^a; cf. *Hâshiya Isâm*, (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Kütiüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, 1757), 169^b.

33 al-Isfarāyīnī, *Isām al-Tasavvurât maa’ al-tasdikât*, 140^b; cf. *Hâshiyah Isâm*, 169^b-170^a.

قلت المراد بالمفهومين ما يعد مفهوميين ويعتبران متعددين. فيدخل الحد والمحدود ليعدهما متغايرين لأنه يترتب عليه فائدة الاكتساب. ويخرج الجزئيان اللذان تعددا بالاعتبار ولا يعد الجزئي بالاعتبار متعددا. ويعد الكلي كذلك لان الكليات امور تدور على اعتبار العقل بخلاف الامور الجزئية. فانها امور متأصلة في الوجود لا مدخل في تحققها لا اعتبار العقل.

To this, I would say that when we speak of two notions being considered separate entities and counted as distinct numerically, we imply that the complete definition and what it defines are seen as distinct notions because they each contribute uniquely to understanding. However, singular terms multiplied in number through construction are exempt from this consideration, as constructed singulars are not regarded as being multiplied in number. Universals, on the other hand, are treated as such. Unlike singulars, universals are conceptual entities formed through intellectual construction. In contrast, singulars exist independently, and their realization is not influenced by intellectual constructs.³⁴

In his commentary on *al-Shamsiyyah*, al-Isfarāyīnī takes a clear stance influenced by al-Jurjānī's view that demonstratives denote concrete, demonstrable entities. He does not consider the constructed singular meanings referred by these demonstrative pronouns represent in logic. For both al-Isfarāyīnī and al-Jurjānī, the essential aspect in conceptualization is the essential meaning, not the constructed multiplicity. However, al-Isfarāyīnī does emphasize the distinction between the defining and the defined notions, suggesting a semantic approach where two notions—one defining and one defined—pertain to the same reality. This semantic perspective is further developed by Mīr Abū al-Fath (d. 1568), a disciple of al-Isfarāyīnī, and al-Gelenbevi (d. 1791), who followed their works. They continue to explore the concept of semantic conceptualization (*bi-hasab al-maḥmūm*), building upon the foundations laid by al-Taftāzānī, transmitted through al-Dawwānī and al-Isfarāyīnī. This orientation finds expression in their philosophical texts, illustrating a lineage of thought that evolves over successive generations.

In his analysis of al-Dawwānī's commentary on al-Taftāzānī's *al-Tahdhīb*, Mīr Abū al-Fath expands on the interpretation of terms like "this laugher" and "this writer," which employ demonstrative pronouns. He examines whether these terms refer to specific individuals or the qualities inherent in those individuals. Mīr Abū al-Fath acknowledges that these terms can denote different qualities of the same individual

34 al-Isfarāyīnī, *I'sām al-Tasavvurât maa' al-tasdīkat*, 140^b; cf. *Hāshiyah I'sām*, Şehid Ali Paşa, 169^b-170^a.

or other individuals with their respective qualities. Nonetheless, he recognizes their equivalence when referring to the same individual despite potential variations in their meanings.

فقولنا هذا الضاحك وهذا الكاتب إما إشارة إلى زيد الكاتب وزيد الضاحك أو إلى كاتب زيد وضاحك زيد وإما إشارة إلى زيد الكاتب وعمرو الضاحك أو إلى كاتب زيد وضاحك عمرو. فهما بالمعنيين الأوليين والثانيين متساويان وبالمعنيين الأخيرين متباينان

Our words “this laugher” and “this writer” can refer either to Zayd as the Laugher or Zayd as the Writer, or they can refer to Zayd who laughs and Zayd who writes. Similarly, they can refer to Amr as the Writer and Zayd as the Laugher or to Zayd who laughs and Amr who writes. Depending on whether these terms are used in the first and second meanings, they are considered equivalent terms, whereas, if used in the latter meanings, they represent opposite terms.³⁵

Khalhālī, in his glossary on al-Dawwānī’s commentary on *al-Tahdhīb*, advocates for the perspective that relations are predicated upon universals, which are differentiated both in real terms and in terms of construction. To illustrate this viewpoint:

فإن النسب يشمل الكليين المتغايرين بالذات والمتغايرين بالاعتبار. فلو لم يكن التغاير الاعتباري كافيا في كونهما مفهومين لم يكن شيء من النسب الأربع متحققا في الكليين المتغايرين بالاعتبار ضرورة امتناع تحقق النسبة في مفهوم واحد مع أنه متحقق فإن المعرفة في التعريف اللفظي قد يكون نفس المعرفة بالذات ومغاير له بالاعتبار كما في قولنا الغضنفر والأسد. وهما كليان متساويان.

For relations to encompass two universals that are differentiated from each other in both real terms and in construction, it is crucial that being differentiated in construction suffices for these two universals to be considered distinct notions. Otherwise, one of the four relations would not manifest between two universals that are differentiated in construction alone, similar to how a relation cannot be established within a single concept but is realized. Thus, in verbal definition, the describer can be the same as the described in essence but different in construction, as exemplified by the terms ‘Ghazanfar’ and ‘asad,’ which are two equal universals (meaning lion).³⁶

Thus, emphasizing the role of constructional aspects in the conceptualization of universal concepts, al-Khalhālī proceeds to discuss al-Dawwānī’s rebuttal of al-Ju-

35 Mir Abū al-Fath, *Tahdhīb-i Mīrī*, (Istanbul: Hacı Muharrem Efendi Matbaası, 1305), 88.

36 Khalkhālī, *Hāshiyah al-Tahdhīb*, (Istanbul: Süleyaminiye Kütiüphanesi Carullah Efendi, 1357), 35^a.

rjānī. Al-Khalḥālī supports al-Dawwānī's assertion that terms like 'this writer' and 'this laughter' involve attributing multiple notions to the same entity rather than attributing one notion to multiple entities in the external realm. Therefore, al-Jurjānī's critique that 'singulars will become universals' is deemed invalid.

والمتحقق ههنا هو الثاني دون الأول. فإن المتحقق هو أن مفهوم هذا الضاحك مع مفهوم هذا الطويل ومفهوم هذا القاعد صادق على ذات واحدة موجودة في الخارج هي ذات زيد لا أن هذا المفهوم الحاصل في النفس صادق على الأمور المتكثرة في الخارج. وأما ذات زيد المشار إليه الموجود في الخارج فليس هو معنى حاصلًا في النفس ولا صادقًا على الكثرة بحسب الخارج. فلا ينبغي أن يتوهم لزوم كونه كليًا بالمعنى المذكور

What is realized here is the latter scenario, not the former. It clarifies that terms such as 'this sitter' and 'this laughter,' alongside 'this tall one,' correctly apply to a single external being—Zayd himself—not multiple external entities. The existence of Zayd, referenced externally, does not signify a concept that arises within the soul or is universally applicable across multiple instances. Hence, assuming it must be a universal in the manner al-Jurjānī suggests is unwarranted.³⁷

Thus, al-Khalḥālī dismisses al-Jurjānī's apprehension that constructed singulars would be treated as universal terms.

His student, Sadr al-Dīnẓadeh al-Shirwānī (d. 1627), who authored a new gloss on Khalḥālī's commentary, criticizes his teacher's use of verbal definition as an example of differentiating concepts from construction. According to al-Shirwānī, this constructional differentiation applies not only to literal definitions but also to terms defined (*al-mahdūd*) and defining terms (*al-hadd*) referring to the same object within the context of real definition (*al-ta'rif al-hakīkī*). Moreover, these terms, possessing different senses while referring to the same referent, establish an equality relation between them.³⁸

Philosophers such as al-Dawwānī, Mīr Abū al-Fath, al-Khalḥālī, and Gelenbevī upheld al-Taftāzānī's stance, advocating for an equality relation among constructed singulars. Conversely, defenders of al-Jurjānī's position included figures like al-Isfarāyīnī, Siyālkūṭī, and al-Dusūqī. In his gloss on al-Jurjānī's commentary on *al-Sham-*

37 Khalkhālī, *Hāshiyah al-Tahdhīb* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Küttüphanesi, Carullah Efendi, 1357), 35^a.

38 Sadr al-Dīnẓadeh al-Shirwānī, *Hāshiyah Sadr al-Dīnẓadeh alā Hāshiyah al-Dawānī*, (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Küttüphanesi, Carullah Efendi, 1357), 123.

sīyyah, ‘Abd al-Ḥakim al-Siyālqūṭī argues that constructed singulars lack real existence because they do not exist in *nafs al-amr* (the essence of the thing as it is); rather, they are purely suppositioanal beings. Such suppositional existence of constructions is irrelevant because reputations do not participate in the existence of particulars as real entities. Furthermore, al-Siyālqūṭī contends that these singulars should not be considered solely based on their constructional multiplicity; viewing them in this manner would liken them to universal terms, a point stressed by Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī. With this response, al-Siyālqūṭī believes he effectively rebuts al-Dawwānī’s objection to al-Jurjānī.

أي لوعد جزئي واحد بمجرد مقارنة الاعتبارات التي لا مدخل لها في تشخصه جزئيات متعددة بحسب نفس الامر لزم ان يكون الجزئي مقولا على كثيرين؛ لانه مقارن بالواصف المتعددة الموجبة لتكثرها في نفس الامر. فهو جزئيات متعددة يصدق كل واحد منها على ما عداه. فاندفع ما قاله المحقق الدواني وما ذكره من لزوم كون الجزئيات كلية ممنوع؛ لان الكلية تجوز صدقه على ذوات متكررة لا صدقه مع مفهومات آخر على ذات واحدة. والمتحقق هناك هو الثاني دون الاول وهكذا ما قيل انهم قالوا ان الحد التام مغاير للمحدود بالاعتبار مع انهم اعتبروا التساوي بينهما فعلم انهم لا يشترطون في التساوي كون الطرفين متغايرين بللذات.

If a singular were mistakenly considered as multiple in *nafs al-amr* solely due to associations with constructions that do not contribute to its actual existence, then this singular would need to apply to multiple entities, as it is linked to multiple attributes in *nafs al-amr* that necessitate its multiplication. Consequently, there would exist several singulars, each applicable to the other. This is why the position of the scholar al-Dawwānī and his assertion that “universality means the potential for a concept to apply to multiple entities, otherwise it is not universality but rather the potential for a concept to apply to a single entity alongside other concepts” holds true here, not the former. Hence, the argument defending that “in this case, singulars must be treated as universals” finds support. Their view underscores that the distinction between the defining and the defined in terms of construction does not negate their equality. Therefore, they do not require the two sides of equality to differ fundamentally.³⁹

Thus, al-Siyālqūṭī asserts that the foundation of conceptualization lies not in constructional differentiation but in essential differentiation. In this regard, he aligns with al-Jurjānī regarding the semantics of demonstrative pronouns, arguing

39 al-Siyālqūṭī, *Hashīyah al-Siyālqūṭī*, in *Shurūh al-Shamsīyyah*, I, (Cairo: al-Maktabah-al-Azhariyyah li al-Turās, 2011/1432), 299.

that these terms signify specific meanings.⁴⁰ Therefore, unlike al-Taftāzānī and his followers, al-Jurjānī and his adherents do not consider semantic grounding alone sufficient for conceptualization; they emphasize that concepts emerge as meanings referring to ontologically grounded entities, not mere constructions. al-Dasūqī (d. 1815), another philosopher who posits that demonstrative pronouns are exclusively tied to the meanings of tangible and visible things (*al-makhsūs al-mushāhed*),⁴¹ supports this view in his gloss on the *al-Shamsiyyah*, asserting that constructional multiplication cannot play a role in conceptualization:

(قوله فلانهما لا يكونان الا متباينين) سواء اتحدا نوعا كزيد و بكر و اختلفا كهذا الانسان و هذا الحمار. فان قلت هذا الضاحك و هذا الكاتب جزئيان و لا يتأتى بينهما تباين. فالجواب انه ان كان القصد الاشارة الى زيد و عمرو فمتباينان. و ان كان القصد الى شئ واحد فلا يعقل تباين اذ موضوعه في شيئين. فان قلت الاشارة اليه باعتبار الكاتب غيرها باعتبار الضاحك قلت ان التعدد الاعتباري لا يلتفت له.

As for his statement that “two singular terms can only be distinct,” whether they are one in kind like Zayd and Bakr, or differentiated like “this man” and “this donkey,” if you argue that “this laugher” and “this writer” are two singular terms and there is no opposition between them, the response is as follows: If they are intended to refer to Zayd and Amr respectively, then these two terms are distinct. However, suppose they are meant to refer to the same entity. In that case, they have no opposition because they are posited concerning two different things. Therefore, I argue that constructional multiplication should not be considered.⁴²

In a seventeenth-century treatise dedicated to concept relations, authored by al-Shaikh Shihābuddīn Ahmad al-Gunaimī al-Ansārī (d. 1635), a significant debate on the determinants of relations is outlined. According to treatise al-Jurjānī argued that only terms validated in *naḥs al-amr* can form relations, dismissing the idea of relations between terms based solely on suppositional validity. He notably rejected the notion of an equality relation among constructed singular terms. However, he was contested himself via the examples “this laugher” and “this writer” which are overlapping each other, as two equal and two singular terms.

40 al-Siyālqūṭī, *Hāshiyah Siyālqūṭī alā Kitāb al-Mutavval li al-Taftāzānī*, ed. Mohammad Sayyed Othmān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2012/1433), 363.

41 al-Dasūqī, following al-Jurjānī, states that the sensible things that are the subject of the intellect (*al-mahsūs al-maʿkūl*) and the observed things that are the subject of the senses other than the eye are not the subject or meaning of the demonstrative pronouns. See Al-Dasūqī, *Hāshiyah al-Dasūqī alā Muhtasa al-Saʿd*, ed. Khalil Ibrāhīm Khalil, (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2002), 600.

42 al-Dasūqī, *Hāshiyah al-Dasūqī*, in *Shurūh al-Shamsiyyah*, I, 298.

Further discussion in the treatise addresses al-Jurjānī's response to this objection, noting it as a refutation against al-Taftazānī's viewpoint. Afterward discussing the al-Jurjānī's answer declared in response to this objection, the author of the text states that this answer is a refutation against al-Taftazānī⁴³ then, in this regard, adds that al-Dawwānī kept up with al-Taftazānī. We can verify our finding that the philosopher who articulated in logic the viewpoint that conceptualization based on constructional differentiation in particulars, was al-Taftazānī, also, we can observe that there was a conflict between al-Taftazānī and al-Jurjānī, in regard to the subject, in addition to that al-Dawwānī stands out in the later tradition as the proponent of the thought that we encounter in al-Taftazānī's work.

The impact of al-Taftazānī's ideas is evident in texts discussing demonstratives and beyond, where the distinction between defining and described terms began incorporating semantic conceptualization. Scholars increasingly considered relations among concepts, distinguishing them by their essence rather than external referents. Gelenbevi, in his work *al-Burhān*, expounded on these "relations in terms of intension (*bi hasab al-mafhum*)," emphasizing their significance in philosophical discourse. He illustrated this with examples like "man" and "rational animal," highlighting their equality in intension despite differences in extension. He contrasted them with terms like "man" and "rational being," which show absolute, general, and specific relations.

Thus, Gelenbevi and his predecessors advanced the view that different conceptual statements referring to the same object could constitute distinct concepts based on the nuances of their meanings, reflecting a semantic perspective on singular terms containing demonstratives:

وأما الجزئيان فهما إما متباينان كزيد وعمرو وإما متساويان كما إذا أشرنا إلى زيد بهذا الضاحك وهذا الكاتب فالهذيتان متصادقتان متساويتان

These two singulars can either be two opposite terms, akin to Zayd and Amr, or they can be two equal terms, such as when we refer to Zayd using the terms "this laughter" and "this writer." Therefore, these two demonstratives, "haziyyatan", overlap and are equal.⁴⁴

43 Sheikh Siḥāb al-Dīn Ahmad al-Ansārī al-Gunaimī, *Bulūgh al-Erab bi Tahrīr al-Nisab*, (Boston: Harvard University Houghton Library, MS Arab 153), 9.

44 Gelenbevi, *Burhān-i Gelenbevi*, (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1310) 7.

Gelenbevi uses demonstratives to refer to the same object through different constructions, thereby indicating terms whose referent is identical but whose meanings differ. In compound expressions like ‘this laughter’ and ‘this writer,’ which combine a demonstrative noun with a universal term, the demonstrative noun signifies the particular. In contrast, the universal term used alongside allows for differentiation in meaning while referring to the same specific object. This illustrates that demonstratives specify the extension singularly, while the accompanying universals introduce variation in the intention. This approach aligns closely with al-Taftazānī’s perspective on the semantics of demonstrative terms, which plays a crucial role in semantic conceptualization by enabling expressions not merely about observable particulars but also conceptual constructions. Al-Musūlī, Gelenbevi’s commentator, clarifies these points as follows:

(و اما الجزئيان فهما اما متباينان كزيد و عمرو) لانه لا يخلو اما ان يتفارقا فيكونان متباينين
 كما في المثالين المذكورين او يتصادقا و يجتمعا في فرد واحد كما اشار اليه بقوله (و اما
 متساويان كما اذا اشرنا الى زيد هذا الضاحك و هذا الكاتب) فيكونان متساويين (فالهديتان)
 المنفهمتان من اسم الاشارة فيهما (متصادقتان) على زيد (متساويتان)

(As for the -these- two singulars, they are either two opposite terms, like Zayd and Amr) Because two singulars either differentiate, therefore they are two opposite terms, such as cited examples above; or they become two equal overlapping terms that are subsumed under one individual as in the statement (two equal terms just as when we refer to Zayd -by the terms- “this laughter” and “this writer”). The two thatness -two demonstrative pronouns- which can be inferred through the demonstratives within these statements are two equal and overlapping things on Zayd.⁴⁵

Thus, the thought of conceptualization based on constructional differentiation has increasingly taken hold among several logicians. This approach suggests that a concept is not only considered with regard to its reference and extensions but also with regard to its intensions and senses (*bi hasab al-mafhūm*) even if they have one and the same reference. Using demonstrative pronouns, posited in response to a mental concept rather than to distinct, perceptible concrete entities, allows singular terms containing demonstratives to function as constructed particulars without being transformed into real entities. Therefore, various terms can be de-

45 Musūlī, *Tanwīr al-Burhān (Sharh Burhān al-Gelenbevi)*, (Istanbul: Matbaa al-Sharīkah al-Morat-biyyah li-Ārtīn Āsādūryān, 1307), 58.

rived through differentiation in intention concerning a particular object. Whether this stems from al-Taftazānī's view that demonstratives are posited in response to a mental concept or from the general nature of their positing compared to their sense, the prominence of demonstratives in logic indicates a recognition of constructed singulars, a notion primarily advanced by him.

IV. Concluding Remarks

The approach taken by al-Taftazānī has been pivotal in shaping the idea of intention-oriented terms based on different constructions (*al-i'tibârât*), alongside and sometimes in contrast to the reference-oriented understanding of concepts, extending even to singular terms. While figures like al-Isfarāyīnī accepted this approach for universal concepts, some dissenters did not extend it to singulars. Though there is little direct evidence of logicians after Taftazānī explicitly adopting the concept of "constructed singulars", those who opposed involving singulars in relations often aligned with the semantic approaches of al-Ījī and al-Jurjānī. These philosophers argued that demonstrative pronouns in natural language refer to concrete perceptible things and emphasized essential conceptualization over constructional ones.

Al-Taftazānī's view on the meaning of demonstratives proved influential for constructing singular intentions. It is fair to argue that the statements in which the demonstrative is employed have turned into a logical concept thanks to al-Taftazānī for the following reasons:

- It is the philosopher al-Taftazānī, who enabled constructed singular to be involved in relations objecting to the rule that "relations are taken into account only between universals", as testified by the texts of al-Isfarāyīnī and Sheikh Shihābuddīn al-Guneymī al-Ansārī.
- al-Taftazānī, as opposed to Īcī, also thought that the demonstratives are posited in response to general meaning in the mind.
- By conveying the abovementioned semantic approach to his commentary on al-Shamsiyyah, initially cited the semantic value of demonstratives, thereafter, stated there is a relation of equality among singular terms in which they are employed.
- al-Taftazānī's view that the meaning of the demonstrative pronouns is general meaning in the mind, not the things that each concrete and are pointed to them-

selves, has enabled demonstrative which are used in the statements such as “this laugh” and “this writer”, to have been employed as terms that have different senses but same references of these statements without referring two different objects in both statements.

- There was a strict conflict between al-Taftazānī and al-Jurjānī on the semantics of demonstratives, and parallel to this, there is also a split in opinion appeared regarding the logical function of the singular terms in which they are included.
- Ultimately, across the history of logic, there have been philosophers who have upheld the claims of the two philosophers in accordance with the splitting that appears between al-Taftazānī and al-Jurjānī.
- A significant disagreement on the semantics of demonstratives arose between al-Taftazānī and al-Jurjānī, leading to divergent views on the logical function of singular terms containing demonstratives.
- Throughout the history of logic, these philosophical debates continued to influence subsequent thinkers aligned with either al-Taftazānī's or al-Jurjānī's positions.

In conclusion, we can state the following: According to al-Taftazānī's semantic point of view, the linguistic meaning of the demonstrative is constant in itself while its content and reference emerge according to its context. al-Ījī, on the other hand, quite seems to have equated the linguistic meaning and references of these terms. It was the philosopher al-Taftāzānī who inspired the later philosophers with the idea of intension-oriented conceptualization over singulars and definition terms by including the singular terms within which the demonstratives are included, in the relations. As a matter of fact, what is valid in conceptualization for al-Jurjānī and his followers is only the essential multiplication at the extension, and for al-Taftazānī and her followers, it is also the constructional multiplication at the intension. For this reason, it is also opinable to mention a chain of semantic-oriented logicians that emerged in the tradition of Islamic thought with the influence of al-Taftazānī.

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