

The Relationship Between Logic (*Manṭiq*) and Exegesis (*Tafsīr*): Ismā‘īl Gelenbevī's Interpretation of Sūrat al-Anfāl, Verse 23*

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Abstract: This article examines the relationship between logic (*manṭiq*) and exegesis (*tafsīr*) through the specific case of the treatise titled *Risāla fī Tafsīr Qawlihi Ta‘ālā*: “wa-law ‘alima Allāhu fihim khayran la-asma‘ahum”, written by Ismā‘īl Gelenbevī (d. 1205/1791), one of the most distinguished Ottoman scholars, on the 23rd verse of Surat al-Anfāl. As al-Gelenbevī states, certain ill-intentioned people claim that the verse contains a syllogism and that the conclusion of this syllogism is impossible: “Had Allah found any goodness in them, He would have certainly made them hear. [But] even if He had made them hear, they would have surely turned away heedlessly.” According to this syllogism, the conclusion should be as follows: “Had Allah found any goodness in them, they would [still] have turned away heedlessly.” However, it is necessary that those in whom Allah the Almighty knows there is good should not turn away. In his treatise, al-Gelenbevī presents three different approaches to this objection: (i) there is no syllogism in the verse; (ii) even if we accept that there is a syllogism in the verse; the syllogism does not satisfy the necessary formal conditions (*al-shurūṭ al-ṣūriyya*); and (iii) even if the alleged syllogism in the verse satisfies the necessary formal conditions, the conclusion is not impossible. Al-Gelenbevī examines the subject in detail within the context of the science of logic, evaluating the views of those who authored works on this matter before him, primarily those of his master, Abū Sa‘īd Muḥammad Hādīmī (d. 1176/1762). In this respect, the treatise constitutes a highly significant demonstration of how effective logic can be in the practice of exegesis. In this study, I aim to offer a modest contribution to the field by examining the relationship between logic and exegesis, focusing specifically on the treatise.

Keywords: Exegesis, Logic, Sūrat al-Anfāl, Hādīmī, al-Gelenbevī.

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Introduction

Logic is a discipline that, when its rules are followed, protects the individual from error in the process of thought. The reception of logic within the Islamic world gave rise to divergent perspectives. During the early period, while certain scholars maintained a hostile stance toward this nascent science, others embraced a more favorable outlook. In subsequent eras, logic achieved broad recognition within the Islamic world, propelled by the transformative influence of al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037). Following this transformative trajectory, it was al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) who established logic as the prerequisite for “deeming one’s knowledge reliable.” Indeed, al-Ghazālī’s celebrated dictum—“the knowledge of those who lack a mastery of logic is not to be trusted”—effectively became a definitive maxim among scholars.

Undoubtedly, the most sublime object of human contemplation is the Word of Allah. Consequently, the principles of logic serve as a vital instrument for the comprehension and interpretation of the Qur’ān. Although the systematic employment of logic as an instrument within exegesis emerged only in later periods, it is evident that the science of logic has occupied the agenda of exegetes (*mufasssīrūn*) since the early eras of the Islamic sciences. For instance, Imam al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), the eponymous founder of the Māturīdī school, refers in his *Ta’wīlāt Ahl al-Sunna* to an individual whom he characterizes as “the possessor of logic” (*ṣāhib al-mantiq*).¹ Similarly, Ibn Sīnā, another prominent figure from the early period, offers a compelling paradigm in his *Tafsīr Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ* for how logic serves as an instrumental science (*al-‘ilm al-ālī*) for exegesis. Numerous post-classical scholars—most notably al-Dawwānī (d. 908/1502) and Abū Sa’īd Muḥammad Hādīmī, to whom we shall frequently refer in this study—authored commentaries on this paradigm.²

Al-Ghazālī’s *al-Qiṣṭās al-Mustaqīm* represents a seminal contribution to the discourse on the relationship between logic and exegesis. In this work, al-Ghazālī provides various examples demonstrating how syllogistic figures (*ashkāl al-qiyās*) are employed within the Qur’ān.³ In the prologue of his treatise, al-Ghazālī elucidates “the five scales (*al-mawāzīn al-khamsa*) revealed within the Book of Allah and im-

1 Imam al-Māturīdī, *Ta’wīlāt Ahl al-Sunna* (Istanbul: Dāru’l-Mīzān, 2005), 1:117.

2 Ahmet Faruk Güney, *İhlās Sûresi Tefsiri ve Şerhleri* (Istanbul: The Manuscript Institution of Turkey, 2022).

3 See: Abū Hāmid Imām al-Ghazālī, *el-Kiṣṭâsu’l-Müstakîm: Doğsdoğru Ölçü*, ed. İbrahim Çapak (İstanbul: The Manuscript Institution of Turkey, 2023).

parted to the messengers as instruments for accurate evaluation.⁷⁴ These scales correspond to the first three figures of the connective syllogism (*al-qiyās al-iqtirānī*) and two distinct types of conditional propositions (*al-qaḍāyā al-sharṭiyya*). Beyond the foundational influences of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī, a wide array of scholars, including Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), al-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286), Ebussu'ūd Efendi (d. 982/1574), and al-Ālūsī (d. 1270/1854), have integrated logic as a methodology into their exegetical studies.

This synthesizing approach was not without its detractors, however; various scholars within the Islamic world voiced strong opposition to the application of logic within the Islamic sciences. This critical stance is most notably exemplified by the works of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), specifically *Naqḍ al-Mantiq and al-Radd 'alā al-Mantiqiyiyyīn*, as well as by al-Suyūṭī's (d. 911/1505) *Ṣawn al-Mantiq wa-l-Kalām 'an Fannay al-Mantiq wa-l-Kalām*. Furthermore, historical accounts relate that Imam al-Nawawī and Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ formally designated the study of logic forbidden (*ḥarām*).⁵

A further illustration of the application of logic within the realm of exegesis is provided by the scholarly discourse surrounding verse 23 of Sūrat al-Anfāl, which constitutes the central focus of this inquiry. The verse states: "Had Allah found any goodness in them, He would have certainly made them hear. [But] even if He had made them hear, they would have surely turned away heedlessly."

Within the framework of the problem addressed in the treatises, the verse features a first figure⁶ connective syllogism (*al-qiyās al-iqtirānī*)⁷ formulated from two conditional premises. Crucially, however, this syllogism entails a conclusion that is inherently impossible. The logical progression embedded within the verse can be formalized as follows:

Minor Premise (*al-muqaddima al-ṣughrā*) (s): Had Allah known any goodness (*khayr*) in them, He would certainly have made them hear.

4 Abū Ḥāmid Imām al-Ghazālī, *el-Kistāsu'l-Müstakīm*, 48.

5 Aḥmad al-Damanhūrī, *Īḍāḥ al-Mubham min Ma'ānī al-Sullam* (Beirut: Dār al-Baṣā'ir, 2013), 152–53.

6 First Figure: A syllogistic structure in which the middle term (*al-ḥadd al-awsaṭ*) functions as the predicate (*maḥmūl*) of the minor premise and the subject (*mawḍū'*) of the major premise. al-Gelenbevi, *Burhān-i Gelenbevi* (Istanbul: Maḥba'a-i 'Uthmāniyya, 1310 AH), 35.

7 Connective syllogism (*al-qiyās al-iqtirānī*): A syllogistic form in which neither the conclusion nor its contradictory (*naqīd*) is explicitly contained (*bi-l-fi'l*) within the premises. al-Gelenbevi, *Burhān*, 32.

Major Premise (*al-muqaddima al-kubrā*) (k): And had He made them hear, they would nonetheless have turned away.

Conclusion (*al-natiġa*) (n): Consequently, had Allah known any goodness in them, they would [still] have turned away.⁸

Such a conclusion, however, is fundamentally untenable.⁹ For an individual in whom Allah knows goodness to exist ought not—in strict accordance with this divine knowledge—turn away from the truth. To posit otherwise would be to suggest that Divine Knowledge could devolve into ignorance, a proposition that is ontologically impossible.¹⁰ The crux of the dilemma lies in the fact that, despite the goodness known within them, no such virtue is manifested; instead, these individuals persist in their aversion to the truth.

Identifying the exact progenitor of the debate surrounding this verse remains a complex task. Nevertheless, a distinguished lineage of scholars—including Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,¹¹ Ibn Hishām (d. 761/1360),¹² al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390),¹³ Hādīmī,¹⁴ Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (d. 1205/1791), and al-Ālūsī (d. 1270/1854)¹⁵—have devoted specific treatises or chapters to this issue. This collective scholarly engagement underscores the verse's pivotal significance for the nexus between logic and exegesis, particularly within the genre of *Mushkil al-Qurʾān* (The Challenging Passages of the Qurʾān). Conversely, while commentators such as Imam al-Māturīdī,¹⁶ al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286),¹⁷ and Abū

8 To ensure conciseness and facilitate ease of reading, the premises will not be restated in full throughout the remainder of this study; instead, they will be referred to solely by their designated abbreviations.

9 Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī, “Risāla fī qawlihi taʾālā law ʿalima Allāhu fihim khayran,” in *The Late Ottoman Kalam Tradition: İsmail Gelenbevi (1730–1791) and His Kalam Treatises* (Istanbul: Ibn Haldun University, 2017), 90.

10 al-Gelenbevī, “*Risāla fī qawlihi*,” 90.

11 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī al-Shahīr bi-l-Tafsīr al-Kabīr wa-Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981), 15:149.

12 Ibn Hishām, *Mughnī al-Labīb ʿan Kutub al-Aʿrīb* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, n.d.), 1:289.

13 al-Taftāzānī, *al-Mutawwal: Sharḥ Talkhīṣ Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2013), 336.

14 Harun Bekiroğlu, “Muhammed Hādīmī’nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri Hakkında Risalesinin Tahkikli Neşri,” *Bayburt Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi* 4 (2016).

15 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-Maʿānī fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿazīm wa-l-Sabʿ al-Mathānī* (Beirut: Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 9:189–190.

16 al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt Ahl al-Sunna* (Istanbul: Dār al-Mizān, 2005), 6:193–194.

17 al-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa-Asrār al-Taʾwīl al-Maʿrūf bi-Tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2001), 1:380–381.

al-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310)¹⁸ did not address the controversy directly, they adopted an oblique posture by incorporating certain interpretive possibilities into their approaches that will be scrutinized in the subsequent stages of our study.

In this study, Ismā'il Gelenbevī's treatise *Risāla fī Tafsīr Qawlihī Ta'ālā: "wa-law 'alima Allāhu fihim khayran la-asma'ahum"*, one of the many works composed regarding the verse in question, will be the primary object of inquiry. The fundamental rationale for selecting al-Gelenbevī is his critical contribution to the subject, which he achieved by making both explicit and implicit references to the logic-exegesis debates conducted prior to his time. Thus, an analysis centered on al-Gelenbevī facilitates observation of the developmental trajectories of the discussions surrounding this verse. Furthermore, al-Gelenbevī's treatise elucidates the exegesis-logic nexus with significantly more clarity than other works, granting it a privileged status. This article thus endeavors to evaluate al-Gelenbevī's work alongside its sources, with a particular emphasis on the work of his mentor, Abū Sa'īd Hādīmī. Like his student, Hādīmī authored an independent treatise on and engaged in a profound discussion of the subject.¹⁹ The intellectual continuity maintained by these two figures—who belong to the same scholarly tradition within a master-student framework—can be observed more clearly.

On the Treatise of Ismā'il Gelenbevī

As noted in the introduction, Ismā'il Gelenbewī authored a standalone treatise dedicated to the exegesis of the relevant verse in Sūrat al-Anfāl.²⁰ To date, five extant manuscript copies of this work have been identified. However, no record has been found of any printed editions published during the Ottoman era. These manuscript copies are as follows:

18 Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī, *Madārik al-Tanzīl wa-Ḥaqā'iq al-Ta'wīl* (Beirut: Dār al-Kalim al-Ṭayyib, 1998), 1:639.

19 For two articles specifically addressing Hādīmī's treatise, see: Harun Bekiroğlu, "Mantiğın Bir Tefsir Yöntemi Olarak Kullanılması: Muhammed Hādīmī'nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri", *Hitit Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 14, no. 27 (2015); Bekiroğlu, "Hādīmī'nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri."

20 Throughout the remainder of this study, the aforementioned work by al-Gelenbevī will be referred to simply as the *Risāla*.

i) Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Giresun Yazmalar Koleksiyonu, MS 106

In this copy, the title of the treatise is not explicitly mentioned. The scribe recorded the phrase “al-Gelenbevī’s Treatise” (*Risālat al-Gelenbevī*) at the beginning of the work. No date of transcription is specified. The scribe appended a note at the end of the treatise stating: “This is the final portion of what was transcribed from the copy that was produced from al-Gelenbevī’s own autograph.”

ii) Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Kasidecizâde Koleksiyonu, MS 723

In this copy, the work is referred to in the introductory section as “al-Gelenbevī’s Treatise: *Estāʾdhu bi-Allāh- ʿAlima Allāhu fihim khayran la-asmaʿahum wa-law asmaʿahum la-tawallaw.*” However, no separate title is explicitly mentioned at the beginning of the treatise itself.

iii) Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Mehmed Nuri Efendi Koleksiyonu, MS 197

In this copy, the work is referred to at the beginning as “*Risāla fī qawlihī taʿālā: wa-law ʿalima Allāh.*” No separate title is present in the introductory section.

iv) Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yazma Bağışlar Koleksiyonu, MS 606

In this copy, the scribe recorded the phrase “*Risālat wa-law ʿalima Allāh li-l-Gelenbevī*” in the margin. No date of transcription is mentioned.

v) Konya Yazma Eserler Bölge Müdürlüğü Kütüphanesi, Bölge Yazma Eserler Koleksiyonu, MS 9432

The title of the work is not mentioned in this copy. At the beginning of the treatise, the scribe recorded a note stating: “This treatise belongs to the virtuous al-Gelenbevī” (*Hādhihi al-risāla li-l-fāḍil al-Gelenbevī*). While there is no information regarding the date of transcription, a seal at the beginning of the work indicates that it was endowed to the Akşehir Library by ʿUmar Akshahrī.

In the contemporary period, there have been two critical editions of the treatise:

i) A section of Abdulrahman A. M. Mherigh’s master’s thesis, titled “The Late Ottoman Kalam Tradition: İsmail Gelenbevi (1730–1791) and His Kalam Treatises”

Although Mherigh edited al-Gelenbevī’s treatise under the title *Risāla fī rafʿ al-ishkāl fī qawlihī taʿālā wa-law ʿalima Allāh fihim khayran la-asmaʿahum*, such a designation was not encountered in manuscripts (i), (ii), or (iii), which he utilized.

Despite occasional errors in the critical edition, Mherigh's edition will be adopted as the basis for our study to facilitate the reader's tracking of our citations.

ii) The work titled *Risāla fī daf' al-ishkāl 'an tafsīr qawlihī ta'ālā wa-law 'alīma Allāh fthim khayran la-asma'ahum li-Shaykhzāda wa-ayḍan bi-l-Gelenbevi*, published by Muhammed Taha

Unfortunately, we were unable to consult this publication.

The treatise was also the subject of Asad Q. Ahmad's article titled "The Logic of God's Knowledge."²¹ However, since that work provides a general overview rather than an exhaustive examination of the treatise's logical arguments, it falls outside the scope of our specific evaluation.

Al-Gelenbevi's Exegesis of Verse 23 of Sūrat al-Anfāl

In the introduction to the *Risāla*, al-Gelenbevi identifies two distinct groups as the potential sources of the problem:

i) Certain heretics (*zindīqs*) and unbelievers (*mulhids*) who intend to raise objections against the Qur'ān.

ii) Certain Muslims who harbor doubts regarding religious matters.²²

In our study, no information was found regarding the originator of the problem or those who perpetuated this objection in later periods. Al-Gelenbevi's phrase, "*wa-la'allahu ishkālun...*", suggests that the issue may be situated within the scope of *Mushkil al-Qur'ān*.²³ Moreover, by generating a rebuttal through a method similar to that of his detractors—namely, via the science of logic (*'ilm al-mantiq*)—al-Gelenbevi demonstrates that he regarded logic as a valid instrument for resolution within the framework of *Mushkil al-Qur'ān*.

Initially, al-Gelenbevi categorizes the responses to the objection under three distinct perspectives:

21 Asad Q. Ahmed, "The Logic of Gods Knowledge", (n.d.), 149-157.

22 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihī*, 90.

23 Adem Yerinde, "Müşkilü'l-Kur'ân" (İstanbul: TDV İSAM Yayınları, 2006).

- i) There is no syllogism (*qiyās*) present within the verse;
- ii) A syllogism does exist within the verse; however, it does not fulfill the formal conditions;
- iii) The formal conditions of the syllogism are satisfied; however, the resulting conclusion is not impossible.

In perspectives (ii) and (iii), al-Gelenbevī presents a new approach, proceeding independently of the objection addressed in the first perspective. By doing so, he ensures that an exhaustive response is provided for every possible contingency.

In contrast to al-Gelenbevī, Hādīmī organizes the objections within two primary divisions:²⁴

a) Objections rejecting the presence of a syllogism in the verse. Under this category, Hādīmī provides eight distinct responses.

b) Objections accepting the presence of a syllogism in the verse. Under this category, he presents four distinct responses.²⁵

Prior to addressing the objections, it is pertinent to further elucidate the conceptualization of the “syllogism” as employed by both al-Gelenbevī and Hādīmī. Because certain responses that Hādīmī evaluates under category (a) are treated by al-Gelenbevī under category (ii). Consequently, in several instances where Hādīmī maintains that no syllogism is present within the verse, al-Gelenbevī acknowledges its existence but contends that it fails to satisfy the requisite formal conditions.

As will be explored in detail in the subsequent section, al-Gelenbevī asserts that within the objections classified under category (i), the middle term (*al-ḥadd al-awsaṭ*) fails to repeat. The middle term is an indispensable component of the syllogism, serving as the element that enables the predication of the major term (*al-ḥadd al-akbar*) to the minor term (*al-ḥadd al-asghar*). Consequently, in the objections

24 In order to prevent any potential confusion while comparing the arguments of al-Gelenbevī and Hādīmī throughout various sections of this article, we have opted to designate Hādīmī's arguments with letters rather than Roman numerals.

25 Harun Bekiroğlu, “Mantığın Bir Tefsir Yöntemi Olarak Kullanılması: Muhammed Hādīmī'nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri” [The Use of Logic as an Exegetical Method: Muhammad al-Khadimi's Commentary on Verse 23 of Surat al-Anfal], 104.

where al-Gelenbevi maintains that “there is no syllogism,” we observe the absence of the middle term among the three fundamental elements of a syllogism and thus of the necessary connecting factor to link the premises supposedly constituting the syllogism.

The “absence of a syllogism” as expressed by Hādīmī in category (a) refers to the lack of a structure configured to yield a necessary conclusion.²⁶ In this sense, al-Gelenbevi's observation in category (i)—namely, the failure of the middle term to repeat—falls within the scope of Hādīmī's category (a). Indeed, any structure devoid of a middle term constitutes a construction that is not built to yield a necessary conclusion. Furthermore, in instances where the formal conditions of a syllogism are not fulfilled, the syllogism likewise fails to yield a necessary conclusion.

To illustrate this point, let us construct a syllogism from the following premises: “Ahmet is a human. Some humans are students.” Based on the explanation provided above, this syllogism would not fall under al-Gelenbevi's objection in category (i), since the middle term “human” repeats in both premises. However, does the assent (*taşdīq*) to these two premises necessitate the assent to a third proposition? Certainly not. The formal structure of the syllogism does not compel us to accept any conclusion. Ahmet may be a student, but he may just as well not be, as it is indeterminate whether Ahmet is included within the class of “some humans” specified in the major premise. Consequently, one cannot claim to know whether Ahmet is a student based on this syllogism. As al-Gelenbevi defines it in *al-Burhān*, a syllogism is a proof that necessitates the conclusion by its very essence (*li-dhātihī*).²⁷ Therefore, if a structure fails to satisfy the requisite conditions of quality (*kayfiyya*) and quantity (*kammīyya*), it does not necessitate the conclusion. In other words, a construction that fails to fulfill the formal conditions cannot strictly be designated as a syllogism. Such a construction would be evaluated by Hādīmī within the framework of category (a).

26 In this study, by “conclusion” (*natīja*), we refer to a proposition that follows by necessity from the premises of the syllogism themselves (*li-dhātihā*) and is distinct from them.

27 al-Gelenbevi, *al-Burhān*, 32.

The First Approach: The Absence of Any Syllogism within the Verse

In the first stage of his resolution of the problem advanced by heretics (*zindīqs*), al-Gelenbevī considers the approach that the verse does not contain a formal syllogism. There are two distinct responses provided under this option, both of which are detailed expansions of the fourth response evaluated by Hādīmī under his category (a). Hādīmī formulates this proof as follows:

The middle term (al-ḥadd al-awsaṭ) does not repeat. For while the act of “making [them] hear” (*ismāʿ*) in the first premise is a useful one, the “making [them] hear” in the second premise is useless. Alternatively, the “making [them] hear” in the second premise refers to an act of hearing performed under the condition that Allah knows no good in them.²⁸

In explaining this proof, Hādīmī notes that both alternatives were mentioned by Ibn Hishām (d. 761/1360) in *Mughnī al-Labīb*;²⁹ he specifies that Ibn Hishām is unique in the first alternative, whereas the second is also found in al-Bayḍāwī’s *Anwār*.³⁰

The First Response: The Divergence of the Acts of “Making-Hear” (*ismāʿ*) in the Two Premises

In both responses situated under option (i), al-Gelenbevī maintains that the middle term fails to repeat. Asserting the non-repetition of the middle term serves as an absolute impediment to the construction of a syllogism.³¹ The factor that distinguishes these responses from one another lies in the varying interpretations regarding the expression *asmaʿahum*, which is identified as the putative middle term.

28 Harun Bekiroğlu, “Mantığın Bir Tefsir Yöntemi Olarak Kullanılması: Muhammed Hādīmī’nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 106.

29 Ibn Hishām mentions three distinct responses regarding the aforementioned problem in *Mughnī al-Labīb*. Two of these responses are based on the non-repetition of the middle term, as stated by Hādīmī. The third objection concerns the modalities (*jihāt*) of the premises in the syllogism. Ibn Hishām, *Mughnī al-Labīb ‘an Kutub al-A’rīb*, 1:289.

30 al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa-Asrār al-Ta’wīl* (Beirut: Dār Şādir, 2001), 1:380–381. Bekiroğlu, “Hādīmī’nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 107.

31 Because the presence of a middle, major, and minor term is mandatory for the formation of a syllogism. See. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya* (Dersaadet: Maṭba‘a-i Āmīra, 1300), 142.

According to the first of these interpretations, the “making-hear” (*ismā'*) mentioned in (s) is a useful one, whereas the “making-hear” in (k) is useless. Consequently, as the middle term does not repeat, the existence of a syllogism cannot be posited. Indeed, despite the phonetic similarity in their articulation, the middle term fails to repeat due to the presence of two distinct instances of the expression *asma'ahum* that diverge in meaning.

Following the adjustment of terms, the meanings of the propositions can be reformulated as follows:

(s₁): If Allah had known any good in them, He would have certainly granted them a useful making-hear (*ismā'*).

(k₁): And even if He were to grant them a useless making-hear, they would have surely turned away.

In order to expound upon this response in greater detail, al-Gelenbevi scrutinizes the meaning of “useless making-hear.” In his view, the making-hear in question denotes either “an obligation in an absolute sense” or “a complete making-hear concomitant with the stubbornness and arrogance of those people.”³² In this new context, two distinct meanings emerge specifically for (k₁):

(k_{1.1}) And even if He were to grant them a making-hear that constitutes an obligation in an absolute sense, they would have certainly turned away.

(k_{1.2}) And even if He were to grant them a complete making-hear concomitant with their stubbornness and arrogance, they would have certainly turned away.

In the case of (k_{1.1}), the antecedent of (k) would still be true; the disbelievers have indeed turned away in situations where they were subjected to an absolute obligation.³³ In the case of (k_{1.2}), however, the antecedent of (k) would not be true.³⁴ Al-Gelenbevi associates this second situation with the meaning attributed to the particle *law*.

Prior to elaborating on al-Gelenbevi's approach, it is pertinent to examine the linguistic significance of the particle *law*. Within the scope of this study, the particle *law* will be employed in three distinct senses:

32 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 90.

33 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 90.

34 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 90.

i) As a particle employed synonymously with the conditional particle *in* (إِنْ), conveying the sense of “if” or “should”;

ii) As a particle that can be utilized to express the impossibility of one state of affairs based on the impossibility of another. This logic is articulated as follows: “Had it been thus, it would have been so. However, since the latter is impossible, the former is likewise impossible.” In this sense, the particle *law* is extensively employed in the language. This sense will be examined in greater detail in subsequent sections.

iii) As exemplified in the *mawqūf* hadith,³⁵ “Had he not feared Allah; he would not have disobeyed Him” (*law lam yakhafi Allāha lam yaʿsihi*).³⁶ The meaning of this hadith is as follows: “Even if he did not fear Allah, he would still not have disobeyed Him,” which implies that, given he does fear Him, he would certainly never disobey.

According to al-Gelenbevī, the meaning of the particle *law* in the verse in question is identical to its usage in the *mawqūf* hadith.³⁷ When this usage is taken into account, the meaning of premise (k) would be as follows: “Even if they were subjected to a complete making-hear concomitant with their stubbornness and arrogance, they would have turned away; therefore, in this state where no making-hear occurs, they would turn away *a fortiori*.” In this form, the premise is not true, for the act of turning away is contingent upon the occurrence of making-hear. In the absence of such an encounter with making-hear, it is impossible for turning away to take place. As al-Taftāzānī notes, “turning away” signifies departing and refusing to submit, which can only be realized through the making-hear.³⁸

At this juncture, al-Gelenbevī also addresses a prospective objection. It posits that while the particle *law* in the *mawqūf* hadith links two negative propositions, the verse evidently contains two affirmative ones. Does this specific sense of *law*, then, apply strictly and exclusively to the connection of two negative propositions?

35 A *mawqūf* hadith refers to reports attributed to the Companions (*Ṣaḥāba*) concerning their words, actions, or similar matters. Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Maʿrifat Anwāʿ Ulūm al-Ḥadīth* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1986), 1/46.

36 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Jamʿ al-Jawāmiʿ al-Maʿrūf bi-al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr* (Cairo: al-Azhar al-Sharīf, 2005), 16/178.

37 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 90.

38 al-Taftāzānī, *al-Mutawwal*, 336.

al-Gelenbevi responds to this prospective question in the negative. In his view, this specific sense of *law* can be employed not only in two negative propositions, as seen in the *mawqūf* hadith, but also in two affirmative ones, or in a combination of one affirmative and one negative proposition. To illustrate this possibility, al-Gelenbevi adduces the following expression: “Had you insulted me, I would have honored you” (*law shatamtanī la-akramtuka*).³⁹ The meaning of this expression is as follows: “Even if you were to insult me, I would still honor you; therefore, in the absence of such an insult, I would honor you *a fortiori*.” Furthermore, in both (k1.1) and (k1.2), the middle term fails to repeat; consequently, no syllogism is constituted.

The Second Response: The Conditionality of Making-Hear within the Major Premise

The second approach to the failure of the middle term to repeat is that the “making-hear” appearing in the consequent of (s)⁴⁰ is conditioned upon “Allah Almighty knowing any good in them.” In contrast, the “making-hear” in (k)⁴¹ is qualified by the “absence of such knowledge on the part of Allah Almighty.”⁴² In this case, (s) and (k) signify the following meanings:

(s2) If Allah Almighty had known any good in them, He would have granted them making-hear on the basis of His knowing good in them.

(k2) And if Allah Almighty were to grant them making-hear—in the state of the absence of such knowledge on the part of Allah Almighty—they would have still turned away.

The semantic differentiation of making-hear across the two premises precludes the constitution of a syllogism.

However, al-Gelenbevi critiques this response. In his view, this approach is not conducive to demonstrating the absence of a syllogism or the non-repetition of the

39 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 90.

40 I.e., the portion “He would have certainly made them hear” of the proposition: “If Allah had known any good in them, He would have certainly made them hear.”

41 I.e., the portion “And if He were to make them hear” of the proposition: “And if He were to make them hear, they would have surely turned away.”

42 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 91.

middle term.⁴³ The primary focus of this objection instead lies in the failure to satisfy the universality (*kullīyya*) of the major premise (k), which is a prerequisite for the first figure. Indeed, the state mentioned in (k) regarding “the absence of such knowledge on the part of Allah Almighty” constitutes one of the possible instances in which the antecedent can be realized alongside the consequent.⁴⁴

Al-Gelenbevi’s objection can also be elucidated through an alternative illustration. In the proposition “If the sun rises, it is daytime,” the possible instances or times in which the antecedent and the consequent co-occur can be expressed as “today,” “tomorrow,” or “the following day.” Specifying one of these possible instances within the proposition entails selecting one among the potential realizations. Thus, in a connective (*iqtirānī*) syllogism constructed from the propositions “If the sun rises today, it is daytime” and “If it is daytime today, there is no night,” qualifying the existence of daytime with one of the possible realizations—such as “today,” as illustrated here—does not result in a change to the middle term.

According to al-Gelenbevi, interpreting the verse in this manner does not merely shift the middle term; rather, as in the example of the sun rising and the presence of daylight, it denotes one of the instances in which the realization of the logical relation (*nisba*) is possible. In other words, for him, this formulation is not a factor that leads to a semantic differentiation in the middle term (*asmā’ahum*). Instead, this stipulation represents one of the possible circumstances under which the relation established between the antecedent and the consequent in conditional propositions can be actualized. As al-Gelenbevi asserts, the qualification of the relation itself—rather than the terms of the proposition—is not a condition that invalidates the syllogism. Consequently, the focal point of this objection is not the non-repetition of the middle term, but rather the failure to satisfy the requirement of universality for the major premise (k).

At this juncture, a further question emerges that must be addressed from the standpoint of logical principles: how exactly, as al-Gelenbevi posits, would the objection be directed toward the requirement for the universality (*kullīyya*) of the major premise (k)? The universality or particularity (*juz’īyya*) of conditional propositions

43 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 91.

44 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 91.

pertains to whether the judgment encompasses all possible instances and times of the relation (*nisba*) of the consequent to the antecedent, or merely an indefinite part thereof. If the judgment extends to all such instances, the proposition is universal; if it is restricted to an unspecified portion, it is particular.⁴⁵ The qualification within the objection implies that (k) does not encompass every possible state; thus, the conditionality holds for some instances rather than all. Consequently, premise (k) fails to be universal. Under these circumstances, one cannot claim the absence of a syllogism; rather, a syllogism indeed exists, yet it fails to yield a valid conclusion because the necessary conditions remain unfulfilled. Furthermore, a qualification within premise (s) poses no obstacle to either the existence of the syllogism or its formal requirements. For in the first figure, it suffices for the minor premise (s) to be affirmative; whether it is universal or particular is of no consequence to the validity of the syllogism.

al-Gelenbevi is cognizant of a potential objection that may arise in response to his critique of the second answer. A respondent might argue that the aforementioned qualifications are not intrinsic to the relation but are instead part of the terms themselves. If these qualifications are considered part of the terms, the middle term will inevitably shift. Indeed, in such a case, the consequent of (s) and the antecedent of (k) no longer convey the same meaning.⁴⁶ Al-Gelenbevi notes in response that if the qualification in question is treated as a component of the proposition, the debate reverts to a state similar to the issue of “useful versus useless *ismā'*.”⁴⁷ In other words, the mentioned qualifications would prevent the repetition of the identical middle term in both premises. Consequently, no new objection arises at this juncture; once it is established that the middle term has shifted, the specific meanings of the consequent of (s) and the antecedent of (k)—previously presumed to be the middle term—become of little consequence. Indeed, the objection must now be evaluated beyond the mere existence of the syllogism, focusing specifically on its formal conditions or its resulting conclusion.

45 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Shamsīyya*, 105.

46 (s2) If Allah Almighty had known any good in them, He would have certainly granted them making-hear while knowing good in them. (k2) And if Allah Almighty were to grant them making-hear while not knowing any good in them, they would have still turned away.

47 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlīhī*, 91.

In my humble opinion, the problem here cannot be the failure to satisfy the requirement for the universality of the major premise (k). Indeed, according to al-Gelenbevi's own statement, a specific possible realization was selected in both propositions. When a particular instance among possible realizations is designated, the conditional proposition is classified as a singular (*shakhṣiyya*) proposition.⁴⁸ On the other hand, as al-Gelenbevi also asserts in *al-Burhān*, a singular proposition has the force of a universal one.⁴⁹ Consequently, if the premises were singular, they would carry the force of a universal proposition, thereby satisfying this requirement for the major premise. At this juncture, a potential response might be considered: that the qualification in question renders the proposition particular (*juz'iyya*) rather than singular.

The Second Approach: The Presence of a Syllogism that Fails to Fulfill the Formal Prerequisites

In the preceding section, al-Gelenbevi examined the responses asserting the absence of a syllogism in the verse. In this section, in contrast, he addresses the critiques that can be raised if the existence of a syllogism is granted. According to this perspective, although a syllogism may be present, it fails to fulfill the formal conditions (the requirements of the figure). Since a syllogism that does not satisfy its formal conditions does not necessitate a conclusion, no logical impossibility arises. The critiques mentioned by al-Gelenbevi in this chapter are also cited by Hādīmī. Within this framework, al-Gelenbevi's first response corresponds to Hādīmī's fifth response under category (a), while al-Gelenbevi's second response corresponds to Hādīmī's sixth response under the same category. Hādīmī also emphasizes that al-Taftāzānī included both responses.⁵⁰

In option (a.5), Hādīmī states that the particles *in* and *law* are markers of indefinite (*muhmala*) propositions.⁵¹ As al-Gelenbevi also notes, indefinite propositions—

48 al-Gelenbevi, *Gelenbevi fī 'ilm al-manṭiq 'alā matn Ḍāghūjī* (Dār al-Nūr al-Mubīn, 2016), 84.

49 al-Gelenbevi, *al-Burhān*, 16.

50 Bekiroğlu, "Hādīmī'nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri", 108.

51 An indefinite proposition refers to a proposition whose subject is a universal concept but whose quantity is not specified. See: al-Gelenbevi, *al-Burhān*, 16. For Hādīmī's evidence in option (a.5), see: Bekiroğlu, "Hādīmī'nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri", 108.

whose quantity is not explicitly specified—possess the force of a particular (*juz'yya*) proposition.⁵² According to the objection raised against the verse under study, a first-figure syllogism ought to be present. Indeed, “*ismā*” appears in the consequent of the minor premise (s) and in the antecedent of the major premise (k). On the other hand, one of the formal prerequisites for the first figure is that the major premise must be universal. The inclusion of a particular proposition—or an indefinite one that possesses the force of a particular—within the major premise prevents the fulfillment of the syllogism's formal conditions.⁵³ Consequently, the syllogism does not necessitate a conclusion, and the alleged impossibility does not manifest.

At this stage of the debate, a critical question arises: is the particle *law* invariably employed in Arabic as a marker of an indefinite (*muhmala*) proposition? If this is indeed the case, the objection is well-founded, as the requirement for the major premise (k) to be universal would remain unfulfilled. Conversely, if the particle *law* can denote various quantities within the language, the objection may lose its validity.

Rejecting this premise, Hādīmī argues that the particle *law* is not strictly confined to the function of an indefinite marker. As evidence, he points out that the conditional proposition utilized in repetitive syllogisms (*istithnā'ī*)⁵⁴ must also be universal. The frequent use of *law* as the particle for the conditional proposition within the minor premise (s) of repetitive syllogisms in logic textbooks serves as a testament to the term's diverse applications in Arabic. Indeed, the universality of the minor premise (s) is a formal prerequisite for the validity of repetitive syllogisms.⁵⁵ One such example demonstrating that the particle *law* can impart a universal meaning to a proposition within a repetitive syllogism is the verse: “Had there been within them gods besides Allah, they would both have been ruined” (*law kāna fihimā ālihatun illā Allāh la-fasadatā*) (21:22). As will be elaborated below, the particle *law* in this verse serves as a marker for a universal proposition.

Furthermore, from a logical perspective, the status of indefinite propositions as equivalent to particular ones is by no means an absolute rule. For instance, Ibn Sinā

52 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 91.

53 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 91.

54 A syllogism is called repetitive (*istithnā'ī*) if it contains either the conclusion itself -in both its matter and form- or the form of its contradiction. al-Gelenbevi, *al-Burhān*, 32.

55 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya*, 174.

points out that propositions utilized in scientific discourses, such as “*al-fā‘ilu marfū‘un*,” possess the force of a universal proposition even if they are indefinite in form. Similarly, Hādīmī asserts that in certain contexts, such as rhetoric (*khaṭāba*), indefinite propositions are also treated as possessing the force of a universal proposition.⁵⁶

In option (a.6), Hādīmī focuses on the coincidental (*ittifāqīyya*) nature of the propositions employed in the syllogism.⁵⁷ Coincidental propositions are conditional propositions that lack a relationship of necessity between their components. Conversely, if a relationship of necessity exists between the terms of the proposition, it is designated as an implicative (*luzūmīyya*) proposition.⁵⁸ This necessity can manifest in various forms: the antecedent being the cause (*‘illa*) of the consequent, the consequent being the cause of the antecedent, or both being the effects (*ma‘lūl*) of a common cause.

The crux of this objection, which is also elaborated by al-Gelenbevī, is the unsuitability of coincidental propositions for the construction of a syllogism. Indeed, one of the requirements for a connective syllogism composed of conditional propositions is that the premises must be implicative.⁵⁹ Accordingly, if a syllogism composed of coincidental propositions exists within the verse, it would fail to yield a necessary conclusion, as it does not satisfy the requirements of the form even if a syllogistic structure is present. In other words, the conclusion alleged to follow from the syllogism is not one that the syllogism actually necessitates.

Why, then, are the conditional proposition(s) employed in the syllogism considered coincidental? How does this state of affairs affect the meaning of the propositions? According to Hādīmī, the reason premise (s) is coincidental is that “the knowledge of Allah Almighty” is not the causal factor for a thing coming into existence. Consequently, the “making-hear” mentioned in the consequent of (s) cannot occur solely as a result of the knowledge mentioned in the antecedent. Indeed, coming into existence depends upon will (*irāda*), power (*qudra*), and creation (*takwīn*), rather than knowledge (*‘ilm*).⁶⁰

56 Bekiroğlu, “Hādīmī’nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 108.

57 Bekiroğlu, “Hādīmī’nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 108.

58 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya*, 98.

59 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya*, 174.

60 Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, *Muvazzah İlmi Kelam Dersleri Ehli Sünnet İtikadı* (Ravza Yayınları, n.d.), 166–169. It may be argued at this point that will, power, and creation themselves depend upon

The same applies to the second proposition. Consequently, *ismâ'*, signifying the bestowing of a form of knowledge, is not the cause for “turning away.” Much like making-hear, turning away depends upon the *irâda*, *qudra*, and *takwîn* of Allah Almighty.⁶¹ Therefore, since no relationship of necessity or causality exists between the components of conditional premise (k)—namely, making-hear and turning away—the proposition is coincidental. Under these circumstances, the syllogism fails to fulfill its formal requirements. Thus, it is impossible for the alleged absurd conclusion to follow from the syllogism in question; in its current state, it is incapable of yielding a conclusion.

Another argument for the coincidental nature of the proposition employed in the syllogism is its inability to establish a relationship of necessity between making-hear and turning away. Indeed, believers have also “heard,” yet they did not turn away. Had making-hear necessitated turning away, it would follow that believers would also turn away—a conclusion that contradicts the very notions of faith (*îmân*) and trial (*imtihân*).

The First Response: The Major Premise in the First Figure is Not Indefinite

According to the first response cited by al-Gelenbevî under this option, both premises in the syllogism are indefinite. This is because, as Hâdimî also notes, *law* is a marker for indefinite propositions. At this juncture, al-Gelenbevî follows Hâdimî's objection but advances the debate a step further: even if it were granted that the particle *law* is utilized as a universal in the verse—thereby satisfying the formal requirement—another problem would arise.

In this scenario, assuming the middle term is repeated, Allah Almighty would have granted hearing to those in whom He knew good, yet those granted hearing would have failed to believe and turned away. If the major premise (k) were universal, it would imply that “everyone granted hearing” would inevitably turn away. In other words, the premise would be understood as: “And whomever He were to grant hearing, they would surely have turned away.” However, as a matter of empirical fact,

knowledge, as it is impossible to incline toward or create something without knowing it. However, the intent here is that knowledge does not necessitate (*yastalzîm*) existence. In other words, the presence of knowledge does not necessitate the act of willing or creating.

61 Bekiroğlu, “Hâdimî'nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 108.

it is known that in some instances where hearing was granted—specifically, those where people chose faith—turning away was not a necessary consequence.⁶² On the contrary, in such cases, the making-hear resulted not in turning away, but in steadfastness. Therefore, treating the major premise of the syllogism as universal is problematic not only regarding the formal prerequisites of the syllogism but also in terms of its semantic coherence. Consequently, for al-Gelenbevī, the issue does not merely stem from the fact that *law* is an indefinite marker or that an indefinite proposition possesses the force of a particular one; rather, it lies in the inherent impossibility of the major premise being universal from a semantic perspective.

The Second Response: The Inadmissibility of Coincidental Propositions in a Syllogism

In this response, al-Gelenbevī sustains Hādīmī’s objection regarding the employment of coincidental propositions in a syllogism.⁶³ Diverging from Hādīmī, however, al-Gelenbevī elaborates on the varieties of hypothetical conditional propositions as a preamble to his second critique. According to this classification, a conditional proposition is either implicative or coincidental. The latter is further divided into two meanings: (i) the specific sense, and (ii) the general sense. In its specific sense, a coincidental proposition asserts that the truth of the consequent happens to coincide with the truth of the antecedent. In such a case, both components of the proposition must be true. However, no such situation is observed in either of the conditional propositions under discussion.⁶⁴ An example of a coincidental proposition in its specific sense would be: “If Ali has arrived, the lights of the house are on.” In this proposition, Ali’s arrival does not strictly necessitate the lights being on; nevertheless, the truth of the proposition—in this specific sense—is contingent upon the actual occurrence of both events.

Should premise (s) be regarded as a coincidental proposition in its specific sense, it would fail to satisfy the requirement of truth, because Allah Almighty did not discern any good within them, which renders the antecedent false. Since the truth of a coincidental proposition in its specific sense is contingent upon the truth of its

62 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 91.

63 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 91.

64 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 91.

antecedent, premise (s) must necessarily be false. Furthermore, for a syllogism to yield a true conclusion, its premises must themselves be true. A syllogism grounded in false premises will fail to produce a true conclusion, even if its formal structure necessitates one by virtue of its form.

In a coincidental proposition in its general sense, "the judgment is that the truth of the consequent follows upon the mere assumption of the antecedent's truth, regardless of whether the antecedent itself is factually true."⁶⁵ On this basis, for the proposition "If Ali has arrived, the lights of the house are on" to be true, it is sufficient that the lights are actually on. In this sense, the truth of the consequent suffices for the validity of the conditional proposition; the actualization of the antecedent is not a prerequisite. The antecedent may be either true or false, just as in the specific sense. Consequently, premise (k) would be true. After all, while no hearing was granted to these individuals, they have nonetheless turned away.

Following this brief introduction, al-Gelenbevî explains that the prerequisite for a connective syllogism composed of conditional propositions to yield a conclusion is that it must be constructed from implicative propositions. For a syllogism to fail to yield a conclusion, it is enough that it be composed of coincidental propositions, whether in the general or the specific sense. At this stage, the following question may be posed: does the presence of a coincidental proposition within a connective syllogism render the syllogism invalid in an absolute sense? Although there is a consensus that syllogisms composed of two coincidental propositions are invalid, some scholars maintain that connective syllogisms formed from one implicative and one coincidental proposition may be valid under specific conditions. These conditions are as follows:

- i) The implicative proposition must be universal.
- ii) Within the implicative proposition, the middle term must serve as the antecedent.
- iii) Regarding the middle term in the coincidental proposition: if the proposition is the minor premise (s), the middle term must be the consequent; if it is the major premise (k), the middle term must be the antecedent.⁶⁶

65 al-Gelenbevî, *Risāla fî qawlihi*, 92.

66 al-Gelenbevî, *Risāla fî qawlihi*, 92.

According to al-Gelenbevi, even if one were to concede that a syllogism employing a coincidental proposition could yield a conclusion, further complications would arise within this specific syllogism. The fundamental point al-Gelenbevi relies upon in asserting that the syllogism would still fail to yield a conclusion is a general maxim frequently cited by logicians: “If the consequent can remain true alongside the contradictory of the antecedent, this serves as evidence that the relationship between the two is merely coincidental.”⁶⁷ For instance, consider the proposition “If you work, you will be successful,” and let us assume that the individual in question has indeed attained success. However, success does not invariably stem from labor; one may achieve success without working. Consequently, the consequent remains true even alongside the contradictory of the antecedent. In this case, it is established that the relationship between the two components is coincidental—that is, they lack a relationship of mutual necessity.

Based on this maxim, al-Gelenbevi states that (s) is a coincidental proposition. Indeed, the consequent of this proposition—turning away—can remain true even when the antecedent is false (i.e., in the absence of hearing). However, at this juncture, a difficulty arises regarding the second condition for a connective syllogism containing a coincidental proposition. Since the syllogism in question is constructed in the first figure, the middle term occupies the consequent of the minor premise (s) and the antecedent of the major premise (k).⁶⁸ If the coincidental proposition serves as the major premise, then the minor premise must be implicative,⁶⁹ as to maintain the validity of a syllogism containing a coincidental proposition requires the presence of one implicative and one coincidental premise. Yet, if the minor premise (s) is implicative, the middle term—by virtue of the syllogism being in the first figure—would be the consequent of (s). However, the second of the conditions stipulates that the middle term must necessarily serve as the antecedent in the implicative proposition. Consequently, even if the obstacle to the lack of an implicative relationship were overcome, further complications would arise if the premises were treated as coincidental.⁷⁰

67 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 92.

68 The Minor Premise (s): “If Allah Almighty had known any good in them, He would have made them hear.” The Major Premise (k): “And if He had made them hear, they would surely have turned away.”

69 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 92.

70 al-Gelenbevi introduces a further debate here regarding whether the first condition has been met, analyzing the approaches of the Māturīdī, Ash‘arī, and Mu‘tazilī schools. However, as these discussions exceed the scope of this study -focuses on the relationship between logic and exegesis- they are not included here. For the full discussion, see: al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 93.

The Conclusion of the Syllogism is Not Impossible

Al-Gelenbevi takes the argument a step further: even if such a syllogism were to exist, as claimed by his opponents, and even if it satisfied all formal requirements, the resulting conclusion would still not be impossible. At this juncture, the responses cited by al-Gelenbevi are the first two responses provided by Hâdimî under option (b).

Before explicating (b.1), Hâdimî mentions that this response was noted by Ibn Hishâm in *Mughnî al-Labîb*.⁷¹ According to the latter, the evidence is as follows: The attachment of Allah Almighty's knowledge to the occurrence of good from these individuals is for certain times; it is not for all times. In the remaining times, no good can be found in these individuals, and they could very well become apostates.⁷² In this case, there is no impossibility involved.⁷³ If Hâdimî's expressions were to be translated into the language of logic, it would be observed that Ibn Hishâm ascribed a "temporal" (*waqtiyya*) modality to the proposition.

The response cited by Hâdimî under option (b.2) is also discussed by al-Taftâzânî in *al-Muṭawwal*. According to the latter, both the antecedent and the consequent of (n) are impossible.⁷⁴ Specifically, it is impossible for Allah Almighty to discern good in these individuals, owing to the absence of any good within them. This impossibility, in turn, entails another impossibility—namely, their "turning away from good"—granted the assumption that good was known in them. The crux of this argument lies in the fact that the impossibility of the components of a conditional proposition does not preclude the truth of the proposition itself.

The proposition, "If my bookshelf possessed an intellect, it would perceive universals," serves as an illustration of this principle. Indeed, both components of this conditional proposition are impossible, as it is neither possible for a bookshelf to possess an intellect nor for it to perceive universals. Nevertheless, the conditional proposition itself is true; for were the bookshelf to possess an intellect, it would indeed be capable of perceiving universals. The truth of an implicative conditional proposition depends

71 Ibn Hishâm, *Mughnî al-Labîb 'an Kutub al-A'arîb*, 1/289.

72 Bekiroğlu, "Hâdimî'nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri", 110-111.

73 Bekiroğlu, "Muhammed Hâdimî'nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri Hakkında Risalesinin Tahkikli Neşri", 110.

74 Bekiroğlu, "Hâdimî'nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri", 111.

not so much on the factual truth of its components as it does on the correct identification of the underlying relationship of necessity. For this reason, while the proposition “If my bookshelf possessed an intellect, it would perceive universals”—in which both parts are false—is accepted as true, the proposition “If you work, you will be successful” is false if constructed as an implicative one. Working does not strictly necessitate success; an individual who works may nonetheless fail to achieve it. Consequently, if necessity is predicated of such a relationship, the conditional proposition will be false due to the absence of a nexus of necessity between the components.

At this point, Hādīmī raises an objection to the evidence. In his view, this maxim dictates that a relationship of necessity between two impossibles is valid only if one impossible actually necessitates the other.⁷⁵ The previously cited “bookshelf” proposition serves as an example: both the bookshelf possessing an intellect and its perception of universals are impossible. Nevertheless, because these two impossibles are mutually necessitating, the judgment of necessity between them is correctly established. Conversely, a conditional proposition such as “If the sun were able to speak, the universe would have no creator”—where both components are impossible—would not be true because there is no relationship of necessity between the sun’s ability to speak and the non-existence of a creator for the universe. Applying this to our discussion, since Allah Almighty’s knowledge of good in these individuals does not necessitate their turning away, the current explication remains invalid. Indeed, the non-attachment of Divine Knowledge to any good within them does not strictly necessitate any particular effect; thus, it cannot be presented as the rationale for an impossibility such as their turning away.

In response to this objection, Hādīmī specifies that the condition pertains to essential (*li-dhātihī*) impossibilities; in the case of non-essential (*li-ghayrihī*) impossibilities, such a condition is not stipulated.⁷⁶ According to al-his approach, in this specific instance, since both the non-attachment of Divine Knowledge to any good within these individuals and their not turning away are not essential impossibilities, they fall outside the scope of the debate in question.

75 Bekiroğlu, “Hādīmī’nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 111.

76 Bekiroğlu, “Hādīmī’nin Enfâl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 111.

The First Response: Constructing the Syllogism via a Temporal Modality

In this section, al-Gelenbevī asserts that even if the formal validity of the syllogism is granted, no impossibility ensues. Indeed, it is entirely possible to interpret the conclusion of the syllogism as follows: “If Allah Almighty had known any good in them at a specific time, they would have turned away at a different time.” Consequently, these individuals could have turned away after good had been discerned in them and they had attained faith.⁷⁷ Such a scenario does not entail any impossibility, as both the discernment of good and the act of turning away are realized—albeit not concurrently. This temporal distinction ensures that the two states do not result in a logical contradiction.

According to al-Gelenbevī, while this response resolves the problem from a logical standpoint, it engenders a further complication from a theological perspective, because the response characterizes faith that is followed by apostasy as “good.” Such faith—or such a notion of goodness—does not constitute an acceptable form of good within the framework of the Sharia.⁷⁸

In response to al-Gelenbevī's objection, it may be argued that the faith under commendation is absolute faith, the designation of which as “good” is valid within the Sharia, because praising faith at a specific moment in time does not necessitate that it be praised with regard to its aftermath. Furthermore, no issue arises from praising and characterizing absolute faith—which is predicable of specific faith—as “good.” Faith, in absolute terms, is inherently good. The subsequent occurrence of apostasy is a distinct negation of good, entirely independent of the faith itself.

The Second Response: The Impossibility of the Components Does Not Entail the Impossibility of the Conditional Proposition

After noting the emergence of a theological problem in the previous response, al-Gelenbevī takes his inquiry a step further, opening new ground for debate. Accordingly, even if faith followed by apostasy is granted the designation of “good,” it is still pos-

77 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 93.

78 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 94.

sible to maintain that the conclusion is not impossible.⁷⁹ Since these individuals lack any inherent good, it is impossible for Allah Almighty to discern good within them; if no good exists in them, no good can be known in them.

Furthermore, one impossibility may necessitate another impossibility. This second impossibility is their act of turning away. Indeed, it is impossible for them to turn away granted the assumption that Allah discerned good within them. However, in view of the conclusion, this state of affairs occupies the position of a consequent within an impossible conditional proposition. Thus, the conclusion represents one impossibility—the discernment of good in these individuals—necessitating another impossibility—the turning away of those in whom good is discerned. Since the conditional relation established between the two components can be valid even if both are inherently impossible, the conditional proposition itself may be considered true.

Al-Gelenbevī notes that this response is open to debate from two perspectives.

i) The impossibility of Allah Almighty discerning good in these individuals is contingent upon the impossibility of good occurring from them.⁸⁰

If the occurrence of good from them were not impossible, then Allah Almighty's discernment of that good would not be impossible either. On the other hand, the occurrence of good from them is indeed not impossible; were it impossible, their status as morally accountable beings would be rendered meaningless. Consequently, at this juncture, it can be said that the modality of the negation of good from them is not necessity, but perpetuity (*dawām*). While good has never been established in them, this does not imply that its establishment—namely, faith—is impossible. If it is possible for good to be established in them, then Allah Almighty's discernment of good within them is likewise not impossible.

At this juncture, al-Gelenbevī specifies that the difficulty regarding objection (i) can be circumvented in two ways:

i.1) According to the Ash'arites, who adhere to the view of moderate determinism (*al-jabr al-mutawassit*), the occurrence of good from these individuals is impossible. Consequently, Allah Almighty's discernment of good within them is likewise impossible.

79 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 93.

80 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 93.

i.2) If the major premise of the syllogism is accepted as both implicative and universal, then for each of the individuals in question, faith would be impossible even granted the assumption of their hearing. If they do not attain faith if they hear, they certainly will not attain faith if they do not hear. Therefore, faith will in no way issue from these individuals.⁸¹

Al-Gelenbevi's second objection to the response, paralleling Hâdimî's objection, is as follows:

ii) One impossibility necessitating another is not valid in every instance; it is valid only when a relationship of necessity exists between them.

If one impossibility does not necessitate the other, an implicative proposition cannot be constructed between them. However, the conclusion of the alleged syllogism must be implicative because, regarding the propositions "Allah Almighty's discernment of good in them" and "their turning away," no issue would arise if they were treated as a coincidental proposition in its general sense, given that the truth of the consequent is sufficient for the truth of such a proposition, even if the antecedent is false. Since the act of turning away is established as a fact, the coincidental proposition in its general sense is indeed true. Furthermore, the antecedent of the conclusion—namely, whether Allah Almighty discerns good in these individuals or not—is of no significance for a coincidental proposition in its general sense. Consequently, a problem arises only when the proposition is treated as an implicative one.

In this instance, the mere impossibility of the components is insufficient for the truth of an implicative proposition; rather, the impossibles must necessitate one another. However, "Allah Almighty's discernment of good in these individuals" necessitates that those in whom He discerns good refrain from turning away: the manifestation of good is possible only if these individuals do not turn away. Yet the consequent of the conclusion features "turning away" instead of "not turning away." Conversely, had the consequent of the proposition been "not turning away," no impossibility would have arisen, and the proposition would have been true; it is necessary for those in whom Allah Almighty discerns good not to turn away. Consequently, objection (ii)—which relies on the claim that one impossibility necessitates another—is invalid in this specific instance.

81 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 93.

The Approach of the Critical Scholars (*al-Muḥaqqiqūn*) and al-Gelenbevī's Assessment

After evaluating the six responses, al-Gelenbevī addresses the approach of the group he designates “the Critical Scholars (*al-Muḥaqqiqūn*).” The response that al-Gelenbevī examines at this juncture is cited by Hādīmī as the first response under option (a). Hādīmī succinctly sets forth (a.1) as follows: “[There is no syllogism in the verse.] For in eloquent language (*al-luḡha al-fuṣṣa*), the particle *law* is not employed in connective syllogisms.”⁸²

The first noteworthy point in Hādīmī's argument is that the initial evidence presented under option (a)—wherein he asserts the absence of a syllogism—does not deny the syllogism in absolute terms, but specifically whether the verse exhibits the form of a connective syllogism. It follows that the issue lies not with the existence of a syllogism in general, but specifically with the presence of a connective one. For it is only within a connective syllogism that “making-hear” would serve as the middle term, linking “Allah Almighty's discernment of good” with “turning away.” By contrast, if a repetitive syllogism were present, such issues would not arise; a repetitive syllogism does not feature a formal structure that links two propositions in the conclusion in that specific manner.

Setting aside minor textual variations, the view attributed by al-Gelenbevī to the critical scholars is found in al-Taftāzānī's *Muṭawwal*.⁸³ Hādīmī himself, after all, notes that the evidence in question was employed by al-Taftāzānī.⁸⁴ According to this perspective, every inquiry and response predicated on the acceptance of a syllogism is fundamentally misguided.⁸⁵ It follows that the existence of a syllogism that fails to meet its formal requirements within the Word of Allah Almighty is impossible. Furthermore, such a faulty structure is devoid of any functional utility; a syllogism, by its very nature, is constructed solely to derive a conclusion.⁸⁶ Should it fail to fulfill its necessary conditions, it yields neither a conclusion nor any discernible benefit.

82 Bekiroğlu, “Hādīmī'nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 104.

83 al-Taftāzānī, *Muṭawwal*, 337.

84 Bekiroğlu, “Hādīmī'nin Enfāl Suresinin 23. Ayetini Tefsiri”, 105.

85 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 94.

86 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 94.

According to al-Gelenbevi, the employment of the particle *law* within a connective syllogism is not considered eloquent (*al-lughā al-fuṣṣhā*). In eloquent usage, the particle *law* is strictly reserved for a repetitive syllogism wherein the contradictory of the consequent is excluded. As an illustration of this idiomatic application, al-Gelenbevi adduces the verse: "Had there been within them gods besides Allah, they both would have been corrupted" (21:22). In accordance with the usage, the repetitive syllogistic form of this verse is structured as follows:

i) Minor Premise: If there were gods besides Allah in the heavens and the earth, they both would have been corrupted.

ii) Major Premise: But they have not been corrupted.

iii) Conclusion: Therefore, there are no gods besides Allah in them.

Within the verse, only premise (i) of the syllogism is explicitly stated. On the other hand, the linguistic application of the particle *law* necessitates the presence of both (ii) and (iii). As has been noted, *law* is a particle that signifies the impossibility of one thing because of the impossibility of another. Due to the ubiquitous nature of this usage, the contradictory of the consequent—that is, (ii)—is not mentioned as a distinct component. *Law*, after all, necessitates a repetitive syllogism where the contradictory of the consequent is excluded. Thus, both the contradictory of the consequent and the contradictory of the antecedent are indicated precisely through the employment of the particle *law*.

In this light, in Anfāl 23, the particle *law* signifies a repetitive syllogism in which the contradictory of the consequent is excluded, perfectly aligning with its usage in eloquent language:

(s3) Minor Premise: If Allah Almighty had known any good in them, He certainly would have made them hear.

(k3) Major Premise: But He did not make them hear.

(n3) Conclusion: Therefore, Allah Almighty did not know any good in them.

The second proposition in the verse, (k), should be treated as a discrete utterance, independent of (s). In this case, the *wāw* at the beginning of (k) must be regarded as a *wāw al-istīnāf* (the particle of beginning); in other words, a new sentence commences from this point. As reported by al-Gelenbevi, those who decouple (s) and (k)

by maintaining that the particle *law* in (s) denotes a separate repetitive syllogism in its eloquent sense attribute to the *law* in (k) the same nuance found in the *mawqūf* hadith: “Had he not feared Allah, he would not have disobeyed Him” (*law lam yakhaf Allāha lam yaʿshih*).⁸⁷ In this context, the premise would mean the following:

(k₃) Even if hearing were granted to them, they would have turned away regardless; failing that hearing, they shall all the more surely turn away.

At this juncture, al-Gelenbevi emphasizes that the response provided by the critical scholars constitutes nothing more than an additional answer predicated on the rejection of the syllogism. In fact, it is specifically the postulation of a connective syllogism that is being dismissed as the source of the issue. On the other hand, al-Gelenbevi notes that this very response is itself susceptible to further critical scrutiny.

While the response derived from the semantic functions of the particle *law* effectively precludes an actual (*bi-l-fiʿl*) syllogism by decoupling the two sentences, it provides no safeguard against a potential (*bi-l-quwwa*) syllogism that may be constructed from these propositions. Given the existence of two distinct conditional propositions—namely, (s₃) and (k)—it remains possible to argue that evaluating them in tandem allows for the formation of a new syllogism that results in an impossible conclusion.⁸⁸ Effectively, al-Gelenbevi maintains that the critical scholars’ resolution amounts to nothing more than a deferral of the underlying problem.

At this juncture, the following objection may be raised against al-Gelenbevi: the specified semantic function of the particle *law* inherently serves as a barrier even to the formation of a potential syllogism. After all, the particle *law* is employed in its eloquent sense within (s), whereas in (k), it carries the specific nuance found in the *mawqūf* hadith. Under these circumstances, although (s) exists in isolation as an explicitly uttered statement, it ultimately necessitates a repetitive syllogism. As for the repetitive syllogism necessitated by (s), it is incapable of constituting a new syllogism in conjunction with (k). This is because the repetitive syllogism of (s) yields the conclusion (n₃): “Allah Almighty did not know any good in them.” By contrast, proposition (k) lacks any middle term that could establish a logical bridge with the new proposition (n₃). It follows that, in view of the specified meanings of the particle *law*, (s) and (k) fail to constitute a syllogism, even in potency.

87 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fi qawlihi*, 94.

88 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fi qawlihi*, 94.

However, this objection is not well-founded. Because although the chosen meaning of the particle *law* necessitates a repetitive syllogism, proposition (s)—serving as the minor premise of this repetitive syllogism—exists independently of the syllogism itself in its capacity as a premise. In its status as a premise within that framework, (s) can be utilized in a second syllogism, independent of the conclusion it necessitates and, as al-Gelenbevi specifies, thereby giving rise to a potential syllogism. After all, (s) and (k) continue to exist as two separate contents. It follows that if these two propositions are rendered as premises to construct a syllogism, the objection will inevitably resurface.

At this point, al-Gelenbevi asserts that the resolution presented by the critical scholars shifts the difficulty from formal structure (*ṣūra*) to material content (*mādda*).⁸⁹ To put it another way, once the specific meanings of the particle *law* are established, no issue remains regarding the formal validity of the repetitive syllogism. From this point forward, the discourse proceeds exclusively on the plane of content. In al-Gelenbevi's view, even if the particle *law* is understood in these designated senses, it remains inevitable that one of the two conditional propositions is false. Since the formal structure is valid and the conclusion is a necessary consequence of the premises, it is impossible for both premises to be true simultaneously; were both the content and the structure sound, the conclusion would necessarily hold true. It follows that the verse remains subject to various inquiries.

Here, al-Gelenbevi elevates the discourse by evaluating an objection raised by al-Taftāzānī. Al-Taftāzānī contends that the meaning of the particle *law* in (k) cannot be equated with the nuance found in the *mawqūf* hadith. His argument rests on the premise that “turning away” denotes a refusal to submit, an act that is only conceivable subsequent to hearing.⁹⁰ Yet, if the aforementioned interpretation of *law* were adopted, the proposition would imply: “While these people turned away in the event of being made to hear, they would all the more certainly turn away in the absence of hearing.” In this light, because hearing is not present within the scope of the proposition, “turning away” is rendered impossible.

89 al-Gelenbevi, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 95.

90 al-Taftāzānī, *Mutawwal*, 334.

Al-Gelenbevī states that the validity of this objection is contingent upon the specific interpretation of “making-hear” mentioned previously. If “making-hear” is understood as the absolute imposition of obligation, the objection is indeed pertinent.⁹¹ After all, without this hearing—that is, the *taklīf*—the act of turning away remains impossible. In this context, al-Gelenbevī raises a counter-argument. He posits that an alternative meaning for “making-hear” is viable: “perfect hearing (*al-ismā‘ al-tāmm*),” defined as subjecting one to divine command in a manner that facilitates the apprehension of the truth.⁹²

To demonstrate that “making-hear” signifies “perfect hearing,” al-Gelenbevī focuses on the consequent of (s). On this basis, hearing, in its absolute sense, cannot be understood as the mere imposition of obligation.⁹³ After all, hearing in this sense applies universally to everyone rather than being exclusive to those in whom good is known. Furthermore, interpreting hearing as absolute obligation would give rise to another complication: under such an interpretation, the particle *law* could not, in its eloquent usage, be placed at the beginning of the proposition.⁹⁴

(s3) If Allah Almighty had known any good in them, He certainly would have made them subject to absolute obligation.

(k3) But He did not make them subject to absolute obligation.

(n3) Therefore, He did not know any good in them.

However, if *law* were to be placed at the beginning with this interpretation, would it be possible for obligation to be established for anyone? Al-Gelenbevī answers this question in the negative. After all, in this sense, *law* would necessitate the contradictory of the consequent—the absence of hearing—meaning a total lack of absolute obligation. This conclusion is patently false; after all, these individuals are indeed subject to obligation in the absolute sense. In this light, the hearing mentioned in the first proposition must be understood as perfect hearing. Similarly, al-Gelenbevī maintains that the hearing in (k) does not signify absolute obligation; the most probable meaning, in his view, is perfect hearing.

91 al-Taftāzānī, *Mutawwal*, 334.

92 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 95.

93 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 95.

94 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihi*, 95.

At this point, al-Gelenbevī addresses a highly critical objection that could be directed toward him. In his view, this perspective constituted another method of rejecting the existence of a connective syllogism. However, should both instances of “making-hear” be interpreted identically, the groundwork for a syllogism would be laid. Al-Gelenbevī clarifies that the validity of this response is predicated upon the assumption that rejecting the existence of a syllogism does not inherently require the two instances of “hearing” to carry distinct meanings.⁹⁵ Put differently, the simple repetition of “hearing”—acting as the putative middle term—is insufficient to confirm the presence of a formal syllogism. In this case, the verse shall signify the following:

Had Allah Almighty known any good in them, He would have granted them perfect hearing. Even had He granted them perfect hearing, they would have turned away out of their stubbornness and arrogance; in the absence of such hearing, their turning away is established *a fortiori*. After all, in this state, they have failed to apprehend the truth.

Finally, al-Gelenbevī relates an objection raised by a group of critical scholars. This group addresses al-Taftāzānī's contention that if the *law* in (k) carries the nuance of the *mawqūf* hadith, both hearing and turning away would be rendered impossible. They argue that the expression *tawallā* (turning away) in the verse does not denote a turning away that is functionally dependent on hearing. In fact, the subsequent portion of the verse explicitly states that these people are “turning away” (*wa-hum mu'ridūn*). For this group, the essence of *tawallā* lies in the failure to derive benefit from the act of making them hear.⁹⁶ Such a failure is not intrinsically linked to the act of hearing itself; even in the case of perfect hearing, a person may fail to benefit. It follows that their failure to benefit from an incomplete hearing is established *a fortiori*.

Al-Gelenbevī specifies that the qualifying clause introduced by the *wāw al-ḥālīyya* describes the state of the subject (*fā'il*) of the verb “turned away” (*tawallaw*). On this basis, the objection raised by the critical scholars carries no weight.⁹⁷ After

95 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihī*, 95.

96 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihī*, 96.

97 al-Gelenbevī, *Risāla fī qawlihī*, 96.

all, these subjects must be understood as failing to derive benefit while in a state of having already turned away. It follows that the act of turning away retains its function within the syllogistic structure. In this context, al-Gelenbevī underscores that al-Taftāzānī’s objection can only be effectively averted through the specific method he previously established.

Conclusion

Throughout history, diverse perspectives have emerged regarding whether logic constitutes a decisive methodology within the Islamic sciences. While certain scholars have argued that logic plays a pivotal role in fields such as exegesis (*tafsīr*), theology (*kalām*), and jurisprudence (*fiqh*), others have maintained a more distant, or even adversarial, posture. Over time, however, the prevailing attitude toward logic shifted toward a notably more positive orientation. Regarded by al-Ghazālī as the “criterion of the sciences” (*mi’yār al-‘ulūm*), logic established the standards for intellectual inquiry across other disciplines and became the ultimate benchmark for validity. One of the prominent figures to adopt this approach was Ismā‘īl Gelenbevī, the focus of this study. In his exegesis of Sūrat al-Anfāl 23, al-Gelenbevī utilized logic as a rigorous methodology; moreover, he addressed potential objections through the framework of logical principles. In doing so, he demonstrated how logical rules can be effectively deployed not only in the broader field of exegesis but specifically within the domain of *Mushkil al-Qur’ān*.

In this study, the scope is not confined exclusively to al-Gelenbevī’s *Risāla*; it also incorporates the works of pivotal figures such as Hādīmī, al-Taftāzānī, and Ibn Hishām. This comparative framework has made it possible to examine and evaluate the intellectual predecessors who likely served as sources for al-Gelenbevī, both in terms of the proposed resolutions to the problems posed by the verse and the counter-arguments directed toward those resolutions. This comparative analysis reveals that while Hādīmī’s treatise offers a significantly broader range of responses than that of al-Gelenbevī, al-Gelenbevī effectively advances the existing discourse, providing original and novel contributions to the literature.

Through the case of al-Gelenbevī’s *Risāla*, I have illustrated how logic can be effectively deployed as a methodology in the fields of *tafsīr* and *Mushkil al-Qur’ān*. Additionally, the fact that Hādīmī and al-Gelenbevī—a master and a student—pro-

duced works reflecting a similar approach to the same verse remains a striking point of interest. This similarity necessitates an inquiry into the broader attitude of the Ottoman *'ilmīyya* toward the logic-exegesis relationship: did these two figures maintain an exceptional posture, or were they indicative of a more pervasive scholarly consensus? It is thus of paramount importance to investigate the Ottoman commentary and gloss (*sharḥ-ḥāshiya*) literature, alongside independent verse and *sūra* commentaries, to delineate the specific role accorded to logic in the hermeneutics of divine discourse.

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