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Al-Fārābī (d. c. 950) was the first Muslim philosopher to introduce the demonstration (burhān) theory, which constitutes the base of Aristotelian logic and is the most distinctive characteristic of Peripatetic philosophy, into Islamic thought. He compiled his Kitāb al-Burhān, which played a role determining the course of many discussions in Islamic philosophy, with reference to Aristotle’s (d. 322 BCE) Posterior Analytics. Ali Tekin’s Varlık ve Akıl: Aristoteles ve Fārābî’de Burhân Teorisi, which analyzes Aristotle and al-Fārābī’s theories of demonstration, is remarkable in terms of its detailed comparison of these two philosophers’ thoughts on such an important matter.

Tekin’s four-chapter work is framed by such questions like how does al-Fārābī’s Burhān differ from prior books about this theory written in Greek, Syriac, Arabic and Latin; whether it is a commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics; and to what extent al-Fārābī introduced this theory into his philosophical system. The author devotes the first chapter to the place of Posterior Analytics in the Peripatetic tradition, commentaries written on this book, and al-Fārābī’s works on it. The following two chapters describe Aristotle and al-Fārābī’s theories of demonstration, respectively, and their subtitles have been designed with regard to the classification they used in their books. The last chapter evaluates the two philosophers’ demonstration theories from various aspects and tries to determine the theory’s place and importance in al-Fārābī’s philosophy.

In the first chapter, “The Place of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Kitāb al-Burhān) in the Peripatetic Tradition, Its Commentaries and Fārābī’s Works of Posterior Analytics,” Tekin presents the place of this work in the tradition first by referring to Aristotle’s interpretation and then to those of such Aristotelian

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philosophers as Alexander of Aphrodisias (d. ca. 200), John Philoponus (d. 570),
al-Fārābī, Avicenna (d. 428/1037), Averroes (d. 595/1198), and Maimonides (d. 601/1204). He eventually declares that apart from some minor details, most of
these authors agree that demonstration is the focal point of the Peripatetic system
of logic and philosophy and that all other works of logic are just a preliminary to
the Burhān. While books on logic preceding demonstration were forms of it, the
ones that came after it are guiding lights that one can use to distinguish between
scientific and non-scientific issues.

In the second chapter, “Aristotle’s Demonstration Theory,” Tekin briefly
introduces *Posterior Analytics* within the contexts of its title, internal order,
classical translations, and its Greek editions. He also mentions its Greek, Syriac,
Arabic, Latin, and English commentaries, as well as introduces al-Fārābī’s works
on *Posterior Analytics* and the publishing, commentaries, and annotations
written on *Kitāb al-Burhān*. In addition to its detailed description of Aristotle’s
*Posterior Analytics*, the first two subchapters, “Demonstration and Introduction to
Definition” and “Demonstration,” respectively, discuss the definition of Burhān;
demonstrative analogy and its parts; the essentiality of its premises; subjects,
principles, and questions of sciences; the demonstration of existence; causal and
absolute demonstration; demonstrations in terms of superiority; the process of
demonstration, presumption, ignorance, and fallacy; the division of the sciences;
and the demonstration, demonstrativeness, and certainty in sciences. The third
subchapter comprises the definition of definition; the structure of definition; the
definition-demonstration relationship and demonstration as a method of obtaining
a definition; the evaluation of these methods; undefinables; and uniqueness and
variability of definition. This chapter seeks to describe the subjects in the book
of demonstration based not only on Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*, but also on his
other works of logic.

The third chapter, “Demonstration Theory of al-Fārābī,” deals with subjects
like an introduction to the theory of knowledge, science, and scientific discussion
that constitutes al-Fārābī’s *Kitāb al-Burhān*; merits and classes of merits; settings
of demonstration, definition, and sciences; and the way of demonstrative speaking.
Tekin structures each subchapter according to the order found al-Fārābī’s *Kitāb
al-Burhān* and presents the subjects descriptively by providing as much evidence
as possible, mostly from his *al-Khaṭābah*, *Kitāb al-Jadal*, *Kitāb al-Qiyās*, *Kitāb al-
Amkinat al-Mughallīṭah*, *al-Tawṭiḥ*, *al-Madkhal*, *al-Alfāẓ al-Musta’malah fi al-
Manṭiq*, and other books.
In the fourth and final chapter, “Contributions of al-Fārābī to Demonstration Theory,” Tekin first of all includes the philosopher’s reception of Aristotle, brief summaries of their books of demonstration, and a comparison of these two books. He then analyzes the place of the theory, according to al-Fārābī, in logic, philosophy, the history of thought, the virtuous society, and the virtuous religion. This is the study’s most remarkable chapter in terms of its contributions to the history of logic literature. However, the author moves away from the description and discusses al-Fārābī’s contributions to the theory of demonstration from different perspectives on the ground that a more detailed comparison is impossible within the limits of the study. He thus contents himself with only demonstrating the comparison of the contents of Kitāb al-Burhān and how al-Fārābī applied the demonstration theory to logic and philosophy.

According to Tekin, the difference in these two demonstration texts’ textual structure, internal order, thematic hierarchy, and divisions is revealed when they are subjected to a comparison from these perspectives. While Aristotle’s work is composed of two articles, “Demonstration” and “Definition,” respectively, al-Fārābī’s work includes five chapters. In Tekin’s opinion, however, the latter book’s first chapter serves as an introduction to the second and third chapters, “Demonstration” and “Definition,” respectively. In the last two chapters – which are not included in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics – of “Establishment of Sciences” and “Method of Demonstrative Speaking,” Tekin suggests that most of the terminologies and some subjects used in these chapters are dispersed throughout Aristotle’s works. He also maintains that al-Fārābī reconstructed these subjects by a deep understanding of Aristotle’s work and developing his theory. At this point, even though he suggests that al-Fārābī internalizes knowledge theory in Aristotle’s demonstration theory and constructs and then elaborates a theory of knowledge in the fourth chapter, Tekin does not seem to think that the philosopher preferred to support his claim by referring to related subjects and chapters.

As for the comparison of the texts in terms of their subjects, Tekin limits himself to providing the head numbers of those subjects that are found in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics but not (or only partly) found in al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Burhān. However, he does emphasize al-Fārābī’s contributions to Aristotle’s theory, which are more important within this context, and elaborates on subjects found in al-Fārābī but not in Aristotle. Accordingly, even though some matters presented in the Kitāb al-Burhān’s first chapter are also implicitly found in Aristotle, this chapter essentially belongs to al-Fārābī.
The second chapter broadly comprises matters that are dispersed in Aristotle’s work; however, some of the matters al-Fārābī includes here (e.g., personal predicates and necessities, conditional premises, and the theory relating to how those parts of demonstration that are arranged in the first figure’s first adjustment can be compiled with eight degrees and nine adjustments) are not included in Aristotle. Yet again, in the chapter of definition, instructions on how to obtain a definition from the demonstration of existence and, in the case of the emergence of a middle term, from causes apart from appearance in the form of absolute demonstration, are included in al-Fārābī but not in Aristotle. As a result, according to Tekin, al-Fārābī essentially remained faithful to Aristotle’s demonstration theory but improved and regenerated it within the scientific conditions of his era by adding and dropping some of the contextual issues.

Al-Fārābī only dissents from Aristotle’s thought when it comes to induction. Aristotle contends that induction is a process that begins with sensation and involves experience, whereas al-Fārābī distinguishes experience from induction as, according to him, necessary and certain judgment cannot be obtained from experience. Yet induction contains no specific action of reason with regard to things obtained from sensation and carried to the mind. But in experience, the specific action of reason is highly involved until certainty about the thing obtained from sensation and carried to mind comes into existence. Therefore, while things obtained from experience could be the first principles in demonstrations, things obtained from induction cannot be the first principles of demonstrations.

In the last chapter, Tekin seeks to show the essence of al-Fārābī’s application of the demonstration theory to logic and philosophy as well as its place in the philosopher’s system of thought. Here, he also expresses his view that al-Fārābī made this theory more visible in the science of logic, that he applied it from different aspects, and that he clearly correlated it with the subjects of demonstration theory (e.g., the five universals, categories, propositions, and analogy). Finally, the author emphasizes the meaning of al-Fārābī’s positioning the demonstration theory as the basis of the virtuous society and virtuous nation theories. According to al-Fārābī, a religion that relies on the demonstrative philosophy is a virtuous religion, whereas one that relies on disputative and sophisticated philosophy is not. Along with satisfactory explanations about the relation of the virtuous society and virtuous nation theories with the demonstration theory, some conclusions of the philosopher’s positioning of the latter to the basis of logic and philosophy need further consideration.
Tekin’s book stands in the breach of the demonstration theory, which is the knowledge and science doctrine of Peripatetic philosophy. To date, the number of studies in Turkish and other languages on this topic remains inadequate. The present study is remarkable in terms of analyzing the demonstration theory with regard to Aristotle and al-Fārābī and contributing to a better understanding of many subjects related to logic, principally this very theory, for the second and third chapters clearly explain many of its thorny subjects – explanations that are presented as a whole either with references to Aristotle and al-Fārābī or to commentators who dealt with the works of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes. Providing the ancient Greek equivalents of Arabic terms also allows the author to present al-Fārābī’s way of adapting ancient Greek terminology and enables the readers to follow the conceptual continuity. Therefore, Tekin’s book is both a guiding light for studies about demonstration and a reference guide of these studies. On the other hand, instead of presenting the two philosophers’ opinions simultaneously within the context of a certain problem, he describes their demonstration theories separately, which causes the book’s second and third chapters to occupy a high degree of independence from each other that, to a large extent, they could stand alone as separate works. Even though the fourth chapter partially compensates for this problem, it appears that no strong correlation has been established between them, which gives the second and third chapters’ introductory brief summaries the appearance of repetition.