Article

The Emergence of the Distinction between Complete and Incomplete Causes from Avicenna to al-Abharı

Abstract

In this study, I explore the historical stages of the development of the distinction between
complete and incomplete causes (al-ʿilla al-tāmma and al-ʿilla al-nāqiṣa), which first emerged during the
thirteenth century and was frequently in use thereafter in philosophical and theological writings. For this
purpose, I trace the evolution of one such passage in Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) Ishārāt, namely, III.V.8,
in the context of causal sufficiency during post-classical Islamic thought. Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d.
547/1152), Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), all of whom provided the
first examples of a concept of a complete cause, offer an important notion of this distinction. Moreover,
we can read al-Rāzī’s definition of a complete cause in his al-Maṭālib, with regard to its function, as an
attempt to include the divine will in the causal processes. However, none of those definitions present a
clear distinction between these two types of causes that would enable one to provide a clear definition
for a complete cause. The first examples of a clear distinction between these two causes are provided by
Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1265) and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1277). This distinction occupied an
essential place in the chapters of causality included within philosophical and theological texts written after
the thirteenth century.

Keywords

Causality distinction between complete and incomplete causes Avicenna Abū al-Barakāt al- Baghdādī Suhrawardī Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī