The Ontology of Individualization in Avicenna in the Context of Identity and Differentiation

Abstract

Discussion of the issue of individuation in Avicenna’s philosophy seeks an answer to the question of how individuation can be explained ontologically in light of species-realization in individuals. The ontological aspect of individuation itself has two facets. One of them is what makes the individuals of a given species identical to themselves. The other pertains to what truly distinguishes the individuals of the species from each other. Just as answering for the self alone does not yield dissociation, the dissociation of individuals does not answer the question about their selves. Prior to Avicenna, the explanation of individuals’ selfhood was interpreted in the context of Aristotle’s philosophy and discussions were conducted on whether it is matter or form that gives selfhood. The differentiation of individuals from each other was handled on the sensory plane through the field of properties. The main claim of this article is that Avicenna developed a unique approach with his theory of quiddity that encompasses both aspects of individuation. With this theory, Avicenna explains the self-identity of the individual with “the existence of quiddity-in-itself specific to that individual” and thus creates the necessary ground for a field of properties that will make it possible for the individual to be differentiated from other individuals of the species. The differentiation of individuals is answered through the field of properties that can be “pointed to” as a result of sensory perception. Among these features, position (waḍʿ) and place (ayn) come to the fore in terms of being considered primordial. In order to justify this claim, the theory of quiddity-in-itself, which underlies Avicenna’s original approach to the issue of individuation, and the structure of the properties that emerge depending on secondary dispositions (istiʿdād) will be revealed. In this way, it will be argued that quiddity-in-itself provides the substantial unity that will save the object from being a mass of properties, and that first position and place, and then other sensible properties give the distinctive individual structure on the basis of the idea of istiʿdād. In this way, the article will argue that Avicenna develops an integrated ontology of individuation in terms of quiddity and istiʿdād theories.

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