Abstract
The present paper aims to explore the medieval philosopher Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s (d. pre-
560 AH/1164-5) position concerning the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will and argues
Abū al-Barakāt to have considered the argument for compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human
free will to be invalid. One can defend either divine foreknowledge or human free will; no other solution is
available. By examining his accounts on this issue through the logic and metaphysics of his book al-Muʿtabar
fi-l-ḥikma, Abū al-Barakāt defense of human free will shall become evident.
Keywords
Foreknowledge free will volition future contingency determination predestinationShare
Details
- Authors: Mariam Shehata, Ph. D. Candidate, SOAS University of London
- DOI: dx.doi.org/10.12658/Nazariyat.6.2.M0115en
- Year: 2020 (November) / Volume: 6 / Issue: 2
- Page: 99-131
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