Predication in ʿAlī al-Qūshjī:
One and Many*

Mehmet Özturan**

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the fundamental metaphysical concept of unity (*waḥda*) and the predication schema. The latter posits that "a categorical proposition requires the subject and predicate to be identical in one respect and distinct in another," as treated by ʿAlī al-Qushjī (d. 879/1474) in the kalām commentary titled *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*. This schema, drawn from the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), was later integrated into *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), and subsequently became part of the discourse in philosophical *kalām* texts, particularly in the commentaries on *Tajrīd al-iʿ*tiqād. Commentaries present a variety of distinct approaches to grounding the above schema within the discussion of *ḥaml* (predication). Curiously, the same schema is also addressed in an entirely different context, sc., in the section on unity-multiplicity (*waḥda-kathra*) in *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-ʿAqaʾid*. In the *ḥaml* section, kalām scholars frequently argued that the subject term and predicate term of a categorical proposition must be unified in one respect and distinct in another. In the section on unity and multiplicity, however, it was more common for kalām scholars to posit that entities described as both 'one' and 'many' must be 'one' in one respect, but 'many' in yet another respect. In short, unity and multiplicity are addressed within two distinct contexts: one pertaining to logic and the other to metaphysics. By analyzing Qushjī's commentary, this paper seeks to underscore the intersection between the concepts of unity and multiplicity and the metaphysical foundations of predication in categorical propositions—an area that has not yet received sustained scholarly attention. By demonstrating how logical structures are rooted in their metaphysical foundations, the paper emphasizes the importance of examining logical concepts, such as categorical propositions, alongside metaphysical concepts like unity and multiplicity.

Keywords: ʿAlī al-Qushjī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, one, many, identity, categorical proposition, predication, unity, multiplicity

** Assoc. Prof., İstanbul Medeniyet University/Department of Philosophy, Correspondence: mehmet80@gmail.com

Introduction

The question 'What does it mean to predicate one thing of another?' is frequently addressed in specific sections of logic handbooks, which focus on examining the semantics of universal propositions, particularly the meaning of 'Every s is p.[1] In a categorical proposition, the subject defines the extension (i.e. those things to which the subject-term refers) while the predicate unites with this defined extension. To take the proposition "Zayd is a scribe" as an example: "Zayd" here denotes an entity (here, an individual), whereas "scribe" refers to a set. The proposition asserts, in other words, that the thing denoted by the subject has the property of a scribe, and thus that the subject is an element of the set of scribes. However, a categorical proposition requires more than the indication that the subject term is an element of the predicate term; subject term and predicate term must indicate different meanings and at the same time, they must also be identical in some way. Let us suppose that the proposition "a human is a living being" is correct. Individuals under the subject term 'human' are all subsumed by the set 'living being'. And "human" and "living being" each has different definitions. Even so, 'human' and 'living being' have different definitions, respectively. Such that the 'intension' or meaning of each of these two terms is also distinct from the meaning of the other term, and obviously so in the case of 'human' and 'living being.' Yet 'human' and 'living being' are identical in not less than one respect. It is with respect to their one or more shared properties that we say that they are 'identical in some respect,' such that there is a common point of identity between the two.

Logic books explain that in order for predication to be realized in a categorical proposition, there must be some kind of identity between the subject and the predicate. Likewise, in order for predication to be meaningful (*mufīd*), the predication must contribute on a semantic degree, rather than a literal one.[2] Nonetheless, confining ourselves only to logic handbooks while discussing the nature and conditions of predication would result in overlooking the relation between this theory and metaphysics.

It can be said that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) was the first scholar to discuss the predication schema of a categorical affirmative proposition and to articulate

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1   Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Taḥrīr qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya fī sharḥ al-Shamsiyya*, Edited by Muhsin Bidarfer (Kum: Manshurāt al-Bidar, 2005), 245-260.

2   Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya fī Sharḥ Risālat al-Shamsiyya*, 247-49.

what this schema entails in a canonical form.[3] The establishment of the predication schema begins with Ibn Sīnā's discussion of the semantics of the proposition "a triangle is a figure" in the logic part of his *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbihāt*. In his *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī further explains the meaning of the proposition "A triangle is a figure." Although al-Rāzī raises such issues as the nature of predication and semantics of affirmative proposition in his works written before *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt,* the formulation in *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* in particular had a considerable and unique influence on al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* and its commentators.

In *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt,* al-Rāzī not only attempted to explicitly describe what predication entails but also identified a problem that later scholars would strive to solve through an argument I call "the dilemma of predication."[4] He describes the semantics of the proposition "A triangle is a figure" as such:

أقول: لسائل أن يسأل فيقول: إذا قلنا: (إن المثلث شكل) فمفهوم المثلث هل هو مفهوم الشكل أو مغاير له؟ فإن كان المفهومان واحدًا فلا حمل ولا وضع إلا في الألفاظ المترادفة، وذلك عديم النفع في المباحث العقلية. وإن كان المفهومان متغايرين فالشيء كيف يعقل أن يكون هو ما يغايره؟

فنقول: إن الهوهو يستدعي التغاير من وجه والاتحاد من وجه، وهيهنا مفهوم المثلثية مغاير لمفهوم الشكلية، لكن الذات الموصوفة بهما واحدة فلأجل ذلك صح الهوهوية.[5]

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3   Here the term "schema" is used in the sense of a form or a template showing the ontological and semantic conditions required by categorical propositions. The predication schema is a general form implying that the subject and the predicate in a categorical proposition must in one way unify and in other multiply. If unity and multiplicity are considered as a gap within this form, this gap can be filled with different contents, as in Tarski's truth schema. For instance, a person claiming that the subject and the predicate must be identical in the extramental existence prefers to fill the form of 'unity in one way', with existence, while another person may fill it with extension.

4   For detailed analysis on the meaning of the predication and predication dilemma see: Mehmet Özturan, "Yüklemlemenin Anlamı: Tecrîdü'l-iʿtikâd Üzerine Bir İnceleme," *Beytulhikme: International Journal of Philosophy* 10/1 (2020): 207–218; "Yüklemleme Dilemması: Taşköprüzade'nin Dışsal Özdeşlikçi Yüklemleme Teorisi," *Kutadgubilig: Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları* 41 (2020): 167–180.

5   Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*, ed. ʿAlī Riḍā Najafzāda, c. 1 (Tehran, 2005), 34, 35.

I say: One might rightfully ask and say this:

When we say "[A] triangle is a figure," is the "triangle" concept also a "figure" concept? Or are they different? If both are one and the same, then there is not any subjectification or predication, except in the synonymous words in a literal sense. And yet, the subject and the predication being synonymous is of no benefit in intellectual issues. If instead, two terms are different from each other, how is it possible that a thing is something that differs from it?

On this we say: The template "It is what it is" entails that two things are different from each other in one sense while at the same time identical to each other in another sense. Here, the triangle concept differs from the figure concept. But the entity that has the attributes of "triangle" and "figure" is one and the same. This, in turn, makes the saying "It is what it is" possible.[6]

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī detects a problem regarding predication in affirmative categorical propositions with reference to Ibn Sīnā's explanations. An affirmative categorical predication is in the canonical form "*S is p*." There are two options: either (1) *s* and *p* are distinct from each other or (2) *s* and *p* are identical. If we accept option 1, we would be attributing a thing to something other than itself. In other words, *s* would be not *s* (s,¬s). In option 2, on the other hand, we would be attributing a thing to its own self, which would be a predication between two synonymous terms offering no contribution toward resolving philosophical issues. It is possible to re-establish the dilemma argument in al-Rāzī's framework as such:

P.1. The subject term and predicate term are either different from or identical to one another.

P.2. If the subject term and predicate term are different, this implies that a thing is a thing that is not its own self.

P.3 If the subject term and predicate term are identical, it does not serve a purpose to form a proposition with them.

C. Then, a thing is either a thing that is not its own self or they will not contribute to propositions in any way.

Given that P2 and P3 are respectively correct, forming a proposition in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's dilemma of predication would create absurdities unique to these

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6   Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Qushjī, *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*, ed. Muhammad al-Zārī'ī al-Riḍāī, c. 1 (Kum: Rāid, 1393), 327. All translations in this article are mine.

options. The first absurdity would be on the principle of identity. Suppose that the subject term is *s* and the predicate term is *p*. In this case, if the proposition "*s* is *p*" is interpreted as in P2 (meaning that *p* is something that is not *s*), this interpretation would entail that the proposition is actually in the form "*s* is not *s*." But it is impossible for *s* to be not *s*! This impossibility in turn leads to an absurdity that contradicts the fundamental principle of identity, which asserts that an entity is one and identical to its own self. The second option implies that *s* and *p* mean the same thing and, thus, that they are synonyms. P3 claims that a proposition formed with synonymous words serves no intellectual purpose, thus resulting in an absurdity of uselessness. In short, two key issues must be addressed: predication of synonyms and predication of an entity with its negation or contradiction.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī indicates that there are two alternative ways to formulate predications other than through synonymous words or contradictory predication. Instead of claiming that the subject term and the predicate term are either entirely identical or entirely distinct, he discovers that there is a third possibility, wherein they are "identical in one respect and different in another." In other words, the major proposition in the dilemma of predication (P1) is not exhaustive: the subject term and the predicate term are not necessarily different or identical. Rather, it is possible that they unify in one way and differ in another. Consequently, when an affirmative categorical proposition conforms to this formulation, it does not lead to the absurdities caused by the first and second options (P2 and P3). Al-Rāzī's solution is then quoted by al-Ṭūsī in his *Tajrīd al-I'tiqād.* Later, it has grown into a maxim illustrating the predication schema in an exquisite way:

إن الهوهو يستدعي التغاير من وجه والاتحاد من وجه

"It is it" entails that the subject and the predicate are distinct in one sense and identical in another.[7]

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7   Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*, 1:35. Al-Ṭūsī narrates this solution in two different ways in *Tajrīd al-I'tiqād*:

"والحمل يستدعي اتحاد الطرفين من وجه وتغايرهما من آخر"
"فالهو هو يستدعي جهتي تغاير واتحاد على ما سلف"

See Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Tajrīd al-i'tiqād* (*in Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*), ed. Muhammad al-Zārī al-Rizāī, c. 1 (Kum: Rāid, 1393), 327, 514.

The "predication schema" offered by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to solve the predication dilemma became, over time, a highly discussed topic in the commentaries on *Tajrīd al-i'tiqād*. Apart from logic books, we now have a different context in which predication is discussed: predication in books of philosophical *kalām*. This context is also an appropriate place to identify the key overlooked insight, namely the metaphysical origins of fundamental theories of logic such as predication. This paper examines the predication schema particular to 'Alī al-Qushjī's commentary *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*, that is, the proposition of "the subject and the predication must be identical in one sense and different in another." This schema consists essentially of identity and distinctness. Identity is directly linked to unity while distinctness implies multiplicity. In the following sections, I will leave distinctness aside and analyze 'Alī al-Qushjī's perspective on the terms "identity" and "one/many." The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to determine the relation between identity and "one/many" in the predication schema.

I. Two Sides of Unity/Identity

"Unity" (*ittiḥād*), "identity," "oneness" (*waḥda*), "unification," and "being identical" are used interchangeably throughout this paper. Although these terms are mentioned in different contexts with different wordings, they essentially refer to the same concept. These wordings fall into two separate categories. In the first category, "identity" or "unity" implies that two things are one and the same in all aspects. Philosophers like al-Ṭūsī and al-Qushjī argue that two separate objects or beings cannot be entirely identical and phrase their argument as a metaphysical axiom: "unification of two things is impossible" (اتحاد الإثنين محال).[8] I call this axiom the "Impossibility of the Identicals," with the short forms "absolute identity" and "strong identity." Absolute or strong identity seems remarkably similar to the notion of numerical identity as posited in Leibniz's principle of the "Identity of Indiscernibles." Similar to arguments put forth in Islamic philosophical milieux, numerical identity implies that an object can be identical to itself and nothing else.[9] In this context, numerical identity—just

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8   al-Qushjī. *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*, 1, 512.

9   For a recent study examining the intersection of numerical identity and personal identity in the Mu'tazilites, see Fedor Benevich, "Personal Identity in the Philosophy of Kalām", *Documenti e Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale International Journal on the Philosophical Tradition from Late Antiquity to the Late Middle Ages* 34 (2023): 93-114.

like the principle of the Impossibility of Identicals— emphasizes that two distinct objects cannot be identical; an entity is merely identical to itself and nothing else can be entirely identical to it.

Leibniz's Identity of Indiscernibles likewise aligns with the principle of the Impossibility of the Identicals. In the case of two objects being identical in all their aspects, Leibniz asserts, in fact these two are one and the same object. This assertion leads to the conclusion that two distinct objects cannot be entirely the same, and that the two are actually one object if they appear the same in all aspects.[10] Thus, both numerical identity and Leibniz's principle comply with the Impossibility of the Identicals, or the metaphysical axiom "unification of two things is impossible," thereby affirming that two different objects, entities, or notions cannot be entirely identical.

Identity in the second category is defined as the unification of two things in certain aspects and properties, meaning that they have common features.[11] While this concept is recognized in Western philosophy as qualitative identity, I refer to it as "weak identity." Qualitative/weak identity is described as the sharing of certain qualities by different objects, beings, or notions. For example, Zayd and ʿAmr are both humans, and they are identical in the qualitative sense since they share the same species. If two distinct objects or beings are unified by a common quality, then the identity that categorical propositions are claimed to entail is closely linked to their qualitative identity. As the predication schema in the categorical proposition requires, the gaps of subject and predicate must be filled with two different notions, which must be at some point identical/the same/unified. Thus, categorical propositions compel us to recognize that two distinct notions share a common feature, which is qualitative identity. To be more precise, predication is a subclass of identity within qualitative identity since the former requires the subject and the predicate to have a common "existence" or "extension." I will further elaborate on the argument that predication, i.e., a categorical proposition, is a qualitative form of unity/identity and, conversely, that it is not a numerical identity. However, it will suffice for now to say that predication entails qualitative identity.

10 Peter Forrest, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford: Stanford University, 2020).

11 Harold Noonan and Ben Curtis, "Identity," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Stanford: Stanford University, 2022).

II. The Analysis of the Predication

In parallel with the main text on which he comments, al-Qushjī examines the predication schema in categorical propositions and the related argument under the title of ḥaml (predication). I will first present the passage mentioning the schema and then explore the key concepts in the context of one and many, in line with my argument.

(و **الحمل**) الإيجابي (**يستدعي اتحاد الطرفين**) أي: الموضوع والمحمول، (**من وجه**) وإلا لكان الحمل الإيجابي بالمواطاة حكمًا بوحدة الإثنين، (**و تغايرهما من**) وجه (**آخر**) وإلا لكان حملاً للشيء على نفسه، فلا يكون مفيدًا بل لا يكون هناك حمل حقيقي، ومعنى الحمل أن المتغايرين مفهومًا متحدان ذاتًا

Affirmative predication (al-ḥaml al-ījābī) necessitates the unification of the subject and the predicate in one aspect. For, if not, affirmative predication of two comprising terms would imply a claim that two distinct entities are one/identical. Affirmative **predication necessitates the distinctness of the subject and the predicate in another aspect.** For, if not, one would have to attribute a thing to its own self, which is a predication that serves no purpose, thus not a real predication in any case. [As a result] the meaning of predication is that two things that are different in their concept are identical in extension. their essence.[12]

As can be understood from his identification of the "طرفين" (two terms) as the subject and the predicate, al-Qushjī uses ḥaml to mean the predication in affirmative categorical propositions because the components of a proposition are called subject (mawḍūʿ) and predicate (maḥmūl) only in categorical propositions. If he meant conditional propositions, he would have use the terms "antecedent" (muqaddam) and "consequent" (tālī) for the word "طرفين." al-Qushjī clearly indicates that affirmative categorical propositions are implied by any predication that requires "identity in one aspect" and "distinctness in another."[13]

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12   al-Qushjī. *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*, 1:327.

13   In the lines on the conditions of the *ḥaml*, al-Isfahānī (d.749/1276) makes it clear that the main topic is categorical propositions by explicitly mentioning the phrase "*ḥaml* in the form of *muwātaat*" (*ḥaml al-muwātaāt*) in addition to his using the terms "mawdu-mahmūl." Maḥmūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAbd al-Raḍrāhmān al-Isfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qavāʿīd fī Sharḥi Tajrīd al-*ʿaqāīd, ed. Eşref Altaş, c. 2 (İstanbul: İSAM, 2020), 202. In the following stages of the article, I will occasionally use the term "predication" instead of "affirmative categorical proposition."

On the other hand, the affirmative categorical proposition/predication is associated with "it is it" (*al huwa huwa*) under the titles of unity and multiplicity in the commentary of *Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād*:

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(والهوهو) لفظ مركب جعل اسما فعرف باللام، و المراد به الحمل الإيجابي بالمواطأة ...

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The phrase "**it is it**" (*al-huwa huwa*) is a nominalized compound form. Since it is now a noun, a prefix of alif-lām is attached to it. And what is meant by "*al-huwa huwa*" is an affirmative categorical proposition with two comprising terms.[14]

As these two passages suggest, *ḥaml* is occasionally referred to as the affirmative categorical proposition (*al-ḥaml al-ījābī bi-l-muwāṭʾa*) and occasionally using the "*al-huwa huwa*" phrase. Logic scholars who write in Arabic often use "*al-huwa huwa*" as an alternative term to represent the categorical proposition. Nevertheless, the fact that this phrase appears in the section on unity and multiplicity of a *kalām* text underlines the need to establish a strong connection between predication and unity. Furthermore, the clarity with which al-Qushjī characterizes "*al huwa huwa*" as *ḥaml al*-ījābī suggests that the concepts of predication, categorical proposition, unity, and multiplicity must be considered in conjunction, as they are intrinsically related. Besides, al-Ṭūsī's original passage reveals that "*al huwa huwa*" and the concept of identity have a strong relation.[15] Yet al-Qushjī's main contribution appears when he uses the fundamental concepts and arguments from the section on unity and multiplicity to answer the question "what is required for predication?" and, more importantly, to justify why identity is a necessary condition of categorical proposition. This is to say, he includes the principles and outcomes related to the concepts "one and many" in discussing *ḥaml*. Although this issue will be discussed thoroughly later in the paper, it is important to understand first the relation between predication and the concept of one/many.

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14   al-Qushjī. *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*, 1:510.

15   (والهوهو على هذا النحو) Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād* (*in Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*), 1:510. Here al-Ṭūsī states that the expression "*huwa huwa*" or "it is what it is" resembles the concept of unity.

III. One/many and Categorical Proposition

"One" and "many" are among the most fundamental concepts of *umūr al-ʿāmma* and appear often incorporated within *umūr al-ʿāmma* concepts such as being and cause in the texts of Peripatetic metaphysics, especially Ibn Sīnā's *al-Shifā*, or in the texts of later kal*ā*m scholars who held a different view. Universal principles derived from the analysis of these concepts function in sciences like logic as the basic suppositions and implicit assumptions that shape the way of thinking about logical qualities and principles. For instance, it is quite unusual to encounter such metaphysical foundations related to logical qualities like *ḥaml* and logical conclusion in logical texts written in Arabic. Yet, they are present in the philosophical *kalām* books like *al-Mawāqif*, *al-Maqāṣid*, and *Tajrīd al-iʿ*tiqād while also being profoundly analyzed in the commentaries and annotations of these core texts.[16]

When this shaping role of metaphysics is taken into consideration, it can be concluded that the question of what predication entails concerns not only logic but also metaphysics. One might consider the predication schema a solution for the predication dilemma in logic, and also as a schema derived from the analysis of one/many. I will discuss below how the relevant schema was derived on the basis of the analysis of the one/many in ʿAlī al-Qushjī's explanations. In the following lines, I will accept the predication schema not as a solution to the predication dilemma, but instead as a consequence of the general rules derived from the analysis of the one/many concept.

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(ثم معروضهما) أي: معروض الوحدة و الكثرة (قد يكون واحدًا فله) أي: لمعروض الوحدة والكثرة (جهتان بالضرورة) لامتناع أن يكون الشيء الواحد من جهة واحدة واحدًا و كثيرًا معًا، كأفراد الإنسان مثلاً؛ فإنها كثيرة من حيث ذواتها، وواحدة من حيث إنها إنسان.

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The thing to which the two, i.e., unity and multiplicity accede, **can be one entity**. So, it is indispensable that this thing to which unity and multiplicity are attributed **has two aspects**. For it is impossible for one thing to be "one" and "many" in the same aspect. Let us discuss the term "human individuals" as an example. When we look at human individuals in terms of the individuals included, they are many. But the same individuals are one in terms of the fact that they are all human.[17]

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16   For a recent study on the meaning of the concept of *"al-umūr al-ʿāmma"* in the context of the *Tajrīd* text, see Yasin Apaydın, *Metafiziğin meselesini temellendirmek : Tecrid geleneği bağlamında umur-ı amme sorunu* (İstanbul : Endülüs Yayınları, 2019).

17   al-Qushjī, *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*, 1:503. Emphasis mine.

I would argue that this paragraph from 'Alī Qushjī's commentary is critical in showing that the predication schema—that is, the sentence that requires the subject and predicate to be identical at one point and different at another—can also be obtained in another way. And it is possible to develop the predication schema by following this alternative path. Above, I outlined the predication schema proposing the subject and predicate to be identical at one point and different at another, by using Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's method. In this approach, the subject and the predicate must be identical in one aspect so that we do not have to accept that the two are entirely identical, one. They also must differ in their definitions so that the predication contributes to our knowledge. Now, we can derive the same schema from the analysis related to the use of one/many as an attribute. For example, among human individuals, Zayd and 'Amr are each human beings. Given that Zayd and 'Amr are two distinct persons, they constitute some kind of multiplicity. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that this multiplicity is unified at some point, and that they are identical in a sense: since they are both human beings; they are identical in the sense of being a human. Therefore, individuals, Zayd and 'Amr in this context, are both one and many, but in different senses. Still, it is inconceivable that an entity is both one and many in the same aspect, i.e., as the one and same concept.

Al-Qushjī's thesis, aligning with that of al-Ṭūsī, can be summarized as follows: "If unity and multiplicity are attributed to an entity, the entity must possess two distinct aspects—one corresponding to unity and the other to multiplicity". Al-Qushjī illustrates this thesis with the example of human individuals.[18] He also contributes to al-Ṭūsī's thesis by suggesting why two separate aspects must be supposed. In other words, he reveals, on the basis of one/many, the reasons why different references of the senses of the categorical proposition—in the Fregean sense—must be one. According to al-Qushjī, it is impossible for an entity to have the attributes of "one" and "many" in the same aspect.

We can briefly summarize the argument by now as follows:

P1. If an entity possesses the attributes of "one" and "many," it necessarily has an aspect of unity and another aspect of multiplicity.

P2. The subject and the predicate, as components of categorical proposition, likewise receive attributes of "one" and "many."

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18   al-Qushjī, 1:503.

C. Thus, the subject and the predicate (in a categorical proposition) also exhibit two separate aspects of unity and multiplicity, respectively.

Now, we will attempt to apply al-Ṭūsī's and al-Qushjī's understanding to categorical propositions and answer the following question: can the attribute "many" used for Zayd/ʿAmr and the attribute "one" used for being a human be applied to categorical propositions, too? I argue that these attributes can indeed also be applied to categorical propositions, since a categorical proposition includes things to which we can attribute multiplicity as well as things to which we can attribute unity. For example, Zayd and ʿAmr are two distinct individuals; we can use the plural pronoun "they" when talking about Zayd and ʿAmr since they are more than one. Likewise, the subject and the predicate in categorical propositions are two separate concepts with different definitions. As we say "two," then it is logically appropriate to use the attribute "many" for the pair of subject and predicate. For, the need for subject and predicate to have different definitions entails their being more than one, or, in other words, a multiplicity. Subject and predicate having different definitions highlights that they multiply in their definitions while their multiplicity aspect means the same as their differentiation point from each other.

Here, omitting the copula, the third component of a proposition alongside the subject and predicate, from the aspect of multiplicity may be regarded as problematic. In other words, it is possible to argue that the copula is an inseparable element of a categorical proposition, just like subject and predicate, and thus that the number of components causing multiplicity in the proposition is not two, but three in total. Why, then, does al-Qushjī exclude the copula from the discussion?

In fact, the copula differs crucially from the other two components. As Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī defined it in his annotation on *Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid*, the subject and predicate are considered the matter while the copula appears as the form of the categorical proposition.[19] The main function of the copula is to assert that the subject and predicate are in one aspect identical and in another different. Therefore, although the copula is indeed one of the elements involved in the proposition, it essentially declares that the two main components have some kind of unity. More precisely, what is qualified as "one" and "many" are the subject and predicate: they are many in

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19   Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, "*Ḥāshiyetu Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī*," Edited by Muhsin Bidarfer (Kum: Menshurāt al-Bidar, 2005), 222, dp: 1.

definition since they have two distinct definitions, and one and the same since they are united at some point, i.e., at the copula. So, the copula is a sign that the subject and predicate have unity in some respect.

Let us analyze the sentence "Zayd is a scribe." On the one hand, "Zayd" and "scribe" can be qualified as "many," since they are distinct concepts. On the other hand, we can also say that they are "one," since they share a common point; "Zayd" and "scribe" describe one and the same individual. Despite being completely different concepts, "Zayd" and "scribe" unify in describing the same entity, implying that "Zayd" and "scribe" are identical in a qualitative sense with respect to a particular entity.

Consequently, what is qualified as both "one" and "many" is the same entity: The "scribe" is the same person as Zayd. The copula requires a different consideration, based on al-Jurjānī's explanation of the matter and form. In the proposition "Zayd is a scribe," "Zayd" and "scribe" are material elements and have different definitions. Yet, "is," in accordance with the distinction between the matter and form, indicates that these two different concepts have a certain unity; it is the form itself that ensures the qualitative identity of "Zayd" and "scribe."[20]

So far, the article has suggested that the predication schema for categorical propositions is directly linked to one/many analysis. I have also argued that there is theoretical and textual data to suggest that the "distinctness" and "identity" required by this schema respectively correspond to "multiplicity/*kathra*" and "unity/*waḥda*"

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20   To reiterate, the subject and predicate must be many, i.e., different, in one respect and one, i.e., identical, in another. Multiplicity occurs because the subject and predicate have different definitions. However, the question of where these two different definitions will be united/identical, that is, where unity will be achieved, is an important issue in itself. This is because the copula in the categorical proposition expresses qualitative identity. According to this interpretation, "*s* is *p*" means "*s* is identical with *p*." As I will argue later, it is not possible for *s* and *p* to be literally identical; therefore, they must be identical in a weak sense, qualitatively identical. According to this analysis, the categorical proposition "*s* is *p*" is read as "*s* is identical with *p* in *x*." That is, the categorical proposition can be interpreted as a triple relation in the form of "*s* and *p* are identical and the same in *x*." This *x*, or more precisely, where must the subject and predicate unify, is one of the most critical questions of the predication theory. While it is accepted, almost without dispute, that subject and predicate should have different definitions, their unifying point is controversial. More generally, there are two basic theories, which I will call the extensionist theory of predication and the existentialist theory of predication. According to the extensionist theory, the unity of the proposition is ensured by the fact that the subject and predicate are coextensive. On the other hand, existentialist theory suggests that the unity of the proposition is ensured by the fact that the subject and predicate are one and the same in terms of existence.

Now that correspondence between multiplicity and distinctness has been addressed, we will argue the correspondence of one to unity. In the following analysis, we will reveal that the unity (*ittiḥād*) of subject and predicate and the core metaphysical concept of unity (*ittiḥād-waḥda*) will become more important, and indeed more obvious, in the analysis of the categorical proposition's semantics in *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* and in al-Qushjī's commentary. As a result, the match between multiplicity and distinctness becomes of secondary importance. Yet it is definitely striking that the categorical proposition is discussed as a type of unity/*waḥda* under the title of *waḥda*; here, the categorical proposition is truly presented as one of the subcategories of unity, without any metaphorical intention. If *ḥaml* is considered a type of unity, it follows that all types of unity—except "absolute one"—will also be types of *ḥaml*.

> (والهوهوعلى هذا النحو) أي: على نحو الوحدة، فكما أن بعض أفراد الوحدة أولى
> من البعض بالوحدة، كذلك بعض أفراد الحمل أولى من البعض بالحملية على ما سبق

The form "it is it/*huwa huwa*" resembles the concept of unity. Indeed, just as some parts of unity have priority over others, some parts of predication too have priority over others.[21]

According to the passage, *al-huwa huwa* or the affirmative categorical proposition is one of the subtypes of unity, which suggests that the rules and divisions concerning the parts of unity can also be applied to categorical propositions. More precisely, it implies that the hierarchy within the subcategories of unity is also valid for categorical propositions. Namely, different points of unity can be identified for a collection of many objects. These points of unity may occasionally be the constitutive parts of those objects; they may also represent the object's accidental qualities. In this way, the objects become one with respect to these points of unity, and it is said that they are one or identical at point *x*. However, as al-Ṭūsī addresses, there are various levels of competence among the types of unity. For example, the species-level unity of Zayd and ʿAmr is superior to the genus-level unity of Zayd and a horse, which is based on the broader category of being alive. In an essentialist logic, the unity of objects in terms of constitutive or essential parts like genus and *differentia* is naturally more valuable than their unity in non-constitutive attributes. However, it should be noted that unity and *al-huwa huwa* are not entirely identical, since indivisible unity (*al-waḥda al-shakhṣiyya*)—though it ranks above other types of unity in

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21   al-Qushjī, *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*, 1:510.

this perspective—is not a type of unity encompassed by categorical propositions. In conclusion, what matters is that the predication schema in categorical propositions is not metaphorical but genuinely a subcategory of the concept of unity.[22]

While the classification of the categorical proposition as a type of unity and its inclusion under the broader category of unity provides valuable insights into the nature and principles of predication, 'Alī al-Qushjī appears to disagree with the incorporation of the concept of *huwa huwa* within the discourse on unity. To begin, we shall present, in al-Qushjī's own words, the perspectives of those—myself included—who acknowledge the association between unity and predication.

<div dir="rtl">

قيل: معناه أن هوهو، و هو أن يكون للشيئين وحدة من وجه على نحو الوحدة في الانقسام إلى الأقسام المذكورة، فكما يقال جهة الوحدة إما مقومة أو عارضة، فكذلك جهة هوهو، فجميع أقسام الوحدة متحققة في أقسام هوهو، لكن ينبغي أن يعتبر في هوهو الكثرة؛ فإنه لا يتصور بدون اثنينية، فلا يتصور في الشخص الواحد من حيث هو شخص واحد، بخلاف الوحدة إنها تصور في الشخص الواحد من حيث هو شخص واحد

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It is said that, just like unity, *al-huwa huwa* (the state of two things being one in a particular respect) is divided into the previously mentioned parts. Just as the aspect of unity is said to be divided into constitutive or accidental parts, the same divisions apply to *al-huwa huwa* as well. Therefore, all aspects of unity are also valid for the form of *huwa huwa*. However, in the case of *huwa huwa*, multiplicity must also be taken into account, for the notion of multiplicity cannot be conceived without duality. Therefore, while the aspect of unity can be considered in relation to a single individual, the aspect of multiplicity cannot be conceived for a single individual.[23]

According to 'Alī Qushjī, considering the *huwa huwa* form together with unity/*waḥda* does not offer any remarkable information. He is not optimistic about the benefits of the approach that the categorical proposition will have as many classes as the classes of unity since it is a kind of unity: al-Qushjī accepts in principle that if the concept *s* is used in the analysis of another concept *p*, all parts of *s* are naturally included in the parts of *p*. For example, let us consider the copula. It has two types:

22 Al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-Murad fi Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-I'tiqad*, ed. Ḥasan-zādih Ãmulī (Kum: Muassatu al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1433), 153; Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Muhammad al-Qushjī, *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*, 1:510.

23 al-Qushjī, *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*, 1:511.

affirmative and negative. When we think of a proposition as a composite structure containing the elements of subject, predicate, and copula, the proposition will have as many parts as the copula, since it contains the copula. In other words, the proposition will be divided into two parts, affirmative or negative, just like the copula. Now, let us apply the same to the *huwa huwa* form. In this form, there is one aspect of unity and another of multiplicity. Since *huwa huwa* contains an aspect of unity, it has as many classes as unity does. Yet, al-Qushjī believes that stressing the ratio between the classes of unity and those of *huwa huwa* is of no informative value.[24]

'Alī al-Qushjī's criticism of *redundancy* was strongly disputed by the glossator al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502). According to al-Dawānī, integrating the categorical proposition—the *huwa huwa* form—under the main heading of unity is indeed very useful. It is known that the *huwa huwa* form is the unification of subject and predicate in one aspect. There are two widely accepted views on the point of unification: that the subject and predicate are one in extension, and that they are one in existence.[25] If two different things are one or identical, in existence or in extension, they are said to have common (*muta'āraf*) identity. In other words, in categorical propositions, or propositions in the *huwa huwa* form, the unity of the subject and predicate in existence and the unity of the subject and predicate in extension are the most common types of unity.[26]

However, al-Dawwānī holds that the integrated presentation of *huwa huwa* and unity allowed the *huwa huwa* form to be considered as part of a wider range of options rather than being limited to only two. In other words, according to the common view (*muta'āraf*), the unity in the *huwa huwa* form is achieved when the subject and predicate refer to a single entity or when the intersection of the sets of extension is non-empty. Al-Dawwānī argues that the *muta'āraf* options exclude the possibility of Zayd and Amr having any unity. It is precisely at this point that the integration of *huwa huwa* into unity helps us notice that there are other types of unity, and understand

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24   al-Qushjī, *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*, 1:511.

25   We have already pointed out that there are two theories, labeled as the extensionist and the existentialist theory of predication. See footnote 21 in this article.

26   Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī, *al-Ḥāshiya al-Kādīma 'alā Sharḥ al-Tajrīd: Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*, ed. Muhammad al-Zārīī al-Rizāī (Kum: Intishārāt-i Rāid, 1393), 511, dp. 5. For the justifications and a comprehensive analysis of the distinction between "*ḥaml al-muta'āraf*" and "*ḥaml al-awwalī*," which is regarded as an innovation of al-Dawwānī's, see Khaled El-Rouayheb, "Dawānī (d. 1502) and Dashtakī (d. 1498) on Primary (*awwalī*) and Familiar (*muta'āraf*) Predication," *Oriens* 51, no. 3-4 (2023): 367-92.

that Zayd and Amr can have some kind of unity even without the *muta'āraf* options. For instance, it is impossible for Zayd and Amr to unify in the *huwa huwa* form because they are two distinct entities. Since Zayd and Amr's existences are not one, that is, they do not reflect the form of *muta'āraf* predication, the proposition "Zayd is Amr" cannot be established in the *huwa huwa* form. Nevertheless, when other types of unity are taken into account, Zayd and Amr as two distinct individuals are, in their species, one and the same, since they are both humans. In short, though Zayd and Amr are not unified in the *huwa huwa* form, it is still possible to find a point where they unite.

Al-Dawwānī expresses discomfort with restricting the concept of *ittihād* (identity) to the framework of *huwa huw*a, which only allows the formation of propositions. According to him, not every identity that has an aspect of unity and an aspect of multiplicity has to be a *muta'āraf* identity. Yes, since Zayd and Amr are two different persons, it is impossible for them to be one in existence. However, in this case, it is not a problem that a proposition based on *muta'āraf* unity cannot be established, because Zayd and Amr still have an aspect of unity and an aspect of multiplicity. In other words, according to al-Dawwānī, the *huwa huwa* form, which contains the aspects of unity and multiplicity, does not have to consist of or limited to the *muta'āraf* form (the form of unity in existence).

Unlike 'Alī al-Qushjī, al-Dawwānī seems to support al-Ṭūsī's integrated presentation. According to him, al- Ṭūsī's treatment of the concept of *huwa huwa* under the title of unity allows us to realize that *huwa huwa* is not only limited to the *muta'āraf* form but also has other forms. Indeed, al-Ṭūsī's mention of types of unity other than the *muta'āraf* in the lines immediately following his description of the *huwa huwa* form supports al-Dawwānī's optimistic approach to integrated presentation: al-Ṭūsī says that the unification of two things in their accidental attributes and of two things in their essential attributes have different names. In 'Alī al-Qushjī's commentary, these types of unity are listed by their proper names: unity in kind is called *mumāsala*, unity in genus is called *mujānasa*, unity in quality is called *mushābaha*, unity in quantity is called *musāwāt*, and unity in relativity is called *munāsaba*. 'Alī al-Qushjī is, no doubt, aware that there are other types of unity, but he uses the *huwa huwa* form in the sense of *muta'āraf ḥaml*, and by this he means being one in existence or essence.[27] On the other hand, al-Dawwānī uses *ḥaml* and *huwa huwa* in the same sense and considers *muta'āraf ḥaml* as a subcategory. In conclusion, al-Dawwānī's objection stems from the fact that he uses the terms differently from al-Qushjī.

27   al-Ṭūsī, *Tajrīd al-I'tiqād* (*in Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*), 1:507; al-Qushjī, *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*, 1:507.

IV. Absolute Identity and the Categorical Proposition

Examining the nature and requirements of predication, the fact that *huwa huwa*/ the categorical proposition, one of the basic elements of logic, is dealt with under the title of such basic metaphysical concepts as *waḥda-kathra* (unity/multiplicity) shows us to what extent logic interacts with metaphysical foundations. Now, we will take a second step to reinforce this interaction and discuss the important role of the principle "It is not possible for two things to be absolutely identical" in determining the categorical proposition's schema under the title of metaphysical unity/ multiplicity.

In this second step, ʿAlī al-Qushjī carries the principle of the impossibility of strong identity from the *waḥda-kathra* section to the *ḥaml* section of his work and makes this principle one of the supporting arguments for why the categorical proposition must have the aspect of unity and the aspect of multiplicity. His main goal here seems to be using the insights gained under the title of *waḥda* to establish the semantics of predication and to justify the predication schema of the categorical proposition on the basis of a metaphysical principle.

This principle, which can also be found in previous *kalām* books, ʿAlī al-Qushjī quotes from *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid* with simple modifications.[28] Though we do not claim here that al-Qushjī makes an original contribution, these lines describing the impossibility of strong identity appear as an assumption that grounds his main argument in the argument establishing the predication schema.

First of all, it is essential to understand the principle "Unification of two things is impossible." This principle asserts that two objects cannot have numerical identity while preserving their own identity. Let us get back to Zayd and Amr again, for the sake of an example. According to strong or numerical identity, Zayd and Amr being numerically identical implies that Zayd becomes Amr without losing his own identity or his individuality, and vice versa, which is impossible. Suppose Zayd is transformed into Amr. If both will continue to exist after this transformation, we will have not one person, but two. In this case, it is not possible to speak of numerical identity or numerical oneness.[29]

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28   al-Qushjī, *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*, 1:512.

29   al-Qushjī, 1:512.

In the second scenario, let us assume that either Zayd or Amr does not exist and the other one continues to exist. It is not reasonable to think that someone who has disappeared maintains his identity. As for the third scenario, if we assume that both of them disappear, then a third person will emerge. So in all of the thought experiments in these scenarios, the initial assumption is false. For in the initial assumption, we stipulated that Zayd and Amr, who entered the numerical identity machine, must preserve their individual identities even after they exit this machine. However, in the above scenarios, either one or both of the individuals disappear after the process of unification is applied.[30]

The main conclusion of the above argument is that two different things cannot have a strong identity, provided that we expect them to preserve their difference and selfhood. But more important is the fact that ʿAlī al-Qushjī's noticed that he could apply the impossibility between "two things" and "numerical identity" to the argument that grounds the predication schema. It is indeed reasonable to link the impossibility of numerical identity with the predication schema in the categorical proposition because there is no difference between the two objects that are intended to replace the subject and predicate in the categorical proposition and the two objects that enter the numerical identity machine. In other words, if we can derive a principle as a result of reasoning about "two things" in number, we can also apply this principle to the "two things" that replace the subject and predicate. Al-Qushjī also uses this principle, which denies numerical identity, to justify the predication schema's rule concerning identity.

Al-Qushjī's argument is as follows:

(و **الحمل**) الإيجابي (**يستدعي اتحاد الطرفين**) أي: الموضوع والمحمول، (**من وجه**) وإلا لكان الحمل الإيجابي بالمواطأة حكمًا بوحدة الإثنين

Affirmative **predication requires the subject and the predicate to be identical in one aspect** (*ittiḥād min wajh*). If this were not the case, the affirmative categorical proposition (*al-ḥaml al-ījābī bi-l-muwāṭaʾa*) would mean to claim that two things are one and the same.[31]

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30   al-Qushjī, 1:512.
31   al-Qushjī, 1:327.

What is most important in this argument is the phrase "وحدة الإثنين" (unification of two things), mentioned previously in the *waḥda*/unity section. As noted in the *waḥda* section, the proposition "it is impossible for two distinct objects to be entirely identical" is considered a fundamental principle. Strong identity causes an absurdity, yet ʿAlī al-Qushjī cleverly uses this absurdity and constructs a *modus tollens* deduction through the principle within the *ḥaml* section. In his line of argument, the proposition expressing strong identity is chosen as the consequent of a conditional statement.

P1. If the subject and the predicate in the categorical proposition do not unite in one aspect, they unite entirely.

P2. Their entire unification is nonsense/impossible.

C. Then, the subject and the predicate in the categorical proposition unite in one aspect.

Al-Qushjī proves the necessity of *ittiḥād* in one respect on the basis of the absurdity of "complete *ittiḥād*," which he takes as a contradiction of "*ittiḥād* in one aspect." That is, he proceeds from the idea that "if two things do not unite in one respect, then these two things are fully united." For him, it is easy to reject absolute identity/unity, since this principle has already been dealt with in detail and shown to be absurd in the chapter on *waḥda-kathra*.

At this point, it seems best to confine ourselves to the principle that two distinct objects/persons can never be one and identical and its implications for the predication schema, and in particular for its assertion of unity in one aspect. It is important to notice the following with respect to the rule of numerical identity/strong identity. Two things that enter the numerical identity/absolute identity machine—whether before or after entering it—must still maintain their own identity. Al-Qushjī realizes here that these two things that preserve their self-identity can be seen as two things that fill the gaps of subject term and predicate term. Accordingly, the subject term and the predicate term, that is, these two things, can never be identical, provided that they preserve their self-identity. If complete unity is not possible for these two things whose identities are preserved, the only possible identity option for them is that they are identical in one aspect. We can also interpret this conclusion as follows: it is not possible for two things that continue to be separate things to become one in a complete sense, that is, in the sense of numerical unity.

If it is not possible for two things that continue to be identical to itself to be literally one, a dilemma occurs: in order to establish the categorical proposition, one must either (1) give up duality, that is, multiplicity, or (2) give up complete unity. For, as already emphasized, it is incoherent to defend the complete unity of multiplicity. Two solutions can be offered to overcome this dilemma.

To tackle the problem by following (2), it is necessary to maintain multiplicity and abandon the insistence on complete unity. In this case, it is possible to fill the subject and predicate terms in a categorical proposition with two separate objects. However, since these two objects cannot be absolutely identical, they would have to be identical in at least one aspect. It should be noted that, in reaching this conclusion, al-Qushjī apparently does not examine the option of these two things being completely distinct. In other words, he does not examine whether two things that have nothing in common or relation to each other can exist or whether this idea is absurd.

To solve the problem by following (1), let us try to preserve complete unity and get rid of multiplicity. In this case, the subject and predicate of the categorical proposition will be one and the same thing. "Human is human" and "Zayd is Zayd" are examples of this approach. However, al-Qushjī says that there is no real predication in such propositions, and that these propositions will not contribute to our knowledge since they are a predication of something of itself. Although the subject and the predicate in these propositions exhibit different spatial and temporal transitions, there is no difference between them in meaning. The multiplication of their *tokens* (their verbal existence), via two identical words in the positions of subject and predicate, is not considered a multiplication in terms of meaning. In other words, if we assume that when we write the same word in the subject and predicate, complete identity is preserved, the value of the information that would be gained through multiplication is lost.

It is possible to formulate the argument about the predication dilemma and schema in the basis of al-Qushjī's commentary as follows:

P1. Two things—under the condition that they preserve their self-identity—are either identical entirely or identical in one aspect.

As explained above, al-Qushjī does not explicitly mention—as far as is known—the complete distinctness of two things that preserve their self-identities.

P2. It is impossible for two things—under the condition that they preserve their self-identity—to be completely identical.

This principle, which is moved to the predication schema from the section on unity/multiplicity, claims that absolute identity is impossible.

C1. Then two things are identical in one aspect, under the condition that they preserve self-identity.

P3. Two things—under the condition that they preserve self-identity—are either different or not.

Once again, it is crucial to notice that al-Qushjī does not address the option that two things are entirely different.

P4. If two things—under the condition that they preserve-self identity—do not differ in any way, then they are entirely identical.

P5. It is impossible for two things to be identical while they preserve self-identity.

Like P2, this principle transfered to the predication schema from the section on unity/multiplicity claims that absolute identity is impossible.

C2. Then two things—under the condition that they preserve self identity—are partially different.

If we change the word "two things" in the C1 and C2 for "subject and predicate," this formulation would necessarily be the predication schema itself. The subject and the predicate—under the condition that they preserve self-identity—are identical in one aspect. Also, the subject and the predicate—under the condition that they preserve self-identity—are different in one aspect.

What draws attention in this reconstructed argument can be summarized as follows: al-Qushjī includes the insight mentioned in the unity/multiplicity section, i.e., the principle of the absurdity of strong identity, in order to ground the proposition "the subject and the predicate must be identical in one aspect." He thereby contributes in various ways to our understanding of predication and provides a basis for the implication that predication should be considered an extension of the unity/multiplicity problem.

In this article, I attempted to address the impact of the conceptualization of unity/multiplicity, which is encountered in the *waḥda-kathra* section of metaphysics, on the predication schema of categorical propositions, with a specific focus on 'Alī al-Qushjī. He contributes to our understanding of predication through metaphysics by making predication an extension of the problem of unity and multiplicity.

On this account, it can be said that the rules of logic can be learned from logic books. However, the philosophy of logic should be revealed by investigating the connection of these rules with metaphysics, more specifically *al-umūr al-ʿāmma*. In al-Qushjī's examination, the underlying interaction between unity/multiplicity and predication encourages us to think of logic in relation to metaphysical principles and concepts.

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