Abstract
In this study, I explore the historical stages of the development of the distinction between
complete and incomplete causes (al-ʿilla al-tāmma and al-ʿilla al-nāqiṣa), which first emerged during the
thirteenth century and was frequently in use thereafter in philosophical and theological writings. For this
purpose, I trace the evolution of one such passage in Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) Ishārāt, namely, III.V.8,
in the context of causal sufficiency during post-classical Islamic thought. Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d.
547/1152), Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), all of whom provided the
first examples of a concept of a complete cause, offer an important notion of this distinction. Moreover,
we can read al-Rāzī’s definition of a complete cause in his al-Maṭālib, with regard to its function, as an
attempt to include the divine will in the causal processes. However, none of those definitions present a
clear distinction between these two types of causes that would enable one to provide a clear definition
for a complete cause. The first examples of a clear distinction between these two causes are provided by
Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1265) and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1277). This distinction occupied an
essential place in the chapters of causality included within philosophical and theological texts written after
the thirteenth century.