Abstract
One of the basic questions of the classical theory of soul is the theory of internal senses,
which received its most elaborate form under Avicenna. While he effectively revised this theory, which he
inherited as it was laid out, he expounded upon it according to his own philosophical inclinations, thereby
making significant additions on intricate matters like the number and appellation of the internal senses by
introducing new distinctions and classifications. Over time, Avicenna’s novel framework concerning the
theory drew several criticisms by his successors. An important critique was leveled by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.
The first point of al-Rāzī’s contestation was his critique of the arguments for the existence of each internal
sense as a separate faculty. Al-Rāzī supposed that the soul could perceive all objects of perception without
recourse to independent faculties, each of which was designed for a separate function. Second, he criticized
the narrative that plotted the brain for internal senses. While this critique comprises the main subject
of this study, it will also try to clarify those of its aspects that are related to greater epistemological and
psychological questions, like the nature of the soul, the character of the soul-body relation and interaction,
the nature of perception, the degrees of abstraction, the relation of the soul with the particulars, and its
bearing on them.
Keywords
Avicenna Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī perception abstraction the critique of internal senses internal sensations the soul-body relationShare
Details
- Authors: M. Zahit Tiryaki, Assist. Prof., Istanbul Medeniyet University
- DOI: dx.doi.org/10.12658/Nazariyat.4.2.M0051en
- Year: 2018 (May) / Volume: 4 / Issue: 2
- Page: 75-118
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