Abstract
In al-Mawāqif, ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī argues that the concepts of necessity, contingency, and non-contingency
examined in kalām’s umūr al-‘āmma are not the necessity, contingency, and non-contingency examined in logic’s
modal propositions. The commentators and super-commentators (muḥashshīs) of al-Mawāqif such as al-Sayf al-Dīn
al-Abharī, al-Jurjānī, Ḥasan Çelebi, the famous super-commentators of the Tajrīd tradition, and the author of Sharḥ
al-Maqāṣid, al-Taftāzānī, criticize al-Ījī›s claim. ‘Alī Qūshjī agrees with the critics and, especially, rephrases some of al-
Taftāzānī’s sentences in Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid. In the first half of the article, I provide a systematic presentation of these
criticisms in chronological order. In the second half, I demonstrate the claim that these formally valid criticisms
are not accurate in fact by drawing attention to the implications and consequences of the distinctions between
existence-essence and necessary-contingent. Scholars of the later period criticize al-Ījī almost unanimously. This is
because the scholars of the mutakahkhirūn period had not renewed the definition of the concept of thubūt, which
radically diverged from the concept of existence after the distinctions between existence-essence and necessary-
contingent, even though they had used it in its new sense. For this reason, it is more accurate to understand al-Ījī›s
statement as a warning that expresses the aforementioned mindset of the new era and reveals the new character
of ontological research.
Keywords
Varlık Zorunluluk İmkân İmkânsızlık Kipler Ali Kuşçu ÎcîShare
Details
- Authors: Ömer Türker, Prof., Marmara University
- DOI: dx.doi.org/10.12658/Nazariyat.10.2.M0246en
- Page: 1-19
- Other Languages:
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Türkçe
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