Abstract
In this article, the nineteenth section of Khojazāda’s (d. 893/1488) Tahāfut, which was devoted
to the problem of causality in an example of the works under the same title written during the fifteenth
century and composed with the patronage of the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (d. 886/1481), is subjected
to a critical analysis. His discussion follows a critical course with respect to al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) in
context. This could be detected most clearly in his vindication of Avicenna (d. 428/1037) against al-Ghazālī’s
accusation of the philosophers’ denial of miracles. Moreover, Khojazāda’s discussion has certain differences
with al-Ghazālī’s at both the conceptual and the argumentative levels. The most striking differences at the
argumentative level is Khojazāda’s grounding of his own conception of revelation and miracles on Avicennia’s,
rather than al-Ghazālī’s, theory of prophethood. By the same token, he offered a practical response to the
imputation that the Avicennian system leaves no room for the possibility of miracles. At the conceptual
level, furthermore, he distinguished between complete and incomplete causes, in contradistinction with
al-Ghazālī, and thereby opened another ground in order to demonstrate the inability of those natures that
he viewed as incomplete causes to produce their own effects. On the other hand, Khojazāda concurs with
al-Ghazālī that causality did not presume an ontological necessity, yet this condition did not incur defects
on the certainty of our knowledge.
Keywords
Ottoman thought Tahāfut genre causality Khojazāda al-Ghazālī AvicennaShare
Details
- Authors: Muhammet Fatih Kılıç, Assist. Prof., Mardin Artuklu University
- DOI: dx.doi.org/10.12658/Nazariyat.3.1.M0033en
- Year: 2016 (November) / Volume: 3 / Issue: 1
- Page: 43-76
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